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SUMMARY 
 
The main objective of this dissertation is to develop, validate and evaluate an error 
management taxonomy to be used in the analysis of error events in the area of Air Traffic 
Management (ATM). The goal of the taxonomy is to be able to analyse the mechanisms 
behind human errors and their recovery. Currently an abundance of taxonomies exist to 
describe the mechanisms behind human errors whereas very little is known about the 
mechanisms underlying error detection and recovery. This is unfortunate since timely and 
effective interventions can often prohibit errors from having serious consequences on 
system safety. The goal of the present Ph.D. project is therefore to gain more knowledge 
about how errors are captured. One of the desired outcomes of this project is to provide a 
basis for reinforcing incident prevention strategies. To do so, it is important to have a 
structured classification scheme (a taxonomy) in which operational data about the 
production, detection and recovery of human errors can be categorised including the 
underlying circumstances behind these human errors and their capture.  
 
The report is divided into four parts: 
 
Part one – Background. The first part elaborates on the importance of human error and 
error management in the area of in ATM as well as some generic requirements to an error 
management taxonomy. For readers who are not so familiar with the domain of air traffic 
control a brief description of the ATM system is provided. 
 
Part two – Literature review. In the second part a literature review is carried out to 
determine which categories should be included in the error management taxonomy. The 
focus is on taxonomies associated with human error as well as on human performance 
issues occurring both before and after errors. Before the occurrence of an error the focus 
is, in particular, on the issue of threat management which concerns how operational 
factors that have the potential of leading to errors and jeopardising safety are controlled. 
In relation to the phase after the occurrence of an error there are, in particular, four main 
issues that will be explored: who was involved in the detection and recovery of the error 
and/or its consequences; when was the error or its consequences detected; how was the 
error and/or its consequences detected and corrected; and finally what was the 
behavioural response and outcome? In addition, it should be possible to also give an 
answer to the why-question – namely why did the error occur and why was it successfully 
or unsuccessfully managed? This can be determined on the basis of so-called 
Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) that can be seen as contextual factors that can have 
a positive or negative influence on the course of events.  
 
Part three – Construction of the taxonomy. In the third part the error management 
framework will be described. It has been developed on the basis of the literature review 
and it has been further refined and tested on the basis of incident reports, critical incident 
interviews and simulator studies (the results of which will be described extensively in 
part four). The framework is organised around an error management model. It consists of 
two main components: The core of the framework is developed on the basis of the 
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literature review of error and error management taxonomies. The list of contextual factors 
is developed on the basis of the review of the Performance Shaping Factors. 
 
Part four – Validation. Finally, the utility of the error recovery framework in relation to 
error management analyses will be explored. For this purpose the framework has been 
evaluated on the basis of different kinds of data material. First, the framework has been 
applied to error events found in critical incidents (both Swedish CAA incident reports 
and critical events elicited through the critical incident technique) and in a simulator 
study. On this basis it has been possible to obtain knowledge about the extent to which 
consistent classifications can be obtained (both across time and raters) and, furthermore, 
to explore the chances of discovering patterns that can yield insight into these different 
kinds of data material. Second, the framework has been evaluated by a series of human 
factors experts who have been involved in research that is highly relevant in relation to 
the current project. In this manner it has been possible to get a both qualitative and 
quantitative evaluation of the framework.  
 
The results aimed at applying the framework indicate that it is both possible to achieve 
fairly robust analyses on the basis of the framework and that the framework could verify 
results from other studies as well as provide new insights. Furthermore, the results from 
the questionnaire revealed that the experts found the framework highly relevant in 
relation to the study of error management. In sum, the results obtained from the four 
studies provided support for the notion that the framework could be of use in future error 
management studies. In particular the framework could be useful in relation to analysing 
the effects of various ATM safety initiatives, be they changes in system design, operating 
procedures or training of personnel. 
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BACKGROUND 
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1 Introduction 
 
One of the most well known accidents in the aviation history is the Everglades 
accident in 1972. The accident occurred at a time where the pilots were 
engaged in solving a problem in the cockpit in relation to a landing gear 
warning light (Wickens et al., 1997). Unfortunately one of the pilots had 
inadvertently disengaged the auto-pilot by touching the steering column and 
as a consequence of this the aircraft was descending. The pilots did not 
discover this because they were so preoccupied with the indicator in the 
cockpit. On the ground the controller could see on the radar that the aircraft 
was descending and therefore called the aircraft and asked: “How are things 
going out there?” The pilot thought the ATCO was referring to the problem 
with the indicator and therefore answered that they were doing fine. Moments 
later the aircraft it crashed into the Everglades swamp. Clearly, the chain of 
events leading to the accident was initiated by errors made by the pilots. 
First, by inadvertently touching the steering column and, second, by getting 
fixated on the single problem and not distributing their attention in an 
appropriate manner. In spite of this it seems in retrospect evident that the 
ATCO could most likely have played an active role in the recovery by making 
a more explicit communication with the pilots. 
 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) has been a relatively high reliability system for some 
time. Even though air traffic controllers (ATCOs) every day are in many facilities 
required to handle a large quantity of aircraft very rarely do ATM related accidents – 
such as the one described above - occur. Irrespective of the impressive safety record of 
ATM many studies from a number of different safety critical areas - such as aviation, 
process control and maritime operations - have shown that a majority of incidents and 
accidents involve human error. The current air traffic system is in some respects stretched 
to its capacity limits and the challenges to safety of the ATM system may increase in the 
near future due to the projected traffic level increases and the introduction of 
computerised and automated tools. These changes will have impact on the method of 
operation in ATM and may affect the types of errors, the error rates and the chances of 
recovery. As a consequence of this it is important to be able to learn from human error 
events to ensure that the current high-level of the safety of the system will not be 
compromised. 
 
Studies have shown that human errors have contributed to about 90% or more of ATM 
incidents (Kinney et al., 1977). A fundamental question then arises, namely why do these 
human errors happen? By simply stating that almost all incidents are related to human 
errors does not advance the understanding of the incident causation and thereby the 
chances of mitigating the causal sequence of events. Indeed, if the investigation of critical 
events in the area of ATM stops at the conclusion that it was caused by a controller error, 
little is achieved except finding a culprit for the adverse consequences. The chances of 
learning from the incidents and thereby understanding why they occurred have been 
 16
omitted and, just as important, we do not obtain knowledge about how many similar 
errors normally are prohibited from having consequences on the system safety. 
 
To minimise the risk of events that may compromise the safety of the air traffic it is 
important to develop error resistance strategies. Error resistance strategies can be divided 
into two main categories, namely error prevention and error correction (Lewis and 
Norman, 1986; Frese, 1991). Traditionally human error resistance strategies have mostly 
focused on error prevention. This focus is understandable since many studies of incidents 
and accidents in safety critical domains indicate that the underlying problem is often to be 
found in a combination of shortcomings of human performance in man-machine systems 
and the fact that most of such systems have been designed to be unforgiving to errors. An 
obvious solution to avoid such unwarranted consequences is to make initiatives to 
prevent the occurrence of human errors (e.g. through failsafe protection devices, 
automation and enhanced procedures). 
 
Safety strategies narrowly based on error prevention may not be successful for several 
reasons.  First of all, human errors will inevitably occur and it is impossible to anticipate 
which errors will occur in a specific task context. In particular errors that require insight 
into the higher underlying goals may be difficult to detect by automated detection devices 
(Brodbeck et al., 1993). Second, by focusing exclusively on avoiding various kinds of 
errors there is a risk of imposing excessive limitations on the performance which may 
compromise both effective and adaptive behaviour. Actually, it has been argued that the 
efficiency of error avoidance strategies has been exhausted in ultra-safe areas such as 
aviation and air traffic control, and that the end result of increased error suppression may 
in fact be counterproductive seen from a safety perspective (Amalberti, 2001). Thirdly, 
studies have shown that most errors are actually detected and recovered before leading to 
adverse consequences by either the perpetrator or colleagues (Amalberti & Wioland, 
1997). Since human errors are inherent to real life and people have powerful capabilities 
to control errors it is important to a larger extent to try to manage the manageable and to 
support people’s chances of detecting and recovering from errors. Consequently, error 
management should be considered an important supplementary safety goal. 
 
In spite of a growing interest in the field of error management the understanding of how 
errors are detected and recovered has failed to keep pace with the understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying human error. A possible explanation of the scarcity of studies of 
the error handling process in safety science may be found in the fact that error reduction 
has for a long time been considered the primary and most important means to achieve 
high reliability and safety. In other words: the "zero accident policy", which remains the 
ultimate safety goal, has been interpreted as the "zero error policy" (Wioland & 
Amalberti, 1996). The zero-error policy is not only problematic because it ignores the 
fact that there is a random aspect about human errors and some types of errors may be 
difficult to avoid (e.g. cognitive tunnel vision and confirmation bias). The problem is also 
that the zero-error policy underestimates or ignores the potentially positive value of errors 
(Senders & Moray, 1991; Frese & Van Dyck, 1996): 
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• Coping strategies. The result of an over-emphasis on error avoidance will be a 
reduced ability to cope and control error-induced problems. On the other hand, the 
more errors we make the better we get at dealing with them. Since errors can be 
upsetting and frustrating, experience with error situations can be important in relation 
to learning to deal effectively and rationality with such situations. That is, by having 
experienced similar error situations before the person will know how to correct the 
error quickly and, as a consequence, also be less upset when such situations arise. 
• Creative solutions. Error avoidance strategies will put limits on the range of 
behaviour that is possible and thereby reduce the chances of applying creative 
solutions to novel and unexpected problems. Such solutions might be important in 
relation to finding better ways of doing things. 
• Mental models. Experience with error situations may be beneficial in the development 
of an understanding of the dynamics of a system. Errors constitute an important 
feedback concerning what the person does not know yet and can therefore be used as 
a means to remove previous misconceptions. 
 
The increased scientific and practical interest in the field of error management has 
created an impetus for a new attitude towards human errors and towards the role of 
human operators in the control of complex systems. The traditional view of the human 
operator within the area of human reliability research has been that human operators are 
"intelligent but fragile" machines and, as a consequence, the role of the human actor 
should be minimised (e.g. through automation). A more positive attitude towards the 
human operator has gradually emerged as a result of recent research findings. These 
results have, among other things, revealed that human operators develop protections and 
defences against their own cognitive deficiencies (Amalberti & Wioland, 1997). In this 
manner the human operator plays a positive role in returning a system to a normal and 
safe state after the occurrence of an error. This positive role is, of course, not limited to 
the recovery of human errors, but also to technical failures. 
 
If error management should be considered an important safety strategy it should be 
possible to build safety barriers into man-machine systems based on error management. 
Actually, research has shown that recovery is more than sheer luck and coincidence (Van 
der Schaaf & Kanse, 2000). The results indicate that recovery is something that can be 
planned for and that the human operator can play a powerful role in relation to preventing 
small failures and errors from developing into actual system breakdowns. More 
specifically, several researchers have demonstrated how different human factors 
initiatives - such as training, design and organisational culture - can support the human 
recovery process. Some examples are provided below: 
 
1. Design. The chances of coping with errors in man-machine systems are dependent on 
several system factors and it is important that the system designs focus on mitigating 
the consequences of human error. Rasmussen (1984) has proposed that error recovery 
is critically dependent on the observability and reversibility of errors and their effects.  
Reversibility is within complex environments mainly dependent on system dynamics, 
but can be supported by system features such as equipment redundancy or by 
delaying the effect of executed actions. Observability, on the other hand, is dependent 
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on interface features (such as the visibility, the immediacy and the validity of 
feedback information) and the chances of perceiving mismatches between the 
expected and the actual systems state. The system is error tolerant if it is easy to 
observe erroneous actions and if they do not have immediate and irreversible effects 
(for example, in ATM mid-term and long-term conflict alerts can enhance the 
chances of an early recovery without any serious system consequences). By following 
these principles it should be possible to structure the environment to improve error 
detection and recovery. 
 
2. Training. It has been suggested that coping with errors may be an important part of 
acquiring skills and expertise in a specific domain (Seifert & Hutchins, 1994). 
Therefore, errors should not necessarily be viewed as something that should be 
avoided at any prize, but instead as an opportunity to develop professional problem 
solving abilities and the system should support coping with them to ensure low 
system output error. In fact, the most proficient problem solvers may not necessarily 
be those who commit fewer errors, but those who have the greatest abilities to recover 
from their errors (Allwood, 1984). Reinforcing the error handling capabilities may be 
achieved through training concepts such as error management training. In this training 
technique trainees are encouraged to have a positive attitude towards errors  (e.g. by 
simple heuristics such as “I have made an error. Great!”) and forced to make errors 
(e.g. by giving them problems that exceed their level of expertise) (Dormann & Frese, 
1994). Several human-computer-interaction studies (Dormann & Frese, 1994; 
Nordstrom et al., 1998) have demonstrated a higher after-training performance for 
trainees being exposed to the error management training compared with trainees 
being exposed to error avoidance training. The realisation of the potential benefit of 
error management training has also reached the aviation community. It has, for 
example, been suggested that to improve the error handling skills of teams and crews 
instructors and evaluators should change the focus from detecting and correcting 
errors to observing the crews' error resolution process (Tullo & Salmon, 1997). If it is 
successful it should be rewarded and, if not, efforts should be made to examine the 
error resolution process and how it can be improved.  
 
3. Organisational culture: Organisations may vary in relation to their error culture. At 
one extreme an organisation might aim at avoiding errors at all insofar as errors may 
be associated with grave consequences. This approach can have some negative side 
effects. If, for example, an organisation has a strong error prevention philosophy it 
will normally imply that errors are severely sanctioned which means that people will 
be unwilling to report errors. The result may be that the organisation misses a vital 
source of information in relation to learning from errors. Furthermore, a defensive 
attitude might be the result and many resources will be spent on covering up errors 
instead of benefiting from their potential learning value. On the other extreme, 
organisations associated with a high-level of error tolerance - entailing factors such as 
openness to errors, analysis of the errors committed and long-term learning - may 
instead benefit from errors. Such an approach may ultimately play a significant role 
for the success of an organisation insofar as empirical data supports the notion that 
organisations characterised by an error tolerant culture have a higher tendency to also 
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be associated with the highest level of performance, as measured by both subjective 
and objective performance scales (Van Dyck et al., 1999). As also supported by the 
above-described studies of error management training this could indicate that the way 
people perceive errors and handle them influences performance. It can also indicate 
that these organisations become better at implementing defences and barriers to avoid 
the negative consequences of human errors. 
 
As indicated by the previous paragraphs improvement in system safety in the area of 
ATM requires gaining systematic and detailed knowledge about the underlying 
mechanisms of not only error production but also error recovery. An important step in 
that direction is to explore whether existing error taxonomies, expanded with a 
classification scheme of how they were managed, can be applied to studies of human 
errors in ATM. Such a taxonomy can constitute a useful human factors tool in diagnosing 
underlying mechanisms behind human errors and their resolvement. The results can be 
useful in relation to analysing the effects of various ATM safety initiatives, be they 
changes in system design, operating procedures or training of personnel. 
 
The goal of this project is to develop a taxonomy to study human errors and their 
resolvement within the area of ATM. Important benefits may be associated with attempts 
to develop a coherent framework to study both errors and their recoveries. This is, in 
particular, important because error production and error management cannot be properly 
understood as isolated issues but are instead closely intertwined (Amalberti & Wioland, 
1997). By focusing on both error production and management in the development of a 
coherent error analysis framework it becomes possible to analyse these closely related 
issues in an integrated manner. 
 
1.1 Human error 
 
On an intuitive level most people are able, within their own domain, to make confident 
judgements about whether something is an error or not.  In particular, when adverse 
consequences are observed and human actors played a central role in the course of events 
it seems straightforward to attribute the cause of the situation to human error. However, 
when trying to analyse the concept of human error in more detail it turns out that it is a 
rather elusive concept and is associated with many different meanings. This confusion is 
an impediment to developing structured and effective countermeasures to human error. In 
the following we will briefly review some of the problems and ambiguities associated 
with the label “human error” (for elaborated discussions please refer to Rasmussen, 
1983b; Reason, 1990; Woods et al., 1994) and provide the reader with a working 
definition of human error. 
 
There have been some discussions about whether it is correct to speak of "errors" at all. It 
has been argued that the attribution of cause to the human (and not some system) 
components is to some extent dependent on the stop rule applied in the after-the-fact 
analysis of the causal chain and is therefore not dependent on any objective standards 
(Rasmussen, 1983b). When analysing the causes of substandard system performance the 
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search back through the causal chain will typically continue until a familiar and 
reasonable explanation has been found and a cure is available. Since the human 
component plays a salient role in the man-machine systems there is a large chance that 
the search for the causal explanation will stop when having found a "human error". The 
attribution of the cause to human error is also convenient because a well-known cure is 
available (such as "blame and train"). 
 
The label “human error” also implies that the problem is to be found is on either the 
human or the engineered side of the man-machine equation. Attempts to assign causal 
factors to either the human or the technical components may be limited by the fact that 
these components are closely intertwined in any man-machine system and should not be 
analysed in isolation. If, for instance, an Air Traffic Controller (ATCO) does not detect 
the presence of an aircraft on the radar due to glare or reflection, should this be 
characterised as an error or not?  One could argue that the ATCO is not responsible for 
the omission and that it should not be considered an error. On the other hand, if he had 
moved his head slightly to the side - and thereby moved the reflection - the aircraft would 
probably have been detected. Consequently, it is far from always easy to decide and agree 
on the presence of an error. As a result of such considerations researchers have suggested 
that the term "human error" should be replaced with "man-machine misfits" (Rasmussen, 
1983b) or "erroneous actions" (Hollnagel, 1990). 
 
An attribution of adverse events to the human component of the man-machine system is 
also problematic because it from a legalistic perspective implies a neglected and thereby 
punishable act. In this manner the human controller becomes the scapegoat and is blamed 
for some undesirable consequences. This is unfortunate because the actions performed by 
the controller are selected on the basis of what is thought to be the most appropriate 
action in the given situation. Nonetheless, bad outcomes (i.e. incidents and accidents) will 
often be attributed to process defects (for example, a bad decision) in spite of the fact that 
there is a loose coupling between process and outcome. That is, good decisions may in 
some situations be followed by bad outcomes, but in other situations be inconsequential.   
Nonetheless, hindsight bias - i.e. the tendency to judge the quality of the process on the 
basis of the product and to over-estimate what could have been known in advance - can 
have strong implications for error analyses.  
 
Finally, to label some process defect as “human error” implies that there exists a criterion 
or standard that the performance can be compared with and that the performance does not 
satisfy this criterion. The most obvious criterion to apply is the standard operating 
procedures. However, the standard operating procedures do not necessarily constitute an 
unambiguous criterion. First, not all situations can be covered by the standard operating 
procedures. Second, people rarely recognise rule violations made by themselves as errors, 
because the violations may be motivated by efficiency and/or safety concerns (for 
example, an ATCO may not provide a pilot with traffic information after the resolvement 
of a conflict due to other pending tasks in spite of this being required according to the 
procedures).  Actually, violations and modification of formal rules might be quite rational 
given the actual workload and time constraints. Furthermore, such violations might be an 
integrated part of the established practice (Rasmussen, 1997). In addition, as pointed out 
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by Reason (1997) the proliferation of well-intended procedures may serve to reduce 
compliance with procedures and may thereby be an invitation to violations. 
 
An alternative criterion could be violation of good working practice. That is, would other 
professionals with similar background have acted likewise given the constraints of the 
situation or was the performance below a generally accepted standard. This criterion may 
be of particular relevance in an area such as air traffic control insofar as it is a domain 
that is, in comparison with e.g. aviation, less dominated by procedures. However, this 
criterion is also problematic because different people may have different conceptions 
(dependent on e.g. background and culture) of what constitutes good working practice 
and, again, hindsight bias may obscure the validity of such judgements. 
 
As the previous paragraphs have suggested it may often be difficult to agree on whether 
something is an error or not. It has to be accepted that human error is not something that 
has an objective existence on its own but is instead a social construct which meaning is 
dependent on consensus agreement. Even though it is probably impossible to develop an 
unambiguous and uncontroversial definition of the concept of human error it is useful to 
decide on a working approximation. In the current context the following definition lays 
down whether an error has been committed (adapted from Isaac et al., 2001): 
  
Any action (or inaction) that potentially or actually results in negative system 
effects given the situation that other possibilities were available. This includes 
any deviation from operating procedures, good working practice or intentions.  
 
There are several benefits of this definition. First, the definition of human error is neutral 
with regard to any question of blame. Second, an error does not need to involve any 
system consequences. This is in concordance with the principle that an error should be 
judged on the basis of the underlying processes and not the product. Third, an action or 
inaction can only be labelled as an error if the actor involved could have acted differently 
given the constraints of the situation. That is, it does not make sense to classify 
something as an error if no other alternative was available. Finally, the definition accepts 
several different criteria or standards to which the performance can be compared, namely 
the standards operating procedures, good working practice or simply the actor's 
intentions. 
 
1.2 Error management 
 
In the human factors literature there have been several suggestions concerning which 
label to attach to the process that follows production of error - that is, the process from 
error detection to recovery. Some examples are error handling (Zapf & Reason, 1994), 
error recovery (Lenman & Robert, 1994), failure recovery (Kanse & van der Schaaf, 
2000a) and error management (Frese, 1991). Both the first and the second part of these 
concepts are associated with some ambiguities. In the following some of these problems 
will briefly be described. 
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Both the term "management" and "recovery" are associated with some inherent problems 
because they can refer to different things. The concept of management is ambivalent 
because it can both refer to how front-line operators and high-level decision-makers 
within an organisation deal with errors or faults. The concept of recovery is, first of all, 
problematic because it can refer to both a part and the entire process that follows the 
production of an error or fault. Also, more specifically, it may lead to some confusion 
within the medical domain where recovery is used in a different context (i.e. 
improvement in the patient's physical state which is normally expected after an 
intervention). Some alternatives to these two concepts could be "handling" or "capture". 
Both of these concepts are more neutral in nature, but at the same time have only been 
used very rarely in the research literature. In short, there is no obvious choice between 
these different alternatives and they will therefore be used interchangeably throughout 
this thesis. 
 
A more clear-cut choice of terms seems to be available when examining the first part of 
the above listed concepts to describe the process from error detection to recovery. In this 
context it is useful to examine the figure below that describes the relationship between 
the three central concepts, namely "error", "fault" and "failure": 
Faults 
Errors Technical 
failures 
Failures 
 
Figure 1: Graphical illustration of the relationship between errors, failures, 
technical failures and faults. 
 
The error part concerns those situations where a human error has been committed. Only a 
subgroup of the errors leads to system breakdowns (i.e. faults) and a major part of the 
errors do not have any consequences at all. On the other hand, faults concern system 
breakdowns irrespective of whether these are human- or technology-induced. As can be 
seen in the figure there is an overlap between the two concepts and it is concerned with 
the human error induced system breakdowns. The total of the two squares can be referred 
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to as failures. 
 
The ambition is in the current context that the taxonomy should be applicable to any type 
of system breakdown irrespective of the origin to the failure. Nonetheless, the main focus 
will in the current context be on human induced error situations. Therefore, we will stick 
to the term "error management" and not "fault management" (see e.g. Johannsen, 1988) 
or failure management (so, for example, a total radar blackout would in itself not be a 
recovery event of relevance in the current context).  
 
Several definitions of error management are available (see e.g. Frese, 1991 and Rizzo et 
al., 1995). Below is presented a definition of error management that – in spite of focusing 
on the crew level rather than the individual-cognitive level – gives a precise picture of 
how the concept is used in this thesis:  
  
“Error management at the crew level is defined as actions taken either to reduce 
the probability of errors occurring (error avoidance) or to deal with errors 
committed either by detecting or correcting them before they have operational 
impact (error trapping) or to contain and reduce the severity of those that become 
consequential (error mitigation). It is also possible for crew actions to exacerbate 
the consequences of error.” 
(Reason, 1997). 
 
Even though this definition is fairly long it does have the advantage of highlighting 
several important aspects of the concepts of error management. In particular, it puts an 
emphasis on not only the activities following an error – namely error trapping and 
mitigation – but also stresses the importance of activities preceding the error – namely 
error avoidance. 
 
1.3 ATC - a system description 
 
Air Traffic Control (ATC) is an area which, for a number of reasons, can provide a 
proper context for studying and analysing human error events: (1) Very little work has 
been done on verification and validation of measures (such as error and recovery 
taxonomies) for ATC and, consequently, many findings have been difficult to sustain and 
interpret (Hopkin, 1995); (2) ATC is experiencing many new technological innovations 
which may induce new types of error and alter recovery opportunities (Wickens et al., 
1997) and therefore require studies of various Human Factors solutions and associated 
error and recovery profiles; (3) ATC is known to be a high reliability organisation where 
human errors are rarely allowed to develop into critical situations. That is, in spite of the 
inevitably occurrence of human errors only a very low rate of loss of separation occurs 
which to a large extent is due to the controller's ability to develop and utilise behavioural 
skills to control such situations (Jones, 1997). This makes ATC a very suitable context to 
study human error and recovery. In the following is given a short description of the ATC 
system. 
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The overall goal of air traffic control is often described as ensuring a safe, expeditious 
and orderly flow of traffic at all times. Basically, this means that the challenge of air 
traffic control is to ensure that a safe separation is maintained (i.e. both between aircraft 
and between aircraft and other obstacles such as mountains and ground vehicles) and at 
the same time to do this in such a manner that the efficiency of the air-traffic system is 
not compromised. The control of the traffic is accomplished by three classes of 
controllers located at different facilities. 
 
• Tower (TWR) control: In this facility the aircraft are handled on the taxiways and 
runways in relation to landings and take-offs. The departing aircraft are handed off to 
approach once it is airborne and the arriving aircraft are received from approach. 
• Approach (APP) control1: In spite of its name this facility is responsible for both 
climb and descent of aircraft between high levels and ground. The approach 
controller is therefore responsible for receiving and handing off aircraft to the tower 
and en route control (i.e. ACC).  
• Area Control Centre (ACC) control2: At this facility the control of high-level traffic is 
handled. The flights are here guided along a series of linear routes across the sky and 
at different flight levels. Often the en-route control is split between low level and high 
level. 
 
There are many similarities in the tasks carried out at these different controller positions, 
but there are also variations in the cognitive demands that they place on the controllers. 
For example, the approach and the en route control rely extensively on symbolic 
representation of the traffic information (i.e. the radar and strips) whereas the tower 
control to a large extent is carried out on the basis of direct perception of the traffic 
information (Roske-Hofstrand & Murphy, 1998). Another difference is that the tower and 
approach control mainly requires tactical planning skills whereas en route control 
requires a combination of strategic and tactical planning skills.  
 
In the figure below is described the main actors and tools involved in the en route control.       
 
                                                 
1 Sometimes also referred to as terminal radar control or, in short, TRACON. 
2 Sometimes also referred to as Air Route Traffic Control Centre, in short ARTCC. 
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Planner 
controller 
Radar 
controller 
Radio 
Radar screen Strips 
  
Adjacent 
sector 
 
Figure 2: Schematic representation of actors and resources involved in en route 
ATC (Adapted from Rognin et al., 1998) 
 
Each en route centre is divided into a series of irregular shaped sectors with both 
horizontal and vertical borders. For each sector two controllers - referred to as the radar 
controller and the planner controller3 - can share the responsibility of providing guidance 
and controlling the aircraft (in the advent of low traffic several sectors may be collapsed 
and/or a single controller may be responsible for the whole sector or even several 
sectors). The controllers do not only have responsibility for the aircraft within the sector. 
They are also accountable for anticipating arriving traffic from other sectors and for 
informing neighbouring sector about aircraft leaving the sector. The exact distribution of 
tasks between the radar and planner controller may vary slightly from one country to 
another. The radar controller is responsible for monitoring the radar display to ensure safe 
separation and is in charge of the communication with the pilots. The planner controller 
organises the strips on the strip board and coordinates plans with other planner controllers 
from adjacent sectors.   
 
There are several tools that are of critical importance for the controller. These are the 
radar display, the flight strips and the communication devices. The radar display is 
probably the most vital information source for the controller. Here the location of the 
aircraft inside or close to the sector borders can be seen and a data label for each aircraft 
gives information about the aircraft's callsign, altitude and ground speed. More detailed 
information pertaining to the individual aircraft can be found on the flight strips. This 
includes e.g. the call sign, flight level, departure and destination airport, flight route and 
aircraft type. These types of information play an important role for the strategic planning 
of the air traffic. The strips are also used to write instructions issued to aircraft and as a 
                                                 
3 Sometimes the planner controller is also referred to as data controller. 
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memory augmentation in the case of unusual circumstances pertaining to an aircraft by 
annotating or cocking specific strips at odd angles. To accomplish the task of controlling 
the traffic it is necessary to communicate with other controllers and pilots which is 
normally done by telephone and radio (in the case where the controllers are located at the 
same site direct communication is normally used). The communication with the pilots is 
necessary to, for example, provide pilots with instructions and clearances. Coordination 
between controllers is an important activity in relation to handing over aircraft between 
different sectors. This may be between similar sectors but also between different types of 
sectors. 
 
Even though it is often said that the radar is the most vital source of information this 
statement should be viewed with some modifications insofar as the strip is also a 
significant instrument for the controller. This is supported by the fact that it is possible to 
perform air traffic control with strips and no radar whereas it is extremely difficult to 
perform air traffic control with radar and no strips (Hughes et al., 1992). The importance 
of the strips is not only related to the detailed information they contain, but also the fact 
that the strips can be seen as a notepad or work site where changes in the state of the 
aircraft are noted from the time it enters the sector. In this manner the strips do not only 
provide information about the current and future state of the aircraft, but also historical 
information about what has been done and how the current situation has been reached.  
 
Similar to many other safety critical areas, procedures related to both normal and 
abnormal circumstances play a significant role in regulating the controller's activities. 
There are, for example, procedures for the communication between controller and pilots 
and for maintaining the separation standards between the aircraft. Some of these 
procedures are internationally standardised by the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) whereas others are based on regional rules. In spite of the fact that 
many rules and procedures exist, it is in even official organisational documents specified 
that "nothing in these duties precludes a qualified controller from using his own 
discretion and initiative in any particular circumstances" (Rognin & Blanquart, 1999). 
That is, the procedures cannot be guaranteed to be complete or efficient in all situations 
and it will often be necessary to adapt these to the constraints of the situation. 
 
1.4 Requirements to the taxonomy 
 
A taxonomy is very similar to a categorisation system insofar as they both concern 
classification of phenomena into groups (or taxa). However, a taxonomy may be 
distinguished from a regular classification system by the requirement of being based on a 
sound theoretical basis (Fleishman & Quantance, 1984). Taxonomies are important as a 
foundation in any scientific endeavour. The reason for this is that it is necessary to agree 
on a common and unambiguous frame of reference to advance the understanding of the 
nature, origins and causes of a specific phenomenon of interest. Only by agreeing on a 
particular set of classifications can research results be compared and knowledge be 
accumulated. Therefore, taxonomic efforts make it easier to integrate results and 
contribute to the growth of a research field. Furthermore, it can be expected that the 
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development of an organising framework with a unified set of categories can be useful in 
relation to transferring research results to real-life operational situations. 
 
In this project the goal is to develop an error management taxonomy to be used for 
studies in the area of air traffic control. Before commencing on this endeavour it is useful 
to decide on a set of criteria for developing and evaluating the framework. Unfortunately, 
there are no fixed objective criteria to evaluate the utility of a given taxonomy. However, 
Wiegmann and Shappell (2002) have suggested that for an error framework to be 
successful in this task it should be able to satisfy the following main requirements or 
product criteria: Reliability, Comprehensiveness, Diagnosticity, Usability and Validity. 
How these criteria relate to the development and evaluation of an error management 
framework will be elaborated in the following. 
 
Reliability 
 
For a taxonomy to be useful in the analysis of human errors and recoveries in research 
studies it is, first of all, critical that the framework is able to produce robust results. In 
this context there are several issues of relevance to consider: 
 
• Mutual exclusivity. There should be an internal logic between the concepts within 
the framework to be able to achieve reliable (and useful) results. Therefore, 
particular attention should be paid to whether the concepts are mutually exclusive 
and that the taxonomy does not mix up principally independent issues4. 
 
• Model-based approach. The taxonomy may benefit from being derived from a 
model. This is related to the fact that the model-based approach may have certain 
advantages in relation to depicting the relationship between the individual 
components of a coherent framework (Isaac et al., 2002). Hereby it becomes 
easier to ensure a high level of internal consistency in the taxonomy and to 
achieve a high degree of mutual exclusivity between the individual categories if 
the taxonomy is derived from a model. Ultimately, this may increase the 
robustness of classifications made on the basis of the taxonomy and analyses of 
human-system studies may benefit from having an explicit frame of reference that 
the observed errors and recoveries can be related to. 
 
• Intra- and inter-rater reliability. The same results should be achieved 
independently of where, when and by whom the classification is made. In 
particular, the two main types of reliability, namely inter- and intra-rater 
reliability (McGrath, 1994). Currently, very little research has been done to 
determine the reliability of error frameworks (but see e.g. Wiegmann & Shappell, 
1997 and Isaac et al., 2000) and even less in relation to error management 
frameworks.  
 
                                                 
4 As will be discussed later on the requirement concerning mutual exclusivity can be difficult to sustain in relation to 
the contextual factors that will be referred to as Performance Shaping Factors. 
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Comprehensiveness 
 
For any given taxonomy it is important to consider whether the framework is able to 
cover all of the relevant variables that it purports to cover. In the current context this 
means that it should cover all the relevant categories related to the individual error 
management event and its surrounding context. It also important that the framework is 
able to analyse both normal and abnormal situations since important lessons about error 
management might be obtained by not only focusing on critical events, but also normal 
everyday events where most errors are prevented from developing into serious 
consequences (Helmreich et al., 2001; Maurino, 1999). Even though it is important that 
the framework is able to capture all relevant categories it is at the same time also 
important to avoid irrelevant categories (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2002). If there are many 
irrelevant categories it might jeopardise the framework because researchers and analysts 
have to spend unnecessary resources on reviewing irrelevant categories which can be a 
threat to reliability. The problem with irrelevant categories is also that the resulting 
database may contain too many “missing values”. Thus, a framework can become too 
comprehensive. 
 
Diagnosticity 
 
Diagnosticity is perhaps the most crucial aspect of the framework and concerns its ability 
to move beyond analysing what happened to explaining why it happened. Use of the 
taxonomy for studies of human errors and recoveries should provide insight into their 
underlying causes so that potential error resistance strategies can be established. That is, 
the taxonomy should allow inferences about the specific causes of human error and 
recoveries in terms of generic psychological mechanisms as well as influencing 
contextual factors. The taxonomy can hereby be useful in the development and analysis 
of interventions to reduce the occurrence and consequences of human error. 
 
• Psychological basis. Some classification systems can be used to organise directly 
observable features of human behaviour (such as omission, commission, 
repetition, etc.) whereas others concern inferences of psychological constructions 
or mental stages hypothesised to underlie observable human behaviour. The error 
management taxonomy should allow analyses of errors and recoveries in 
psychological and context-independent terms (and thereby move beyond the 
observable behaviour). The reason for this requirement is that it becomes possible 
to understand the underlying causes of errors and recoveries. This aspect is 
important because identical observable phenomena may be associated with 
different underlying causal mechanisms and, in similar vein, different observable 
phenomena may be associated with equivalent causal mechanisms. Consequently, 
an error management taxonomy based on underlying causal mechanisms may be 
most fruitful when it comes to tackling and mitigating the occurrence and 
consequences of human error (Reason, 1990). 
 
• Contextual factors. Since errors and their capture do not happen in a vacuum but 
in the interaction between people and the general work environment – including 
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the technological, psychosocial and organisational context – it is critical that the 
framework is able to capture the dominant characteristics of the context that 
affects performance. 
 
Diagnosticity also means that the framework should be able to generate insights that are 
in concordance with extant knowledge as well as being able to generate new insights. 
Later on we will review some hypotheses concerning expectations about how an error 
management framework should “behave” to be in concordance with existing research 
literature (see section 7.3). 
 
Usability 
 
Usability is concerned with the extent to which the framework can be applied to practical 
settings. Many conceptual frameworks are developed outside the applied setting and are 
never tested out in real situations. As a consequence of this it can often be difficult to 
apply it to complex real-life situations. Usability can be enhanced by avoiding subtle 
technical and psychological terminology and instead use more intuitively comprehensible 
concepts. This will increase the reliability of the framework and at the same time 
minimise the training requirements.  
 
Validity 
 
Validity is related to the degree to which a framework accurately reflects or assesses the 
specific concept that a researcher is attempting to measure. A pragmatic interpretation of 
the concept of validity of a conceptual framework is the extent to which it is able to 
satisfy the previously four described criteria. For example, content validity is directly 
related to the issue of comprehensiveness and relates to whether the framework 
adequately represents the variety and balance of the field it purports to examine. Face 
validity is closely related to usability and is concerned with whether the framework 
seems reasonable, using ‘common sense’, to people who might be using it. Finally, 
criterion validity is directly related to diagnosticity and is concerned with the 
framework’s ability to provide insight to the underlying mechanisms of error and error 
management events. For this to be the case it is not only important that the framework is 
able to generate results that are in concordance with previous research and logical 
expectations, but also that it is able to uncover new and unknown insights. 
 
There are trade-offs between the desiderata listed above. For example, the usability and 
the diagnosticity criteria may be in conflict (i.e. it may be difficult to achieve a high level 
of usability and at the same time have a high analytical power). Nonetheless, 
consideration to all of the above issues will be made in the development and evaluation 
of the error management framework.  
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1.5 Overview of the report 
 
The goal of this report is to develop an error management taxonomy. Since most of the 
research within the area of human error has focused on error production and not error 
management, the main focus will be on error management. The specific content of the 
following chapters is: 
 
Part Two: Literature Review 
 
• Chapter 2: An extensive amount of research has been made in relation to 
understanding and systemising the mechanisms behind human errors. Some of the 
more prominent taxonomies will be reviewed and the most appropriate framework 
will be selected. 
 
• Chapter 3: Since no off-the-shelf taxonomy exists to describe the error 
management process, it is necessary to develop such a taxonomy. As a starting 
point it is useful to review the existing research literature and on this basis make 
some preliminary suggestions about important distinctions. The review will focus 
on safety critical issues occurring both before and after errors. Before the 
occurrence of an error the focus is, in particular, on the issue of threat 
management which concerns how operational factors that have the potential of 
leading to errors and jeopardising safety are controlled. In relation to the phase 
after the occurrence of an error there are, in particular, four main issues that will 
be explored: who was involved in the detection and recovery of the error and/or 
its consequences; when was the error or its consequences detected; how was the 
error and/or its consequences detected and corrected; and finally what was the 
behavioural response and outcome? 
 
• Chapter 4: Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) can be seen as contextual factors 
that can have a positive or negative influence on the course of events. Some 
important frameworks relevant for the current context will be reviewed. The 
frameworks reviewed are characterised by being contextually relevant (i.e. from 
the aviation or the ATC domain) and/or encompass factors that can positively 
affect the error management process. In this manner it should be possible to also 
give an answer to the why-question – namely why did the error occur and why 
was it successfully or unsuccessfully managed? 
 
• Chapter 5: Error management is not just a coincidence but is instead something 
that can be reinforced through different kinds of human factors initiatives. Both 
training and implementation of new technology concepts seem to be promising 
ways to strengthen the system's defences against human errors. In this chapter the 
focus will be on the training concept referred to as Team Resource Management 
and the design concept referred to as Interactive Critiquing. 
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Part Three: Construction of the Taxonomy 
 
• Chapter 6: The error management framework will be described. It has been 
developed on the basis of the literature review and it has been further refined and 
tested on the basis of incident reports, critical incident interviews and simulator 
studies (the results of which will be described extensively in the later chapters). 
The framework is organised around an error management model. It consists of 
two main components: The core of the framework is developed on the basis of the 
literature review of error and error management taxonomies. The list of contextual 
factors is developed on the basis of the review of the Performance Shaping 
Factors. 
  
Part Four: Validation 
 
• Chapter 7: The methodological approach for evaluating the framework will be 
described. This includes a description of advantages and disadvantages of 
different kinds of approaches and some a priori defined hypotheses concerning 
how the framework is expected to behave (which will be used to establish the 
framework’s criterion validity). 
 
• Chapter 8-11: On the basis of the framework errors and their recoveries will be 
analysed by employing different kinds of data from the domain of ATC.  The data 
from these analyses is used in the development, refinement and evaluation of the 
taxonomy. The first study is a pilot study based on Swedish incident reports 
(Chapter 8). The second is based on a simulator study where ATCO trainees 
carried out scenarios in a realistic setting (Chapter 9). The third is a questionnaire 
study where human factors experts could express their views concerning the 
relevance of both individual dimensions and the overall framework (Chapter 10). 
Finally, a comprehensive version of the framework is applied to the analysis of 
error events found cases elicited through the critical incident technique (Chapter 
11). 
 
• Chapter 12: On the basis of the empirical data and the predetermined evaluation 
criteria (reliability, comprehensiveness, diagnosticity and usability) conclusions 
about the framework will be made. 
 
• Chapter 13: Finally, the results of the project are discussed and suggestions 
concerning future research in the area of error management are made. 
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2 Human error 
 
The controller’s task is highly cognitive in its nature and is dependent on mental 
processes. This means that most of the tasks are covert and cannot be directly observed 
on the basis of resulting behaviour. As a consequence, the taxonomies that will be 
reviewed in this chapter are cognitive in nature. As previously mentioned a taxonomy 
may be distinguished from an ordinary classification system by the requirement of being 
based on a sound theoretical basis. In compliance with this demand a framework will be 
selected that is suitable for the task of analysing human errors related to accidents and 
incidents. Since a vast amount of error taxonomies have been suggested, the focus will be 
on finding a taxonomy that maximises the chances of conducting robust analyses that 
ultimately provides a sound basis for reducing and mitigating the effects of human error.  
 
A large part of the existing error taxonomies are grounded in an information-processing 
model (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997). In general these models draw on the metaphor of 
the human as a computer and describe a number of mental processes or stages occurring 
from registration of stimuli from the environment by the use of sensory organs (eyes, 
ears, etc.) to the execution of a response (verbal or motor). Each of these stages is 
hypothesised to transform the stimuli, or information, and at each of these stages the 
transformation process may be in err or information may be lost. The exact amount of 
stages and their specific function may vary to some degree from one taxonomy to 
another. However, most of the models contain roughly equivalent information processing 
sequences and the main variation is the number of steps between the on-set of a stimulus 
event to the execution of a response. Some of the more prominent and influential 
frameworks are in this context a traditional Information Processing Model (see e.g. 
Wickens 1987, 1992), the Skills-Rules-Knowledge model (see e.g. Rasmussen 1982, 
1983a) and The Model of Unsafe Acts (see e.g. Reason, 1990).  
 
Since no extensive review and evaluation has been made of the individual frameworks 
that will be presented in the following it is not possible to determine the extent to which 
they are able to comply with the previous enlisted requirements on an objective basis. 
However, the frameworks will be evaluated on the basis of the extent to which they have 
some positive or negative attributes related to the previously identified criteria.  
 
2.1 Skills-Rules-Knowledge Model 
 
A natural point of departure in relation to understanding the mechanisms behind human 
error is the work done by Rasmussen insofar as his pioneering work, especially up 
through the eighties, has had a significant impact on how errors are conceptualised in the 
human factors literature. The contribution of Rasmussen lies both in the development of a 
human error taxonomy and in broadening the understanding of what is meant by the term 
human error. In the current context the focus will be to examine the skill-rule-knowledge 
(SRK) framework which has for sometime been considered a market standard when it 
comes to human error taxonomies. Originally this framework was developed on the basis 
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of verbal protocols of technicians engaged in electronic trouble shooting tasks 
(Rasmussen & Jensen, 1974).  
 
An important notion behind the SRK framework is that human behaviour can be 
controlled at different levels of conscious control dependent on the degree of familiarity 
with the task and the environment (Rasmussen, 1983b). More specifically there are - as 
depicted in the figure below - three different levels of control, namely skill-, rule- and 
knowledge-based behaviour. 
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Figure 3: The Skill-Rules-Knowledge model. 
 
At the skill-based level the behaviour is regulated by the lowest level of conscious 
involvement and is characteristic of highly routinised and automated activities. Such 
activities are mainly regulated by perceptual-motor systems of the human cognitive 
apparatus and by spatial-temporal information from the environment. The advantage of 
requiring few or no conscious resources is that the limited conscious resources can be 
used for other purposes such as planning ahead and monitoring past plans. Errors on this 
level are based on variability of force, space, or time coordination. 
 
Rule-based behaviour is also a kind of behaviour that becomes activated in familiar work 
situations, but is distinguished from skill-based behaviour by requiring some degree of 
conscious involvement. The behaviour is controlled by stored rules either derived from 
experience or from other's know-how. Such pre-packaged rules can be activated on the 
basis of perceptually available information in the environment. It is important to note that 
the stored rules can be activated without necessarily having any understanding of the 
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functional properties of the environment. Errors at this level may be associated with 
erroneous classification of situation - and thereby application of the wrong rule - or 
incorrect recall of procedures. 
 
When faced with an unfamiliar problem where no pre-packaged solutions are available it 
is necessary to move to the knowledge-based level of behaviour, which is the highest 
conceptual level.  At this level a new plan has to be generated. This can be accomplished 
either through physically carrying out trial-and-error experiment on the environment, or 
through conceptual reasoning based on an understanding of the functional properties of 
the system being controlled (often referred to as the mental model of system) or a 
combination of both. Errors at the knowledge-based level of behaviour are associated 
with problem solving and goal selection tasks. 
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Reliability. An adaptation of the SRK framework has been used in 
relation to real-time studies of anaesthetist errors (Jensen, 1997). In 
this study the SRK framework was thoroughly evaluated and on the 
basis of several kinds of validity and the framework achieved ratings 
from satisfactory to high. The framework demonstrated inter-rater 
reliability Kappa values of 0.49 and 0.71 in naturalistic and simulated 
environments, respectively. A very similar version of Rasmussen's 
taxonomy has been applied to the analysis of human errors in an 
aviation accident database (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997). The 
taxonomy could in this case accommodate well over 3/4 of the pilot 
causal factors contained in the database. The obtained inter-rater 
reliability Kappa values were as high as 0.935 which reflects an 
excellent level of agreement. 
Diagnosticity. The SRK-framework has been widely adopted in many 
contexts insofar as it provides the opportunity to gain insight into how 
human behaviour can be controlled at different levels of conscious 
control. Errors at these different qualitative levels might be controlled 
through different means and might also be detected by different kinds 
of mechanisms (Reason, 1990). 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Usability. A problem is that it is not always easy to distinguish 
between the different levels of cognitive control – especially in 
environments that are less dominated by procedures such as air traffic 
control. 
Comprehensiveness. The framework does not distinguish between two 
important qualitatively different error types, namely slips and lapses 
(Sarter & Alexander, 2000). 
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2.2 The Model of Unsafe Acts 
 
Reason is another prominent figure in relation to the scientific endeavour of studying the 
mechanisms behind human error.  In particular, his book "Human Error" (1990) has had a 
tremendous influence on how the human factors community understands and analyses 
human errors. The significant contribution of his work lies in the identification of both 
basic human error types and the causal factors present in the system (so-called latent 
failures) before an accident sequence involving human errors actually begins - in short, 
the crucial role of organisations in industrial disasters. In the current context the focus 
will be on the Model of Unsafe Acts that can be used to examine the mechanisms behind 
individual unsafe acts. 
 
The structure of the model is largely derived from Rasmussen's SRK framework. The 
model is shown below. 
 
 
UNSAFE 
ACTS 
INTENDED 
ACTION 
UNINTENDED 
ACTION 
SLIP 
LAPSE 
MISTAKE 
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BASIC 
ERROR 
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 Place_losing 
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Rule-based mistakes 
 Misapplication of good rule. 
 Application of bad rule 
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Exceptional violation 
Acts of sabotage 
 
Figure 4: The model of unsafe acts. 
 
According to the model there are two major groups of unsafe acts, namely intentional and 
not intentional. This distinction does not refer to the outcome of human activity (which in 
the case of human errors are by definition unintended) but is instead related to whether 
the actions are carried out as planned. The unintended actions can be manifested either as 
slips or lapses. Slips are monitoring or attentional errors where an action is planned but 
another one is carried out. These errors occur at the skill-based level of behaviour.  
Lapses are the other type of unintended actions and involve memory failures. Such 
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memory failures can manifest themselves through, for example, forgetting planned items 
or forgetting intentions. 
 
The intentional part of the unsafe acts includes two main groups, namely mistakes and 
violations. Mistakes concern activities that run according to the plan, but where the plan 
is inadequate to achieve the desired goal. Such mistakes can be divided into two groups, 
namely rule-based and knowledge-based mistakes. Rule-based mistakes are associated 
with familiar situations where either a bad rule is applied to the situation or a rule that is 
perfectly adequate for certain circumstances is applied to situations that require a 
different set of actions. Knowledge-based mistakes, on the other hand, can occur in 
situations where no off-the-shelf solutions are available and a new plan has to be 
generated. In such situations slow, limited and effortful cognitive resources have to be 
applied to an often complex problem-solving situation. 
 
Violation is a group of unsafe acts that concern deliberate deviations from rules, 
procedures or regulations. In the model three kinds of violations are listed. Routine 
violations are violations that happen on a regular basis and are perhaps reinforced by 
norms and values within a specific social context. Exceptional violations are those that 
only occur in rare and exceptional circumstances. Such violations may in particular occur 
in unusual situations where the existing procedures are not applicable to solving the 
current situation and where knowledge based reasoning therefore is required. The final 
group of violations is acts of sabotage and is separated from the other violations by the 
fact that the negative consequences are intended (and therefore normally not an issue for 
Human Factors research). 
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Comprehensiveness. In comparison with Rasmussen’s framework 
Reason’s model has the advantage of including violations as a group 
of unsafe acts. Furthermore, it distinguishes between slips and lapses 
at the skill-based level. 
Diagnosticity. Similar to the SRK-framework the model of unsafe acts 
has been applied in a lot of human factors research because it provides 
insight into the underlying mechanisms of intended and non-intended 
actions. 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Usability. Even though the structure of the framework is somehow 
more intuitively comprehensible compared with the SRK-framework 
the distinction between cognitive levels – rule- and knowledge based 
level – is far from easily determined in less proceduralised 
environments such as ATC. 
Reliability. In Reason's model it is implied that an unsafe act is either a 
violation or an error, but in practice it can be both. That is, many 
violations are used as short-cuts to procedures that are considered 
unnecessary and inefficient. Such violations can be labelled 
“intentional non-compliance errors” to underline their dual property of 
being both an error and a violation (Helmreich et al., 2001). 
Reliability. Similar to Rasmussen’s classification system it can be 
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difficult to distinguish between the different levels of cognitive 
control. 
 
2.3 Information Processing Model 
 
Many models of human error are grounded in information processing theory. The 
information processing models are generated on the basis of synthesis of a number of 
results from an abundance of experimental studies aimed at studying specific aspects of 
the human "information processing machinery". One of the most well known models is 
the one proposed by Wickens (1992). The model describes critical stages of information 
processing in relation to a decision-making situation. This descriptive model may be 
useful to describe mental operations or stages that occur between the onset of a critical 
stimulus event in the environment and the response of the decision-maker. It is assumed 
that the different information processing stages in the model are characterised by 
transforming the input and that they demand some time for their operation.  
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Figure 5: Wickens’ model of human information processing 
 
To get an overview of the model we will in the remainder of this section "fly over" the 
landscape of the model and explore some of its main characteristics. As a starting point 
we have a situation that can be characterised through a number of cues from different 
sources in the environment. The cues are initially processed through short term sensory 
stores (STSS) where the representation of physical cues are prolonged for a short period 
after the stimulus has physically terminated without requiring any conscious attention 
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(Wickens, 1992). Different kinds of sensory stores have been suggested for different 
sensory modalities such as echoic memory for auditory stimuli and iconic memory for 
visual stimuli. 
 
Perception concerns integrating and assigning meaning to the physical cues. The most 
basic form of perception is detection which concerns determining whether a signal or 
target (such as an aircraft on a radar monitor) is present. More complicated processing is 
required if it is necessary to determine which class the target belongs to - a process 
referred to as recognition or identification. Classification of perceptual events includes 
making absolute and relative judgements. Absolute judgement concerns identifying a 
stimulus on the basis of its position along one or several stimulus dimensions (e.g. speed 
of an aircraft) whereas relative judgement concerns determining the relative difference 
between two or more stimuli (e.g. which aircraft has the highest speed). 
 
After having assigned meaning to the physical cues a choice of action should follow. This 
occurs in the stage referred to as decision-making and response selection. Problems may 
occur if the cues are absent, vague, ambivalent or conflicting. Furthermore, problems 
may occur if conflicting goals are present. If the decision situation is new and 
unanticipated situation most of the active processing related to understanding the 
situation and making decisions have to be carried out in the working memory. This may 
be associated with some problems because working memory is characterised by being 
temporary, fragile and limited. The limitations of working memory may be circumvented 
if relevant long-term memory structures exist. This may lead to recognition-primed 
decision-making which refers to a relatively rapid and automatic process whereby experts 
make decisions based on recognition of similar situations in the past (Klein, 1989). 
 
The decision to initiate the chosen response is separated from its execution in the model. 
That is, when the decision is made, it has to be carried out. This phase is in the figure 
denoted response execution. In this phase errors are typically associated with problems of 
automaticity which refers to the fact that people are able to carry out highly practised 
action sequences with few or no attentional resources and such activities are associated 
with a specific type of error, namely slips. The outcome of the decision can function as a 
basis for further pick-up of cues and decision-making. In addition, the outcome can also 
function as the basis for decision-making in the future by being stored in the long-term 
memory. In this manner there is a direct link between decisions made in the past and the 
decisions made in the present.  
 
The stages of perception, decision-making and response selection and response execution 
are, as illustrated in the figure, largely dependent on the available attention resources. It is 
hypothesised that there exist a limited amount of attentional resources that can be 
distributed among the different cognitive activities. Four different kinds of problems may 
be associated with the attention (Sanders & McCormick, 1992). (1) Selective attention is 
a characteristic of those situations where several sources of information should be 
monitored for the occurrence of specific events. Problems may be associated with 
selective attention when people have to choose which aspects of the environment to 
direct their attention at (i.e. a top-down process). (2) Focused attention concerns those 
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activities where a source of information should be attended to and other sources 
excluded. Therefore, if some processes require a lot of resources only limited resources 
will be available for the remaining processes. Attentional problems may be associated 
with focused attention because people's attention is often drawn to the most salient 
stimuli in the environment that may not necessarily be the most important ones (i.e. a 
bottom-up process). (3) Divided attention is required where two or more tasks should be 
carried out simultaneously and attention must be paid to both. Due to the limited pool of 
cognitive resources there is a risk that one or several tasks receive insufficient resources 
for successful performance. (4) Sustained attention concerns detecting a signal over 
prolonged periods of monitoring time. Vigilance decrements have been observed to occur 
as a result of sustained attention over prolonged periods of time with the results that 
speed and accuracy in signal detection is reduced.  
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Reliability. In a study by Wiegmann & Shappell (1997) where the 
information-processing model was used in the analysis of an aviation 
accident database a Kappa index of 0.660 was achieved which is 
considered "good" by conventional standards. 
Usability. The model has the advantage of corresponding conceptually 
very well with the controller’s task. It might therefore be easily 
applied to the domain of Air Traffic Control. 
Diagnosticity. Breakdowns in the cognitive processing at the different 
stages in the model might be associated with different kinds of 
remedies (actually several human factors books such as Wickens 
(1992) are dedicated to this issue). 
Comprehensiveness. All the main cognitive error types seem to be 
covered by the information-processing model. 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Usability. Some parts of the framework might appear too theoretical 
and not applicable to practical settings. This, in particular, is the case 
for the sensory processing part of the framework. That this category is 
less relevant in practical settings is, for example, supported by a study 
of Wiegmann & Shappell (1997) of pilot errors where less than 3 % of 
the errors fell within this category. Furthermore, in another study by 
McCoy & Funk (1991) of ATC operator errors based on a modified 
version of Wickens’ model the sensory processing part was not 
included in the analysis. 
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2.4 HERA 
 
HERA is acronym of Human Error Reduction in ATM. It is a comprehensive technique 
that has been developed to analyse the mechanisms and circumstances behind human 
errors in the area of air traffic management. The HERA technique contains one of the 
most elaborated and detailed taxonomies for error analysis and has at the same time been 
specifically adapted to the analysis of human errors in ATM. The framework has been 
developed on the basis of a review of both academic and industrial research of the past 
five decades (Isaac et al., 2002; Andersen & Bove, 2001). 
 
At the core of the HERA technique is a slightly modified version of Wickens' (1992) 
model of human information processing. Below is shown a depiction of the underlying 
model: 
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Figure 6: The HERA model 
 
The model contains five different cognitive domains - each which may be associated with 
qualitatively unique errors. To get a better understanding of how errors can be associated 
with each of these cognitive domains it is useful to review some practical examples: 
 
• Perception and vigilance: This cognitive domain concerns issues related to 
receiving and understanding information. A typical kind of error associated with 
this domain is hearback error. That is, a controller fails to pay attention to the 
content of a pilot's read back and hears what he/she expects to hear. 
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• Working memory: This domain concerns the short-term storage of information. 
For example, a controller may forget to carry out tasks necessary to ensure 
continued safe separation between aircraft in spite of having intended to do so. 
• Long-term memory: The long-term memory contains more permanent 
information based on the person's training and experience. A typical error 
associated with this domain is if the controller recalls a procedure incorrectly 
because, for example, the procedure is rarely used or has not been used recently. 
• Judgement, planning and decision-making: Controllers are constantly required to 
make projections of trajectories, plan future actions and to make decisions. These 
activities may all be associated with errors.  For example, the controller may mis-
project the future position of two aircraft and consequently not consider any need 
to monitor them further. 
• Response execution: Sometimes people carry out actions that they have not 
intended. A well-known example is when a controller gives a clearance to one 
flight level but had intended to give clearance to another flight level. This is often 
referred to as slip of the tongue. 
 
Analysis of human errors is within the HERA technique structured around these different 
cognitive domains. In the following is briefly described how each individual error can be 
analysed on the basis of factors associated with the individual act and outside factors. In 
essence, the way of analysing human errors within the HERA technique is to a large 
extent inspired by Rasmussen's (1982) multi-facet taxonomy where the analysis is not 
stopped at some inappropriate or undesirable behaviour but is continued to an 
investigation of what caused the human to act as he or she did. 
 
 
Figure 7: The main dimensions of the HERA taxonomy 
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2.4.1 The Individual Act 
 
On the basis of the expanded information-processing model each error can be analysed 
on the basis of four levels of detail:  
 
• External Error Modes (EEM) - the external manifestation of the error (e.g. 
omission).  
• Cognitive Domains (CD) - to be able to describe the error in more detail it is 
necessary to have some knowledge about the cognitive function that failed (e.g. 
perception and vigilance). This level of description is based on the cognitive 
model.  
• Internal Error Modes (IEM) - the internal manifestation of the error within each 
cognitive domain (e.g. late detection).  
• Psychological Error Mechanisms (PEM) - the internal mechanism of the error 
within each cognitive domain (e.g. perceptual tunnelling).  
 
2.4.2 Outside Factors 
 
There are three dimensions associated with the outside factors: 
 
• Task: What was the controller doing while the error occurred (e.g. radar 
monitoring or strip work) 
• Information/topic: What kind of information was associated with the error (e.g. 
flight level, heading) 
• Performance shaping factors (PSFs) - What factors may have enhanced the 
chances of the error? Often there are factors in the environment that provoke or 
enhance the risk of errors. Such factors are often referred to as performance 
shaping factors (PSFs). In this manner some of the blame is moved away from the 
individual to the broader context in which he/she is embedded. PSFs are also good 
at pinpointing Human Factors aspects of the ATM environment that contributed 
to the occurrence of the error (and thereby could be altered to counteract the 
occurrence of similar errors in the future).  
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Reliability. Studies have been undertaken to evaluate the precursor of 
the HERA system (TRACEr) and the final version of HERA. In the 
evaluation of the precursor of HERA the classification scheme could 
account for about 98% of the identified air traffic control errors in 
British incident reports and both a good level of inter-analyst 
agreement and user opinion was revealed (Shorrock et al., 1998). Later 
evaluations of the HERA system have also revealed a respectable and 
highly significant level of agreement in relation to the cognitive 
domains (Isaac et al., 2000). 
Diagnosticity. Insofar as the framework has been developed on the 
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basis of a symbiosis of a robust theoretical background and analysis of 
error events in a huge database of authentic ATC incident reports the 
focus has been directed towards uncovering the underlying 
mechanisms and contextual factors. 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Comprehensiveness. The level of detail in the framework may be too 
ambitious. This is problematic, first of all, because it is very difficult 
to make the finer grained distinctions when analysing human 
behaviour in complex and realistic settings. Furthermore, it will 
require a very huge database to be able to derive any meaningful 
statistical information concerning the more detailed cognitive 
categories.      
Reliability. In air traffic management it may be difficult to distinguish 
between short-term and long-term memory. Traditionally, short-term 
memory can only contain a limited amount of information for a very 
short duration (about 10 to 15 seconds) and can therefore only be used 
for information that should be immediately recalled. Long-term 
memory, on the other hand, does not seem to have any constraints in 
relation to capacity and storage time. In air traffic management most 
of the task related to maintaining and updating the picture requires 
remembering information for a duration of 10 to 15 minutes and does 
thereby seem to lie somewhere in between the short-term and long-
term domain (Hopkin, 1995).  
Diagnosticity. It is difficult to see the usefulness of categories of 
External Error Modes.   
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In the previous sections the state-of-the-art of error taxonomies were reviewed. Few 
attempts have been made to apply the taxonomies to the analysis of errors in complex 
domains and it is therefore difficult to make firm conclusions about their relative 
usefulness. Nonetheless, studies indicate that the reviewed taxonomies can accommodate 
a large part of the observed errors and that reliable classifications can be obtained with 
these taxonomies. In spite of the fact that the reviewed taxonomies have been relatively 
successful on the quantitative level (being able to describe most of the identified errors in 
the reliable manner) there may be some reasons why an information processing model 
would be the most appropriate framework to analyse human errors in ATM: 
 
− It may be difficult to determine which processing level in Rasmussen’s and Reason’s 
models an error occurred. For example, in many ATM tasks the situation is not 
completely new or completely old and in such situations it may be difficult to 
determine whether a given error was a rule- or knowledge-based mistake. 
 
− The stages in the information-processing model are frequently mentioned in the 
ATM literature. This may be a reflection of the fact that errors that occur in ATM, 
such as hearback errors, visual misidentifications or decision/planning errors, seem to 
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be most compatible with the information-processing framework. This compatibility is 
also reflected in the fact that only the reviewed information processing models have 
been applied to the domain of ATM. 
 
Clearly the HERA technique contains the most detailed taxonomy in itself insofar as the 
main stages of Wickens' information processing model have been extensively elaborated 
on the basis of the state-of-art knowledge within the area of human error (including the 
other human error frameworks previously described). Furthermore, the taxonomy has 
been specifically adapted to the ATM environment – and been thoroughly validated 
within this environment - and therefore seems to be a good platform on which to base 
error analyses. 
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3 Error management 
 
Throughout the last couple of decades an abundance of research has emerged in relation 
to understanding the nature of human error and the cognitive mechanisms underlying the 
production of a variety of errors. An important insight from these studies is that human 
error is the flip side of human performance and that it is impossible to completely 
eliminate them (Rasmussen, 1987; Reason, 1990). Furthermore, it has been 
acknowledged that there are limits to automatic kinds of error detection devices insofar as 
such machines do not have access to the goals underlying the behaviour (Frese, 1991). 
Therefore, it becomes important to understand how people manage errors committed by 
themselves or others. Nonetheless, the understanding of how errors are detected and 
recovered has failed to keep pace with the understanding of the mechanisms underlying 
human error. This process following error production - often referred to as error 
management or error handling - will be the focus of this section. 
 
An increased understanding of the error management process is a prerequisite to improve 
safety and reliability. A modest, but gradually increasing, amount of studies have 
emerged concerning the error management process. Some of these have been related to 
very specific tasks - such as reading (Carpenter & Daneman, 1981) and writing (Hayes & 
Flowers, 1980) – and been conducted in laboratory settings. Other studies of the process 
following errors have focused on more complex and realistic tasks such as power plants 
(Woods, 1984), human computer interaction (Brodbeck et al., 1993), aviation (Wioland 
& Amalberti, 1996; Sarter & Alexander, 2000; Helmreich, 1999), hospitals (Edmonson, 
1996; Cooper et al., 1982), air traffic control (Wioland & Amalberti, 1998), the maritime 
domain (Seifert & Hutchins, 1994) and everyday tasks (Sellen, 1994). A general insight 
from these studies from different domains is that people have powerful capabilities for 
controlling errors committed by themselves or others. Unfortunately, many of the studies 
have been done by using different conceptual frameworks and therefore it can be difficult 
to integrate their findings.  
 
The goal of the following sections is to provide a review of the status of existing 
knowledge and important issues that should be considered in the development of an error 
management framework. 
 
• In the first section considerations are made concerning the development and content 
of the taxonomy. These considerations constitute the foundation for the decisions 
made in the first phase of the taxonomy development. 
 
• An error management model can be used as an organising principle in the 
development of the taxonomy. Therefore, some of the most promising models will be 
presented and reviewed. 
 
• The concepts of risk and threat management are introduced. Risk management can be 
used to describe the dynamic interaction between error production, detection and 
recovery in dynamic environments which may not be as straightforward as expected 
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and may be dependent on factors such as workload, meta-knowledge and confidence. 
Threat management concerns being aware of important factors in the operational 
environment and dealing effectively with these before they result in errors. 
 
• The taxonomy should be based on a model of human error management and be able 
to answer four fundamental questions: who was involved in the detection and 
recovery of the error and/or its consequences; when was the error or its consequences 
detected; how was the error and/or its consequences detected and corrected; and 
finally what was the behavioural response and outcome? These issues will be 
examined in detail. 
 
3.1 Taxonomic considerations 
 
Before examining specific error management models and taxonomies it is useful to 
decide on generic principles that should guide the development and structure of the 
framework. In the following is a review of the main issues considered before starting on 
the development of the taxonomy (the issues are not presented in any particular order of 
importance). 
 
3.1.1 The level of analysis 
 
Error management is an ongoing task that can be accomplished at different levels within 
an organisation. At the highest level are the high level managers who have the overall 
responsibility of setting and achieving system goals. These managers also play an 
important role in the error culture and thereby the chances of long-term learning and 
improvement. A series of line management departments such as training, maintenance, 
personnel and safety have the responsibility for implementing the strategies of the 
management. Each of these line departments may contribute to defences to avoid failures 
and their potential negative consequences. The last line of defence is the front-line staff - 
namely the controllers - that has the daily responsibility for minimising loss of separation 
events and for the recovery of failures. In the current context the main focus is on 
modelling and classifying how the front-line staff controls errors. Nonetheless, attempts 
at also describing the influence of the broader context on individual performance will be 
made by the use of the so-called Performance Shaping Factors - as will be described later 
on. 
 
3.1.2 Error production vs. error management taxonomy 
 
The way human errors and error management are classified and described may involve 
both similarities and differences, when it comes to the requirements of the taxonomies. 
Both types of taxonomies should make it possible to pinpoint important mechanisms 
involved in a specific human performance event and they should be based on a model 
that contains the important information processing stages behind human performance. An 
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important difference, however, may be found in which components should be described. 
When describing human error the goal is to determine at which stage the information 
processing failed. In contrast, when describing the error handling it becomes relevant to 
describe the whole process of successful/unsuccessful performance (i.e. from an error 
production to an error discovery/recovery phase). In order to describe the successful 
performance we need to examine each of the stages hypothesised to underlie the error 
handling process and their unique characteristics. On this basis it becomes possible to 
map the "cognitive route" of the error-handling task. The fact that an error handling 
model should allow a coherent description of the whole error handling process sets some 
limitations on how much detail it should contain with regards to the numbers of stages 
and their potential transitions. By using a simplistic model it becomes easier to compare 
different error recovery routes. Furthermore, to start out with a simple model is 
seemingly in good concordance with the current level of knowledge in relation to the 
error handling process and to suggest a more elaborate model would probably be 
premature. 
 
3.1.3 Linear vs. circular model  
 
An important issue to consider when developing a model of human error management, 
and as a corollary of this a procedure for studying error management events, is whether it 
should be a linear or a circular model. A linear model will require that a fixed sequence 
of stages can be identified for each error and error management event. Alternatively, a 
circular model will allow a more free flow between individual stages - i.e. some stages 
may be omitted and some stages might be repeated. Both the linear and the circular 
model for describing human error management may be associated with strengths and 
weaknesses. The circular model has the advantage of being able to describe in a precise 
way how the recovery events actually unfold during a scenario (see e.g. Kanse and Van 
der Schaaf, 2000b or section 3.2.1). The approach may, however, have a more restricted 
practical value insofar as a flexible structure in the sequence of stages will compromise 
the possibilities for aggregating data across scenarios and studying interactions between 
stages. Since these characteristics are rather significant with regards to the practical 
usefulness of the framework, it was chosen to accept a rigid linear description of the flow 
of events. 
 
3.1.4 Errors vs. detection/recovery failures 
 
A problematic area when analysing error and recoveries within a single framework is to 
make a clear distinction between errors and unsuccessful detections/recoveries. An 
example where errors and detection/recovery failures are mixed together is shown below. 
 
ATC Example 
Just after the phone call from Stockholm R3 changed the clearance to SAS 
483. The intention was that SAS 483 should have clearance to FL 260, 
but instead R3 said “recleared flight level 270” which SAS read back 
correctly. This may be related to a high stress level due to a high traffic 
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load. Neither R3 nor D3 reacted to the "erroneous" flight level when SAS 
read the clearance back  
[Source: Swedish CAA Report No. 970604]. 
 
In such situations it is necessary to determine whether these missed windows of 
opportunity should be analysed under the heading of error or error management, or both? 
It is difficult to make formal distinctions between error and error management phases. 
Consequently, it is necessary to make a choice between two possible solutions: (1) a 
detection/recovery failure will only be analysed as an error; or (2) a detection/recovery 
failure will be both analysed as a part of the error management process and also as a 
separate error. In the current context the latter solution is chosen because a 
detection/recovery failure is clearly both an error and an integrated part of the error 
management process. 
 
3.1.5 Procedural violations 
 
As previously discussed it is not entirely clear whether intentional procedural violations 
should be conceptualised as a subgroup of errors or not. This issue does also have some 
implications for the error management analysis because intentional violations are 
characterised by the fact that they are volitional - that is, the actor knows beforehand that 
the action or inaction is strictly speaking wrong. An example of this is shown below: 
 
ATC Example 
According to the procedures R6 (and instructor) should have opened 
position R8 at 8.15, but this was not done at the specified time. The 
controller made here a deliberate choice to postpone the opening because 
of low traffic. 
[Source: Swedish CAA Report No. 970826] 
 
In such situations it may seem a bit artificial to speak about detection and correction, 
because such errors are intentional and therefore less likely to elicit a management 
response (Klinect et al., 1999). Nonetheless, it was decided that intentional procedural 
violations should also be included as a subgroup of errors in the error management 
analysis insofar as they constitute an important group of decision-making failures. 
 
3.1.6 Top-down vs. bottom-up approach 
 
The development of an error management taxonomy may be accomplished on the basis 
of a top-down approach (i.e. theory-driven), a bottom-up approach (i.e. data-driven) or a 
combination of these two approaches. In the current context we will start out with a top-
down approach and review taxonomies relevant in relation to understanding the error 
handling process. On the basis of this literature review a preliminary classification 
scheme will be developed. Since very little research in general has been done in relation 
to development of taxonomies to describe the error handling process, even less work has 
been done in relation to examining the error handling process in safety critical domains 
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such as air traffic control. A consequence of this is that we will have to rely – to some 
extent – on work/studies from environments that do not share the characteristics of safety 
and time critical domains. Nonetheless, when exploring and examining the usefulness of 
different classification schemes we will consider their relevance and applicability to the 
task at hand. Furthermore, to enhance the chances of their applicability we will focus on 
studies that have been done in relation to realistic tasks and that consequently have a 
satisfactory level of ecological validity.  
 
3.2 Error management models 
 
As described earlier on it is very important that the classification system is based on a 
coherent model. In the following some error management models will be reviewed to 
establish the most appropriate framework to use in the development of an error 
management taxonomy. 
 
3.2.1 Failure compensation process model 
 
On the basis of insights obtained through a literature survey and analysis of incidents at a 
chemical process plant Kanse & Van der Schaaf (2000a, 2000b) have developed a 
preliminary, general failure compensation model. The model is shown in the figure 
below:    
 
Failure compensation process outcomesFailure compensation processImmediate result
of failure process
Failure process
Technical
failure(s)
(faults)
Organi-
sational
failure(s)
Human
failure(s)
(errors)
Dangerous/
unwanted/
problem
situation
Detection Planned for,
foreseen problems
Unplanned, ad-hoc
Explana-
tion/lo-
calisation
Planned for,
foreseen problems
Unplanned, ad-hoc
Correc-
tion
Planned for,
foreseen problems
Unplanned, ad-hoc
End result
compensation
successful
Compensa-
tion not or
only partially
effective
Incident/acci-
dent with
remaining
negative
consequences
Near-
miss
Unwanted
adverse
effects?
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
End
No
 
Figure 8: Failure compensation process model 
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The model is one of the first attempts at depicting the recovery process in details by 
describing the events beginning with a failure process (either caused by human error, 
organisational failure or technical failure) leading to a dangerous outcome that is 
followed by more or less successful compensation behaviours. Of particular interest are 
the last two boxers in the model, namely failure compensation process and outcome. 
Inspired by other researchers (e.g. Zapf & Reason, 1994) Kanse & Van der Schaaf 
distinguish between three different error handling process stages: 
 
• Error detection: Discovering or suspecting that an error has occurred without 
exact knowledge concerning the nature of the error.  
• Error explanation/localisation: Obtaining knowledge concerning the source of the 
breakdown. That is, the person knows how the error came about and knows why 
the error has occurred.  
• Recovery planning: Initiating a problem solution process to resolve the problem. 
 
It is of interest to note that the transition between the three error handling processes or 
stages is not simply sequential, but is instead more flexible with regards to the individual 
transitions. The model suggests a non-rigid flow from error detection to error recovery 
and some stages may be either omitted or repeated. For example, as part of the planning 
and problem-solving process a person may return to error diagnosis to obtain more 
information concerning the underlying error (Orasanu and Fischer, 1997). 
 
The last box in the figure - the failure compensation process outcomes - is concerned 
with whether the failure compensation process was successful (i.e. a near-miss) or not 
(i.e. incident/accident). These issues associated with the outcome will be further 
addressed when reviewing classifications associated with the "what"-question.        
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Diagnosticity. The advantage of the model is that it describes in a 
rough but intuitive appealing manner the main stages of the error 
management process. Also, it gives a depiction of the potential 
interaction between stages and thereby provides an understanding of 
the potential complexity associated with fault management. 
Usability. The overall structure of the model seems logical and easy to 
understand.  
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Comprehensiveness. The model does not seem to be applicable to 
errors that do not lead to unwanted situations. Consequently, the large 
majority of errors that are caught before any consequences have 
occurred cannot be analysed by this model.  
Comprehensiveness. Little is known concerning the error 
identification phase and the studies that exist indicate that the root 
cause of a problem is rarely sought in high-risk environments 
(Kontogiannis, 1999). This may, in particular, be the case in air traffic 
management where problem solving rarely requires insight into the 
problem's genesis. The exact cause of operational aberrations is often 
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discovered post-hoc, if at all, when e.g. listening to radio recordings of 
the occurrence or talking with the involved pilots. That is, the error 
localisation happens some time after the resolvement of the problem. 
Reliability. Currently, no data are available to evaluate the reliability. 
However, it can be speculated that the many transitions in the model 
might reduce its reliability. 
 
3.2.2 The model of threat and error management 
 
Helmreich et al. (1999) have developed a model of error management on the basis of data 
about flight crew behaviour and situational factors on normal flight. A slightly modified 
version of this model is presented below (that is, all terms related to flight crew have 
been altered to ATCO). 
 
 
External
Threats
Expected
Events /
Risks
Unexpected
Events /
Risks
External
Error
Internal
Threats
ATCO
Error
ATCO
Behaviors
Threat
Recognition
and Error
Avoidance
Behaviors
Error
Detection and
Management
Behaviors
Outcomes
A Safe
Flight
Recovery to
a Safe
Flight
Additional
Error
Incident /
Accident
 
Figure 9: The model of threat and error management 
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According to the model safety risks may come from either expected or unexpected threats 
(in a previous section referred to as performance shaping factors). Expected events 
include predicted weather conditions or airport conditions. Unexpected events, on the 
other hand, include aircraft on wrong flight level, changing weather and equipment 
malfunctions. External errors include all errors caused by non-ATCO people such as 
pilots and maintenance crew.  If these different kinds of threats are recognised at an early 
point in time there is a chance to counteract them and ensure a safe flight. If, on the other 
hand, the threats are not recognised they may lead to an ATCO error. If an ATCO error 
should occur this may lead to different kinds of error detection and management 
behaviours. The result of these could either be a recovery to a safe flight, an 
incident/accident or even additional errors. 
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Diagnosticity. The chief benefit of the model of threat and error 
management is that it provides a description of the main stages of 
threats, errors and error management. In this manner error 
management is placed within a larger context of human behaviour. 
Comprehensiveness. The model is originally derived empirically from 
observations of flight crew behaviour in line operations (e.g. Klinect et 
al., 1999), but has also been applied to the analysis of incidents and 
accidents (e.g. Jones & Tesmer, 1999). In this manner the framework 
has been useful in the study of human errors and their management in 
both normal and abnormal conditions. This means that the framework 
is able to deal with both successful and unsuccessful behaviour.  
Comprehensiveness. The model is unique insofar as it is the only 
model that incorporates threats as an integrated part of the model. This 
is an issue that has not previously been emphasised in any other model 
of error and error management. 
Usability. The model provides an intuitively logical structure to 
understand the error management process. Furthermore, the concepts 
do not require any theoretical background and should therefore be 
easy to understand. 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Reliability. It is interesting to note that the model distinguishes 
between error management at the error and the outcome stage.  
However, in relation to the reliability of classifications made by the 
use of this framework it may introduce some problems because any 
disagreement concerning the stage at which the error was detected will 
also compromise the classifications related to the response and 
outcome of the error. Therefore, it seems more desirable that the 
classification of the stage is separated from the classification of the 
response and outcome of the error. 
Diagnosticity. The classifications included in the model are only of 
behaviours (i.e. the phenotypical level) and outcomes and not of the 
underlying cognitive processes (i.e. the genotypical level). That is, the 
classifications allow a description of what happened but not how it 
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happened. Therefore, the framework should be supplemented with 
other taxonomies to describe the underlying processes. 
Comprehensiveness. In the model it is implied that threat recognition 
and error avoidance will necessarily lead to a safe flight. That is, it is 
possible to be aware of threats without making the necessary 
preparations if, for example, the risk is underestimated. It is also 
possible that in spite of making reasonable initiatives to avoid a threat 
it is not necessarily the case that it is successful (e.g. if a pilot does not 
comply with ATCO instructions aimed at avoiding the threat). 
 
3.3 Threat and risk management 
 
In this section we will examine two concepts that are essential in relation to expanding 
the traditional understanding of the role of the human operator in relation to complex 
systems that has had a tendency to be negatively biased. The human operator is often 
viewed as a potential weak and vulnerable component of the man-machine system that 
has a tendency to commit errors. The concepts of threat and risk management are 
important because they help highlight the positive contribution of the human operator and 
can therefore be significant to give a more balanced picture. The important distinction 
between the two concepts is that threat management is about prohibiting that operational 
threats develop into errors. Risk management, on the other hand, is less concerned with 
the avoidance of errors as such but is to a larger extent concerned with how the errors 
committed are kept under control and prohibited from developing into critical situations. 
In this manner the two concepts complement each other and it seems reasonable to cover 
these two issues within the same section. 
 
3.3.1 Risk management 
 
Error and error management can be conceptualised as an integrated part of a more global 
concept, namely risk management. This is supported by a consensus among several 
studies that show that people as a part of their expertise develop natural abilities to 
control risk-taking and that they develop protections and defences against their own 
cognitive deficiencies (Amalberti & Wioland, 1997). Consequently, the determining 
principle regulating behaviour is not exclusively based on avoiding errors, but is instead 
based on meta-knowledge and confidence concerning being able to control the situation.  
 
A good example of how risk control and human error is related is the issue of cognitive 
resource management. It is commonly accepted that the way workload affects 
performance can be described as an inverted U-curve. A low workload level (e.g. as a 
result of excessive automation) will lead to degraded performance because of decreased 
vigilance and a high workload level will lead to degraded performance because of 
insufficient resources. The highest level of performance is achieved at an intermediate 
level of workload where vigilance is high and the task demands do not exceed the 
available resources. In similar vein, the error production and recovery rate may be 
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constrained by the demands of the context. This idea is illustrated in the figure below 
(Wioland et al., 1999): 
 
Safe operation
Error production
rate
Very degraded
(potentially loss of
control)
Detection &
recovery
rate
Relaxed Standard Maximum
Context and performance
Rate (error
production/
recovery)
 
Figure 10: Hypothetical relationship between workload and rate of error 
production/recovery 
 
As can be seen in the figure the highest level of contained errors can be achieved at 
intermediate levels of task demands. Here a stable level of errors is committed and most 
of these are corrected. When the task demands are low there is a tendency to be 
inattentive and thereby commit more errors and at the same time not be vigilant enough 
to catch the committed errors. On the other hand when the task demands become too high 
rapid increases in the error production rate will occur and at the same time the resources 
for detecting and recovering will become depleted. The result may be loss of control of 
the situation. 
  
A series of field studies among air traffic controllers have provided support for the notion 
that individuals progressively adapt their resource management as a function of task 
demands (Sperandio, 1971; Sperandio 1978). Such changes in control strategies are, in 
particular, important as the air traffic complexity increases insofar as highly economical 
operating methods become necessary to avoid that the workload capacity is exceeded. 
For instance, in many ATM facilities it is common practice during low workload periods 
to give a shorter than planned route as a general traffic service to the aircraft, but as 
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traffic load and complexity increases there is a tendency to stick more to the original 
flight plans. The reason for this is that it becomes exceedingly difficult to maintain the 
picture as workload increases and by sticking to fixed routes less resources are required 
in relation to maintaining awareness about the individual flights. It has also been 
observed by Sperandio that as traffic increases the controllers take into account a smaller 
and smaller amount of variables for each aircraft and start dealing with clusters of aircraft 
instead of optimising each individual flight path. By applying such control strategies the 
controller can handle more aircraft without a high error rate or excessive workload. The 
disadvantage is, however, that by having all of the flights in-trail and travelling at a 
uniform speed, the efficiency of the system is temporarily disrupted.  
 
Results from other studies also indicate that people play an active and dynamic role in 
relation to protecting themselves against the risk of losing control of the situation 
(Wioland and Amalberti, 1996). These control strategies are based on a compromise 
between handling the demands of the system in the best way possible and at the same 
time using a minimum of cognitive resources. The natural consequence of the dynamic 
cognitive control is that people's meta-knowledge and confidence play an important role 
in relation to ensuring that the risks stays within acceptable tolerance limits (i.e. the field 
of safe operations). To have a reliable and well-calibrated meta-knowledge concerning 
one's abilities to control the situation is important to be tuned into the cues signalising 
safety boarders being approached and to have necessary skills to recover from these 
errors. To ensure continuous control of the situation is therefore not the same as total 
error avoidance, but it is instead dependent on meta-knowledge associated with error 
awareness and recovery capabilities. This is supported by studies from different domains 
that show that the errors that are not corrected are also the ones associated with the least 
risk (Orasanu et al., 1999; Wioland & Amalberti, 1998). 
 
People’s ability to develop reliable and well-calibrated meta-knowledge can inadvertently 
be undermined by otherwise well-intended safety initiatives. Actually, it has been argued 
that many existing safety initiatives aimed at improving system safety and efficiency - 
such as design, training and safety policies - may impede operators’ chances of 
developing natural and adaptive abilities to control risk (Amalberti, 2001). In particular, 
the problem is that operators do not experience sufficient possibilities to stabilise their 
meta-knowledge and confidence with regards to their individual safety abilities. An 
extreme focus on protections and defences against human errors undermines the 
possibilities to control the system and ultimately results in an increased risk. Hence, to 
advance safety within already ultra safe systems it is necessary to focus on "strengthening 
the ecological mechanisms of cognitive error regulation rather than on fighting them" 
(Amalberti, 2001). 
 
3.3.2 Threat management 
 
In the following we will examine what is meant by threat and threat management. Several 
definitions of threat have been suggested: 
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“A threat is an indication of something coming; a menace; a likely cause of 
harm” 
(Down, 2001) 
 
“Threats are events or errors that originate outside the influence of the flight 
crew but require active crew management to maintain safety.” 
(LOSA Rating Form, Human Factors Research Project at University of Texas) 
 
These two definitions vary slightly with regards to which events that might fall under the 
heading of threat. The first definition treats threats as a very broad concept that, in 
principle, can cover many different operational factors. Unfortunately, the definition is a 
bit vague. The second definition is more precise by emphasising that threats should only 
be events that can be actively handled by the crew, but at the same time puts some 
unnecessary limits on the concept by constraining it to events that occur outside the 
influence of the group of actors being observed. Below is suggested a modified definition 
of threat: 
 
Threats are operational factors that have the potential of jeopardising safety and 
require active operator involvement to maintain safety. 
 
In the current context, threats are different from errors insofar they are only red flags of 
potential danger (Down, 2001). If the threats are identified in due time it is possible to 
initiate actions that will eliminate or reduce their consequence. However, if it is 
mismanaged or not managed at all the threat becomes an error. In short, a threat might 
lead to an error, but does not need to. That is, there is a probabilistic relationship between 
threat and errors. Furthermore, an error can, in principle, occur without any preceding 
threats (e.g. a slip-of-of-the-tongue can occur without any threats preceding it). 
 
Threats can be subdivided into two independent dimensions: 
 
• Internal: These are situations generated at the operational position. This includes, 
for example, an ATCO that is inexperienced (e.g. on-the-job-training) and 
inadequate team resource management. 
• External: These are situations, events or errors that occur outside the operation. 
This can, for example, be an amateur pilot who is not following the instructions or 
environmental factors that needs to be taken into account when issuing 
instructions. 
 
• Anticipated: Some examples could be forecasted weather (e.g. a thunderstorm) 
or a military exercise. In both of these cases the ATCO will have advance 
information and will thereby be able to incorporate these threats into his or hers 
plans (e.g. reroute aircraft). 
• Unanticipated: This can, for example, be an equipment failure or an emergency 
flight. These kinds of threats are more dangerous seen from an operational 
perspective because they require an immediately alteration of the existing plans to 
be able to deal with an unforeseen situation. So, time will have to be spent on both 
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understanding the new situation and on developing a new plan when time might 
already be a limited factor. 
 
Even though these dimension seem clear-cut it should be noted that there will be some 
grey-area cases. For example, a threat might be unexpected at a certain phase in the 
course of events, but at some point later in time recognised and incorporated into the 
existing flow of plans. In such cases it might be difficult to determine whether this was an 
expected or unexpected threat. 
 
Not all threats are equally important and an important task of the controller is to be aware 
of the threats and to have an adequate understanding of their significance. The potential 
risk associated with different threats is dependent on both the frequency and the potential 
severity associated with the threat. Since a human controller does not have access to data 
about the frequency and the potential severity of a given threat when having to judge and 
decide about which action alternatives to choose between, they will to a large extent be 
dependent on the individual controller’s experience and training. 
 
A good example of how threat anticipation and management is dependent on the 
individual operator’s background and experience is given in the following authentic 
story: 
 
ATC Example 
The ATCO is working alone at night and the only traffic is a slow-going and 
light aircraft. The aircraft is flying from South towards Korsa (a navigational 
fixpoint) at 3000 feet. The standard procedure is to leave Korsa at a certain 
radial. The pilot is then required to turn to runway and will be at final 
approach at 12 miles. With a small aircraft like this the procedure is not 
considered necessary. Based on the current course towards Korsa the ATCO 
estimates that the aircraft will reach final approach at seven miles. The 
ATCO instructs the pilot to continue on the current course and promises to 
give radar vector to final approach at seven miles. The pilot says thanks. 
Now he does not have to look into procedures to see when to descend to 
different altitudes. Instead it is the responsibility of the ATCO to ensure that 
the aircraft is flying at the right altitudes.  
  
Outside Korsa the ATCO instructs the aircraft to descend to 2000 feet. 
Currently the aircraft is flying 30 degrees and the ATCO intends to give the 
aircraft turn instructions to 120 degrees to final approach and then the pilot 
can use the instrument landing system (ILS) to complete landing. The ATCO's 
wife now calls on the telephone because her car is broken down on the 
freeway. When the call is finished the phone rings again. This time it is an 
ATCO from an adjacent aerodrome informing that Rescue 277 (an 
emergency flight) is starting in five minutes and will perhaps cross the 
ATCO's airspace. The aircraft has now passed the point at which he should 
turn to final and is actually close to the sector boarder. The pilot calls the 
ATCO to ask whether he should not turn to the localiser soon. The ATCO 
suddenly discovers that he has forgotten to turn the aircraft at the right time 
and gives instructions to the aircraft to turn right 150 degrees. The aircraft 
did not get in conflict with any other aircraft, but was about to leave the 
sector. If the aircraft had left the sector it would not have imposed any 
conflict factor for any other aircraft.  
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On the basis of this episode and similar episodes from low traffic periods the 
ATCO has learned that he is particularly vulnerable to fatigue and 
distractions in such working situations and to engage in precautionary 
initiatives to avoid similar situations in the future. Therefore, the ATCO now 
gives the pilot instructions to report at certain distances from the VOR. So, 
even if the ATCO should forget the aircraft a call from the pilot can act as a 
reminder and thereby an additional safety net. In this manner there is a 
better chance of breaking the chain of events. 
[Source: Personal interview with an ATCO] 
 
Having reviewed and clarified the concept of threat – and some of its dimensions - it is 
now time to look at what is meant by threat management. A definition is provided below 
(adapted from Jonker, 2000): 
 
Threat management is the act of anticipating and minimising the potential 
consequences of threats on flight safety. 
 
In this definition it is emphasised that effective threat management does not only include 
remaining aware of the critical features of the dynamic environment that vary constantly 
but does also require that initiatives are made to deal with the threats before they develop 
into a more serious situation.  
 
3.3.3 Threats and error management strategies  
 
By knowing in advance that certain kinds of errors are more likely to occur in specific 
threat situations it may become easier to prevent, discover and recover from the error. 
Some empirical evidence exists to support that experience may play a vital role in 
relation to being prepared for threat and error situations. In a preliminary study by 
Mogford et al. (1997) instructors were asked to review five recordings of air traffic 
sequences containing operational errors. That is, the participants viewed the same 
information as the controller who originally committed the errors. On this basis they were 
asked to verbalise any antecedent threats that could lead to an error. Furthermore, they 
were asked to identify when actions were taken that would lead to loss of separation and 
make useful suggestions regarding recovery strategies. The results of this study showed 
that at least one of the four observers recognised an antecedent threat to each error (such 
as high complexity and similar call signs). Furthermore, in nearly every case the error 
was identified and useful suggestions were made with regards to recovery strategies. 
These results indicate that domain expertise supports early recognition of factors that 
could lead to error, the identification of errors and the generation of useful actions to cope 
with the problems.  
 
Several other studies have also provided support for the notion that experienced operators 
have powerful capabilities for dealing with the threats they may encounter. In a study by 
Klinect et al. (1999) of flight crew behaviour the relationship between threats and errors 
and their management were examined on the basis of normal flights. Here it was 
demonstrated that only about 7 percent of the threats influenced the flight crews to 
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commit errors. This indicates that a large part of the threats are discovered and handled in 
due time before leading to errors. In another study by D’Arcy & Della Rocco (2001) 100 
ATCOs were interviewed about their decision-making and strategic planning. In this 
study 65 percent of the participants reported that they always try to formulate a (thought-
out) back-up plan before sending an initial clearance in case their first strategy for solving 
a problem did not work. Furthermore, the more experienced the participants were the 
more likely they reported formulating back-up plans.  
 
As the studies above have indicated control can be maintained on the basis of anticipation 
of threats by either tackling the threat itself (threat management) or by making the 
problem constraints explicit and being prepared that the events may evolve in untoward 
ways (error management). Below are given some concrete examples of how controllers 
can deal with different kinds of threats: 
 
• Workload: Strategies to control threats may be developed as a result of 
experience.  For example, as previously described, controllers start dealing with 
clusters of aircraft as traffic load increases to minimise the workload (Sperandio, 
1978). In similar vein, if the traffic volume becomes high the radar controller in 
charge of the sector may ask for a data controller to assist in the sector work. In 
this way an additional set of “eyes and ears” may support situation monitoring 
and control (Kerns et al., 1999).  
 
• Memory frailty (ATCO): Another example of strategies to counteract the 
occurrence of errors is the way controllers use flight progress strips as an external 
error memory aid. If the controller has to put something temporarily off (e.g. a 
request from a pilot which cannot immediately be granted) the controller can 
offset the relevant strip from the others and use it as a prospective memory cue 
(Vortac et al., 1995). In this way there is a smaller risk of forgetting the future 
action. 
 
• Memory frailty (Pilot): The STCA (Short-Term Conflict Alert) does not know 
the ATCO's plan. So, if for example an aircraft is flying at flight level 330 and 
another is climbing to flight level 310 the STCA may start because within a 
certain time limit (e.g. 40 sec.) a conflict may occur if the current trajectory is 
continued. The STCA does not know that the aircraft will not continue through 
flight level 310. Many ATCOs have made it a good habit to use the STCA as a 
sort of reminder. It happens that pilots erroneously continue a climb and thereby 
burst their assigned flight level. The STCA will normally be activated before this 
happens and the ATCO can therefore make a call to the aircraft to confirm that 
they will be stopping at the cleared level. 
 
• Unreliable (amateur) pilots: The ATCOs warn each other concerning pilots who 
are less reliable ("if they are given a right turn they might turn left"). This is a way 
of ensuring to be extra alert concerning these pilots. They are then given a larger 
safety margin to be prepared for the unexpected. 
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• Confusable callsigns: If a wrong transponder code is used the computer will not 
be able to generate a label on the radar. It can be a problem if two callsigns are 
very similar because then a wrong aircraft might enter the transponder code. Here 
it is particularly important to check the read back to ensure that it was the right 
aircraft that answered. 
 
The strategies described above are all examples of effective threat management. 
However, sometimes the adaptive strategies initiated by the controllers may not be 
equally successful and may in some cases actually be counter-productive. An example is 
given below: 
 
• Failed threat management. In studies of controller-pilot communications it has 
been revealed that during very busy periods controllers have a tendency to issue 
longer and more complex messages in a rapid manner (Morrow et al., 1993). This 
is done to minimise the amount of turn-takings and time on the radio frequency. 
Unfortunately, this delivery technique imposes heavy memory burdens on the 
pilots with significant risks of miscommunications. Contrary to the intention the 
end result may be that a lot of extra time must be spent on clarifications and repair 
of misunderstandings. 
 
3.4 The "who”, "how", "when" and "what" question 
 
After having reviewed the issue of threat and risk management it is now time to turn the 
focus to what happens after an error has occurred. A comprehensive error management 
taxonomy should be able to answer following questions: 
(1) who was involved in the detection and recovery of the error or its consequences;  
(2) when was the error or its consequences detected;  
(3) how was the error or its consequences detected and corrected; and finally  
(4) what was the behavioural response and outcome?  
In the following we review studies that directly or indirectly deal with these questions in 
relation to the error capture and management process. 
 
3.5 The "Who"-question 
 
If the detection and correction is not done by the error producer, it may be done by (1) 
another person in the operational system; (2) automated devices or (3) no one at all - 
often in spite of recovery opportunities. In the following we review studies related to who 
was the active part in the detection and recovery of the error or its consequences.  
 
3.5.1 Detection and correction by a third party  
 
In many complex environments the safety and efficiency of the system is largely 
dependent on the resources of all the people involved in the process. This is particularly 
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evident in relation to detecting and correcting errors. In such situations other people 
involved in the operational task may constitute an important safety net insofar as they can 
bring the attention to the problem and may also be helpful in the resolvement of the 
problem. For example, it has been suggested that detection and correction of operational 
problems by a third party may be especially useful in situations where a person is 
unwilling or unable to revise his or her current interpretation of the situation even though 
data suggests another interpretation (Woods, 1984). This kind of phenomenon is often 
referred to as fixation error.  In such situations the misperceptions are often detected and 
corrected by a third party entering the situation with a fresh viewpoint. 
 
That a third party can contribute to bringing a person out of his/her cognitive fixation is 
illustrated in the following description from a British ATM incident report (Airprox 
24/96): 
 
ATC Example 
A B767 is flying at flight level 280 and when entering a new sector the pilot 
calls the sector controller. However, the sector controller, when answering 
him, says "maintain flight level 310" and the pilot replies "up to 310", 
which is not noticed by the sector controller. Consequently the aircraft 
climbs toward flight level 310 and is thereby brought into direct conflict 
with a B747 on flight level 310. The support controller notices on the 
radar display that the B767 is climbing above flight level 280 and tries to 
bring this to the attention of the sector controller. In spite of the fact that 
the sector controller had just talked with the pilot and had also ticked the 
callsign on the flight progress strip (as an indication that the aircraft has 
contacted the sector), she replies that the B767 aircraft is not on frequency. 
Only after several attempts by both the support controller and the chief 
sector controller the sector controller calls the aircraft and gives an 
avoiding action. It is noted in the report that the high workload may have 
been a major contributory factor to the occurrence.     
 
The importance of a fresh viewpoint from a third party has also been highlighted in a 
study of critical incidents associated with exchanges of anaesthesia personnel during 
anaesthesia management (Cooper et al., 1982). Such relief procedures are designed to 
provide the original anaesthetist with either a short break or a relief for the remainder of 
the operative procedure. There may be advantages and disadvantages associated with the 
relief procedure. On one hand, the relief practices may be useful because the presence of 
a new anaesthetist may have restorative effects on fatigue and, at the same time, may 
support discovery of errors. On the other hand, the relieving anaesthetist may require 
some time to build a coherent picture of the situation and knowledge of the patient may 
not be properly transmitted. The study by Cooper et al. demonstrated that the relief 
procedure was more often beneficial than not. In particular, the relief anaesthetist played 
an important role in the discovery of an error or causes of an error.  Since relief practices 
are also a characteristic of the ATM environment it can be speculated that similar results 
could be produced in the area of ATM. 
 
It is also interesting to note how explicit efforts are often made in relation to supporting 
error detection and correction by a third party in the area of ATM. It is, for example, well 
known that miss-communications occur frequently between pilots and air traffic 
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controllers and that such communication breakdowns can have dire consequences for the 
safety of the air traffic system. Most of the errors are detected and corrected before they 
have adverse consequences. An important explanation for this is that the system has 
developed effective and robust cross-people detection and correction mechanisms such as 
read-back procedures. Another example of how to support cross-people error 
management mechanisms is by having open and accessible air traffic work spaces which 
may enhance the chances that a colleague notices or remembers something that the 
controller may have forgotten (Hopkin, 1995). 
 
To explore in more general terms the detection by a third party process Wioland & 
Doireau (1995) carried out an experiment where pilots watched a movie of routine 
commuter flight and were asked to detect pilot errors. The results from the experiment 
indicated a low average rate of detection by the observers. The errors detected by the 
observers consisted mainly of rule- and knowledge based mistakes whereas only a small 
part of the errors detected were slips. A possible explanation of this result is that the 
observers analyse the situation from a relatively high level of abstraction. This is 
interesting insofar as those errors most frequently detected by the observers were also the 
ones that normally are not easily detected by the people committing them. So, even 
though the quantity of errors detected by a third party is relatively low the quality of these 
errors detected may be of considerable importance. There may be several reasons why the 
amount and quality of errors detected may differ between self induced errors and errors 
observed by a third party. First of all, the cognitive traces of intentions and actions will 
only be directly available in the case of self-induced errors.  In the case of detection by a 
third party the observer is deprived of the subjects real intentions (which is, in particular, 
important in relation to detecting slips) and will have to rely more on indirect criteria, 
general task knowledge and aspects of context. 
 
3.5.2 The Wioland & Amalberti Taxonomy 
 
An issue that is important in relation to analysing the amount and quality of errors 
detected is the degree to which the context and goals are shared between the actor and the 
observer (Wioland & Amalberti, 1998). That is, detection by a third party may be 
dependent on the relationship between the actor, the observer and the task environment.  
It may be speculated that if the goals and the context are largely overlapping and 
compatible there is a good chance of detecting and solving errors by the help of a third 
party.  To describe the relationship between the actor and the observer in relation to the 
error management process it has been suggested to distinguish between two dimensions: 
the level of context sharing and the level of possibilities to act on the situation and to 
share the same goals (Wioland & Amalberti, 1998; Wioland & Doireau 1995).  Based on 
a high and low-level on these two dimensions four types of actor-observer relationships 
can be produced: 
 
• Co-actor in context: the observer and the actor share almost the whole context, 
goals and actions (e.g. two ATCOs or two pilots). 
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• Co-actor outside context: the observer and the actor share a significant part of 
goals, but not the context (e.g. an ATCO and a pilot). 
• Outside observer: the observer and the actor share the context, but have different 
goals and possibilities of action (an aircraft passenger or a visitor). 
• Excluded observer: although sharing neither the same context nor the same goals 
and possibilities of action they are nonetheless related (members of an 
investigation committee or distance educational situations). 
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Diagnosticity. The nice thing about these distinctions between 
different types of actor-observer relationships is that it is a generic 
taxonomy and that the main types of relationships may have different 
effects on the contribution of a third party in the error management 
process. 
Comprehensiveness. The categories above seem to cover the main 
types of generic relations there might exist between an error producer 
and an error detector. 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Diagnosticity. Two of the categories seem to be of minor relevance in 
the current context. “Outside observer” seems to be a highly 
infrequent detector in the error management process. Furthermore, 
“Excluded observer” is seemingly a group of actors whose role is post-
hoc and therefore not a part of the error management process as such. 
Usability. To agree on what constitutes “context” might be associated 
with some problems because this might not be a clear-cut-quality. For 
example, two ATCOs working together in the same position (i.e. a 
Radar and a Planner controller) will share a significant degree of 
context. However, two ATCOs controlling two adjacent sectors will 
share less context, but might still be located closely within the same 
facility. Therefore, “context” seems to be a matter of degree. 
Reliability. The reliability of the classifications above is currently 
unknown. 
 
3.5.3 Team related recovery failures 
 
Even if an error has been discovered by a third party it is far from certain that information 
will be passed on to or received by the error perpetrator. To structure such team related 
recovery failures Sasou & Reason (1999) have suggested that the recovery process can 
fall into three stages, namely detection, indication and correction: 
 
• Failure to detect: If some member of the remainder of the team different from the 
error perpetrator had the opportunity but did not notice the error this is a failure to 
detect. 
• Failure to indicate: If an error has occurred and has been detected by another team 
member the recovery may still break down if the error is not brought to the attention 
of the remainder of the team. 
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• Failure to correct: Even if another member of team becomes aware of the error and 
indicates it to the error perpetrator it is not certain that the error perpetrator will 
change his or her mind. 
 
Implicitly in these three stages is the assumption that the error perpetrator should also be 
the one who corrects the error. This may, in particular, be the case in situations where the 
error perpetrator is a person of higher competency or if only the error perpetrator has 
authority to correct the error (e.g. an ATCO may not or can not interfere with traffic in 
another ATCO's sector). 
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Usability. For team-related recovery activities the above categories 
seem intuitively understandable. 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Comprehensiveness. The distinctions are mainly related to team 
problems where one operator should detect, indicate or correct another 
operator's error. This restricts the general applicability of the 
taxonomy (for example, most errors are detected by the people who 
commit them - see e.g. Wioland & Doireau, 1995). 
Diagnosticity. The categories can only be used to analysing recovery 
failures and not successful recoveries. That is, they can only be used to 
redescribe the error in other terms. We do not learn anything about the 
resources used for catching errors before they lead to serious 
consequences. 
Reliability. No information about the reliability of the framework is 
provided. 
 
3.5.4 Detection and correction by automation 
 
Automation is in many complex domains being implemented as a means to enhance 
system efficiency and safety. In some areas such as aviation a high level of automation is 
already achieved whereas areas such as Air Traffic Control the introduction of 
automation is only in an initial phase. However, due to the fact that the current ATC 
system is in many places stretched to its capacity limits and the prospects of increasing 
traffic volumes in the near future it is expected that automation will become a more 
dominant part of ATC. This development may affect the human role in the ATC system 
and, as a consequence of this, both the errors that will occur and how errors may be 
handled. 
 
A central concept in relation to understanding the interaction between the human 
controller and the automated system is levels of automation. Basically the concept refers 
to the extent to which a task is performed by either the human operator or by machine 
control. At one extreme, a low level of automation means that a particular function or 
task is performed with little or no involvement of machine control. At the other extreme, 
a high level of automation means that most or all of an operation is carried out by 
automation. Intermediate levels of automation lie between these two extremes.        
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It has been argued that instead of characterising levels of automation as a uni-
dimensional scale it is useful to subdivide it into three dimensions, namely information 
acquisition, decision and action selection and implementation (Wickens et al., 1998). 
Information acquisition includes functions such as filtering (for example highlighting 
highly relevant items and greying irrelevant items) and transformation (for example 
computing estimated time to contact between aircraft). Decision and action selection are 
related to the degrees of freedom the human operator has to select different action 
alternatives. Finally, action implementation is a dichotomous scale and concerns whether 
an action is carried out by human or machine control.  
 
To illustrate in concrete terms how the three dimensions may affect the error 
management processes it is useful to take a look at the conflict avoidance task. Many 
ATC facilities have automated conflict detection systems that constitute an important 
safety barrier in the case that an imminent conflict is not discovered by the controller. 
This is a good example of automation at the information acquisitions/integration 
dimension. Furthermore, automation could also be expanded to the decision and action 
selection dimension. Similar to automated systems found on-board many flight decks it is 
possible that the controller is not only warned about a potential conflict, but is also 
advised about which recovery action to take. Finally, in relation to the action 
implementation the automation could, in principle, implement the computed most optimal 
course of action.        
 
Automation can in this way have a role that is comparable to other people in relation to 
the detection and correction of problems. As in the case with detection by a third party it 
is also possible that even if a problem is detected by the system it is not necessarily 
perceived as a problem by the human controller. If, for example, the warning system 
generates a large amount of false alarms, there is a large risk that the controller will 
dismiss the warning even though it reflects a genuine problem. In similar vein, the 
controller may reject an advisory from the system simply because he or she does not trust 
or understand the rationale of the advisory.  
 
3.6 The "How"-question 
 
In the following section we will explore the potential content of the error detection and 
correction stage. Error detection concerns becoming aware of the fact that an error has 
been committed without necessarily having any specific knowledge about the root cause. 
This is probably the most analysed stage which is hardly surprising since it is necessary 
to detect a problem if the error is to be handled. The mental activities associated with 
overcoming or minimising the consequences of the error is referred to as recovery 
planning. No specific taxonomies are available for this stage, but since this is an ordinary 
problem solving or decision-making situation it should be possible to use some of the 
existing taxonomies within this area.  
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3.6.1 Error detection 
 
Error detection is probably the part of the error handling process that has been given most 
attention. This is hardly surprising insofar as error detection is an important part of the 
error handling process: To be able to recover from an error it is necessary to become 
aware of the presence of a problem. This awareness can be triggered by a mismatch 
between the expected outcome and the observed outcome. Furthermore, it may be based 
on a weak or strong indication of something being wrong. In the following we will 
review some studies that can shed some light on the different ways at which people 
become aware of the presence of error. It should be emphasised that the review will not 
include context-limited experimental tasks. Instead the focus will be on studies that 
involve tasks and activities with a certain level of realism and complexity. 
 
3.6.1.1 The Allwood-Montgomery taxonomy 
 
One of the first attempts to distinguish between different detection types in relation to 
solving realistic tasks has been done by Allwood and Montgomery (1982, 1984). This 
error detection taxonomy was developed on the basis of analyses of think-aloud data 
from subjects solving statistical problems. The focus was to explore how people detect 
their own errors before finding the right answer. The categories that emerged from the 
study consisted of three types of negative evaluation episodes (i.e. types of error 
detection processes) and these are shown in the figure below: 
 
 
Error detection processes 
Planned error detection 
(”Standard check 
episode”)  
Spontaneous error detection 
processors 
Direct error detection 
(”Direct error hypothesis episode”) 
Error detection via symptoms  
(”Error suspicion episode”) 
 
Figure 11: Taxonomy of types of error detection processes. 
 
• Standard check: These episodes occur when the subject examines or evaluates the 
state of the task without having any specific expectation of problems or errors. 
• Direct error hypothesis: These episodes occur when the subject reacts to a strange 
result and suspects a particular error to have occurred. 
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• Error suspicion: Even though the subject may not be aware of any specific error 
having occurred, something in the produced state or solution of the task is strange 
or unexpected. 
 
The distinction between standard check and spontaneous error detection episodes is 
interesting insofar as these two categories may be modifiable through different means.  
The standard check episodes seem to be closely related to the individual problem solving 
strategies. Consequently, this category may be influenced from training, instruction and 
experience (e.g. knowing to be error-prone in certain situations). The spontaneous 
detection episodes seem to depend more on how easy it is to perceive and evaluate the 
current state of the task.  This may critically depend on characteristics of the interface and 
on the quality of the feedback.  In short, the different types of detection can be supported 
in different ways. Consequently, the taxonomy may have some relevance in relation to 
the error management framework.  
 
The taxonomy has not only been applied to statistical problem-solving, but also to 
analysis of subjects think-aloud protocols while using a database system (Rizzo et al., 
1987) and to evaluation of an automated process control system of a hot strip mill in a 
steelworks (Bagnara & Rizzo 1989). Among other interesting results these studies 
revealed that the different categories of error detection behaviours were associated with 
different detection rates (the direct error hypotheses have the highest detection rate). 
Furthermore, the occurrence of different categories of error detection behaviour was 
dependent on the specific type of error involved. In particular, the results indicated that 
slips were most closely associated with direct error hypothesis, rule-based mistakes were 
closely associated with direct error hypothesis and error suspicion, and knowledge-based 
mistakes were most closely associated with error suspicion. 
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Diagnosticity. The results presented above indicate that the Allwood-
Montgomery taxonomy could be useful as a rough way of classifying 
error detection processes. A positive feature of the taxonomy is the 
different kinds of errors might be differentially supported by different 
detection mechanisms. Therefore, by knowing the types of errors that 
are most likely to occur in a given setting it is also possible to derive 
the most appropriate detection mechanism to be supported. 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Comprehensiveness. The Allwood-Montgomery taxonomy is not very 
detailed and it only describes the kind of behavioural episodes in the 
error detection, but not the mechanisms behind error detection (Sellen, 
1994). For example, we do not have any information concerning the 
role of memory in detection and we do not know which types of 
information that were used in the detection. 
Usability. The usability of the taxonomy might be limited in the area 
of ATC. For example, the concept of Standard Check might not apply 
very well to the task of the controller insofar as he or she is constantly 
monitoring and up-dating the mental picture of the situation and the 
Standard Check can not be distinguished as a separate phase. 
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Reliability. No data are available concerning the reliability of the 
framework, but due to the fact that the taxonomy does not fit very well 
with domain of ATC it can be speculated that reliability might be 
jeopardised. 
 
3.6.1.2 The Rizzo et al. taxonomy 
 
Rizzo et al. (1995) have suggested a somehow more refined and comprehensive 
taxonomy to describe the processes underlying error detection (or as they prefer to call it: 
mismatch emergence). This classification scheme has been developed on the basis of 
diary studies where subjects have reported errors they have committed in the everyday 
live and how they were detected.  The main categories are given below. 
 
• Inner feedback: This kind of detection is based on information in working memory 
and not on the consequences on the environment. Rizzo et al. (1995) give an example 
where a woman has forgotten her book in a pub. Because her bag felt lighter than 
usual she suddenly remembers that she has left the book at the pub. It can be expected 
that the reminding/memory retrieval category may be most important in relation to 
prospective memory failures. Bagnara and Rizzo (1989) suggest that inner feedback 
also can be associated with mental simulation of activities and of their expected 
consequences and results. In this case the working memory can be used to make 
predictions about whether a plan is going to fail or succeed before implementation of 
any action. 
 
• Action feedback: This kind of detection is based on information from the action itself 
and, again, not on the consequences on the environment. This kind of detection can 
be triggered by visual, proprioceptive or auditory response-produced information. In 
this case, the error may be 'caught-in-the-act' (Kontogiannis 1999). This kind of 
detection is often experienced by skilled typists when they become aware of an error 
before having seen the output of their action. 
 
• External/outcome feedback: Detection occurs due to unexpected consequences on the 
environment. Sometimes the error information is evident and could, in principle, be 
detected by any third person even without complete knowledge of the actor's goal 
(Zapf et al., 1994). At other times - and in particular in complex high-technology 
environments - the detection becomes cumbersome because the feedback may be 
delayed and the effects of previous actions may be masked (Kontogiannis 1999).  
 
• Forcing function: An action cannot be carried out due to some constraints in the 
environment. This kind of error detection differs from action and external/outcome 
feedback by the fact that the correctness of an action does not need to be judged with 
reference to any internal criterion or expectation. Instead the correctness of an action 
is determined by constraints and the physical barriers of the environment (Sellen, 
1994). 
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• Intention uncertainty: This kind of detection occurs when the subject feels unsure 
about what do next. This kind of detection is often related to the loss of activation of 
the ongoing intention.  Rizzo et al. (1995) gives an example where a man walks to his 
office to get a document and on the way gets into a conversation with some 
colleagues. When he reaches his office he has forgotten what he was there for and had 
to return to his colleagues to ask why he went to his office.  
 
• Standard check: The progress in the task is checked/updated without any specific 
hypothesis of a problem.  Simulations of production planning exercises in a hot strip 
mill indicated that this self-monitoring strategy was, in particular, useful in detecting 
slips and to some extent rule-based mistakes (Bagnara and Rizzo, 1989). 
 
There is some overlap, but also some significant differences between this taxonomy and 
the Allwood-Montgomery taxonomy. In relation to the similarities the most evident 
overlap is the standard check behaviour. The relationship between the remaining 
categories in the classification scheme is less evident. It may be speculated that inner 
feedback, action feedback and forcing function may lead to a direct error hypotheses 
insofar as these types of feedback will often be available close in time to the error 
committed (however, direct error hypotheses is not necessarily time-locked to the error).  
In contrast, error suspicion may arise some time after the error committed and be related 
to external/outcome feedback or intention uncertainty.   
 
Sellen (1994) suggests an error detection scheme that is very similar to the Rizzo et al. 
taxonomy. Also this taxonomy was developed on the basis of a large corpus of diary 
reports. One of the most noteworthy differences between the two taxonomies is the 
absence of any category similar to the standard check category. A potential explanation 
for this is that standard check does not describe which kind of information that was used 
for the error detection. Instead standard check seems to be related to the kind of strategies 
used for detecting errors. Another category that is not present in the Sellen taxonomy is 
intention uncertainty. Also this category is a bit problematic. One of the reasons for this 
is that this category contains a combination of an error (having forgotten what to do) and 
error detection (awareness of having forgotten what to do). 
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Diagnosticity. The advantage of this taxonomy is that it provides an 
elaborated list of the underlying processes associated with the error 
detection. The taxonomy is, in particular, useful insofar as it pinpoints 
some different types of feedback processes that underlie direct error 
hypothesis and the error suspicion episodes as described by Allwood 
and Montgomery (1982, 1984). 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Comprehensiveness. An important source of information relevant for 
error detection – namely communication with other people in the 
operational environment – is not included in the taxonomy (see e.g. 
Kontogiannis, 1999). 
Reliability. A potential disadvantage of the Rizzo et al. taxonomy is 
that no studies have been made to validate it. Therefore, it is currently 
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not possible to determine its reliability. 
Usability. The level of detail might be too high for the taxonomy to be 
practically useful. That is, some of the finer details in the taxonomy 
might be too subtle to be practically useful (e.g. the difference 
between inner feedback and action feedback). 
 
3.6.2 Error recovery 
 
Having discovered a problem - and maybe identified its cause – the person should 
consider how to solve the problem. In this case, we do not have any off-the-shelf 
classification schemes to use. However, since the recovery-planning phase is basically a 
problem-solving and decision-making situation (with the possible exception of less time 
and resources available and a higher level of stress), it should be possible to identify a 
proper decision-making model that can bring about some of the important types of 
decisions. Since a recovery might be either successful or unsuccessful (i.e. incomplete or 
flawed) it is necessary that the classification can be used in both cases. Consequently, the 
classification of the process underlying the decision-making or problem-solving process 
should not require any normative judgement of what should have been done. 
 
3.6.2.1 The SRK Taxonomy 
 
Previously in the review of error taxonomies Rasmussen’s Skills-Rules-Knowledge-
model was presented. The SRK-framework has mainly been used in studies of human 
error. That is, the type of error was determined on the basis of the kind of control that was 
exercised in the situation. However, the framework could, in principle, also be used to 
describe the level of performance or behaviour that was exercised in relation to a 
(perhaps) successful performance (see e.g. Johannsen, 1988). That is, recovery may be 
associated with different levels of control and experience: (1) Skill-based recoveries are 
usually routine and automated; (2) Rule-based recoveries use certain types of responses 
of known and frequently experienced scenarios; (3) Knowledge-based recoveries concern 
responses to tackle novel and perhaps dangerous situations which require intensive use of 
cognitive resources. 
 
3.6.2.2 The Bagnara & Rizzo taxonomy. 
 
A potential way to describe the different types of error identification and resolvement 
processes can be found in Bagnara & Rizzo (1989). Even though this classification 
scheme can be found under the heading of "Error recovery" the content of the taxonomy 
seems to be related to both the error identification and recovery process. The main 
categories of this taxonomy are distinguished on the basis of the amount of resources, if 
any at all, that are invested in understanding the error. The main categories are: 
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• Immediate correction: "The user, as soon as he detects a mismatch, makes the 
appropriate correction." 
• Automatic causal analysis: "The user, as soon as he detects a discrepant outcome, 
establishes the cause of the error and what should be done for recovery." 
• Conscious causal analysis: "The user undertakes a typical causal analysis. He 
carefully evaluates the outcome obtained, the actions previously performed, and, 
on the basis of these evaluations puts forward the sensible hypothesis about why 
and when the error has been made and on how to recover from it, plan and 
execute the actions." 
• Explorative causal analysis: "The user is able to identify the source of the 
discrepancy, but finds himself uncertain about the causal chain by which the 
source can be related to the observed discrepancy. In this case, various hypotheses 
are usually tested one after the other in an explorative manner." 
• Overcoming of the mismatch: "The user, when facing a discrepant result, either 
does not pay any attention to what he has already done or, after an exploration 
about the discrepancy, realises him unable to reach an adequate hypothesis. In 
both cases, the user tries either to simply bypass the mismatch, or to fulfil the 
goals to be reached by looking for alternatives within the same scenario to 
overcome it, or searches for alternative scenarios." 
 
A central aspect of this taxonomy is that it distinguishes between forward and backward 
analysis. The first four categories of this taxonomy are associated with backward analysis 
and describe - in incremental order - the amount of cognitive resources associated with 
establishing the causal analysis of the error.  This kind of taxonomic structure is in good 
concordance with the Rasmussen skills-rules-knowledge taxonomy.   
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Diagnosticity. The taxonomy distinguishes between different kinds of 
cognitive resource levels involved in the recovery process.  
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Diagnosticity. A significant part of the framework is devoted to the 
error identification process. In the current context error identification 
is not considered relevant for the error management process.  
Reliability. No information is available concerning the reliability of 
the taxonomy. However, it can be expected that it may be difficult to 
determine on such a detailed level the amount of cognitive resources 
invested in the backward analysis.  
Usability. The fact that the taxonomy describes both the error 
identification phase and the resolution phase within the same 
dimension might limit its practical usability. 
Comprehensiveness. The fact that many errors might be ignored is not 
covered by the taxonomy. 
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3.6.2.3 The Decision Process Model 
 
Orasanu and Fischer (1997) have developed a decision process model in order to describe 
and understand flight-related decision-making. The model was developed on the basis of 
both observational studies of pilot crews carrying out critical scenarios in a high fidelity 
simulator and aviation incident and accident reports. On this basis a number of decision 
events were identified. 
 
The Orasanu-Fischer model is shown below: 
 
 
What is the problem? 
How much time is available? 
How risky (present and future)? 
Problem understood  
OR NOT understood 
Time available 
Risk variable 
Problem understood Problem NOT 
understood 
Rule 
available 
Multiple 
options 
available 
Multiple 
tasks to do 
No options 
available 
Apply rule Choose 
option 
Schedule 
tasks 
Create 
solution 
Gather more 
information 
Cues
Time limits  
Risk high 
 
Figure 12: The Decision Process Model.   
 
There are two main components of the model, namely situation assessment and choice of 
action. In relation to the situation assessment component it can be seen that understanding 
of the situation as well as the perceived risk and the amount of time available to make a 
decision play a central role. If the risk is high and the time is limited, it will be necessary 
to make a fast decision perhaps without having a thorough understanding of the situation. 
On the other hand, if more time is available several options may be relevant.  In the case 
where a problem is inadequately understood attempts may be made to get more 
information to disambiguate the situation. If time is available and the problem is 
understood, selecting an appropriate cause of action may depend on requirements of 
situation. In some situations a procedure may clearly specify the appropriate course of 
 74
action.  In other cases where no rule prescribes a single procedure it is necessary to either 
choose between several options, schedule problems or inventing a new course of action. 
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Diagnosticity. The model contains some important dimensions 
relevant for task domains characterised by high risk, tempo and 
complexity. In particular, the decision events are derived from critical 
task components such as risk, time pressure, situational ambiguity (i.e. 
does the information available clearly specify the problem) and 
response determinacy (i.e. is there a single prescribed response, 
several responses to choose and prioritise between; does the person 
have to create a unique response for the situation). 
Reliability. The model can be directly transferred into the flowchart 
and it is easy to see the relationship and differences between the 
individual categories. 
Usability. The concepts seem to be very intuitive and do not require 
specific theoretical insight. 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Reliability. A potential problem with the category "schedule tasks" is 
that it may be difficult to distinguish from “choose option”. 
Comprehensiveness. All of the categories in the model are derived 
from the assumption that a problem is present and that some remedial 
action is required (this is related to the fact that the model deals with 
responses to abnormal and emergency conditions, not with routine 
decisions). This assumption is not necessarily always true for error 
situations. In some situations no deliberations of recovery solution is 
necessary simply because an intervention might exacerbate the 
situation or because the error problem was considered inconsequential. 
That such error awareness is of importance has been demonstrated in 
an experimental study of a micro-world that simulated an air traffic 
control situation (Wioland & Amalberti, 1998). Here it was shown that 
the subjects with increased level of expertise (and thereby increased 
level of knowledge of the system and the risks) tolerated a larger 
amount of errors without consequences. Therefore, a category labelled 
"ignore" may be included in the "problem understood"-branch. 
 
3.7 The "When"-question 
 
A framework for the analysis of cognitive reliability that contains some potentially 
relevant categories has been proposed by Kontogiannis (1997, 1999). Of particular 
relevance in the current context is the taxonomy associated with the processing stages at 
which an error may be detected. In the figure below can be seen that a performance 
sequence starts out by setting high-level goals and formulating plans to achieve the goals. 
At this initial stage in the performance sequence flaws in the goals and plans might be 
realised before they are implemented on the system. At the next stage the chosen action is 
carried out and feedback associated with the action might indicate some deviation from 
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the desired and intended goal. Finally, actions carried out will after some time delay have 
consequences. Detection at this stage might be hindered by operator actions being 
masked by e.g. actions taken by automated safety systems or other persons. Seen from a 
safety perspective detection should preferably occur before critical consequences have 
ensued. 
 
PLAN
ACT
(delays)
Wait
Set high-
level goals
(intentions)
Formulate/
specify
plans
Monitor
outcomes
Masking
effects
 
Figure 13: Performance stages at which error detection/recovery can occur. 
 
On the basis of this model it is possible to distinguish between three different kinds of 
detection stages, namely the planning, execution or outcome stage.  
 
• The outcome stage: A mismatch between expected effects and observed outcomes 
can trigger error detection. 
• The execution stage: Errors are ‘caught-in-the-act” and subsequently corrected. 
• The planning stage: Operators recognise wrong intentions, or mismatches between 
intentions and plans or procedures formulated earlier. 
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Diagnosticity. The three stages of error detection are of interest 
because the required safety initiatives to support error detection may 
vary for the individual stages. Error detection at the planning stage 
may e.g. be dependent on the quality of communication and co-
ordination between controllers, issues gathered under the general 
heading of team resource management. Therefore, this kind of 
detection may be enhanced if operational plans and decisions are 
properly communicated and acknowledged; if clear roles and 
responsibilities are defined; if the controllers are open for reviewing, 
questioning and revising plans. Detection at the execution stage may 
be supported by controllers actively monitor and crosscheck 
information from colleagues, pilots and system. 
Comprehensiveness. All major stages seem to be covered by the 
taxonomy. 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Usability. Some may object to the concept of error detection at the 
planning stage insofar as it can be argued that if an error has not been 
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carried out it should not be considered error. Nonetheless, as explained 
above, there can be good reasons for distinguishing between error 
detection at the planning stage and at the execution stage since error 
detection can be supported by different means at these two stages. 
Reliability. Finally, it should be mentioned that no formal attempts 
have been made to apply or validate the classification system to real 
error situations. 
 
3.8 The "What"-question 
 
Recovery in dynamic environments is in its nature more complicated than in static 
environments. The important difference between these two kinds of environments is that 
in dynamic environments the time has direct consequences for the state of the 
environment. Hence, the implications of errors may alter as a function of time. If, for 
instance, two aircraft are on a conflicting course due to an error by an ATCO, the 
criticality of the situation may significantly depend on the time elapsed from error 
production to recovery. 
 
The potential relationship between error recovery and outcome failures in dynamic and 
time critical environments is depicted in the figure below (Woods et al., 1994): 
 
Recovery Interval 1 Recovery Interval 2
Time Outcome Failure 1 Outcome Failure 2
Initial
”Error”
”Error”
DetectionShift in Consequences Shift in Consequences
EndStart
 
Figure 14: Relationship between error recovery and outcome failures. 
 
The figure describes the hypothetical consequences of an error as a function of the 
recovery interval (please note that the transition between the recovery intervals may not 
be clear-cut in many situations). If the error is corrected within the first recovery interval 
the effects of the error will completely be reversed. However, at some point in time the 
error will have negative consequences. The consequences may increase in severity as 
additional recovery intervals are exceeded and at some point recovery may no longer be 
an option. The time span between the recovery intervals can be seen as indication of the 
error tolerance of the environments since in an error tolerant environment an error should 
not have immediate and irreversible consequences. In the following we examine two 
ways of classifying the response and consequences of an initial error. 
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3.8.1 Backward and forward recovery 
 
The goal of error recovery is to counteract the negative effects of an error. This may be 
accomplished with different effects on the environment. Dix et al. (1993) distinguish in 
this context between two different types of recovery execution.  
 
• Backward error recovery: This type of recovery concerns situations where the 
situation before the occurrence has been restored. In traditional computer systems this 
can be achieved through commands such as "undo", "cancel" and "stop". 
 
• Forward error recovery: In many situations it is not feasible to return to the state of 
affairs before the error occurrence (for example, breaking a piece of china). Instead 
an alternative course of action will be necessary to minimise the negative 
consequences of the action and, as far as possible, restore the situation to normal (for 
example by gluing the pieces of the china together). 
 
At first glance one would expect that backward error recovery is mainly a possibility in 
static systems (such as traditional HCI tasks) whereas forward error recovery is the only 
way to go in safety critical domains such as air traffic control where actions and time can 
cause irreversible changes to the object of interest. That is, most emergency procedures 
concern stabilising the situation. Nevertheless, backward error recovery may also occur 
in many situations. If, for example, a pilot reads back a clearance wrongly, the controller 
can correct it immediately and the effects of the error are totally removed. 
 
In time critical systems the chances of carrying out a backward recovery may depend on 
system dynamics and on the time elapsed between the error and the recovery response 
(Jambon, 1997). That is, within a certain time window it will normally be possible to 
restore the original situation before the occurrence of the error. After this there may still 
be chances of achieving a non-optimal, but more desirable system's state (i.e. forward 
recovery). As time elapses system failures may propagate and at some point in time it 
may no longer be feasible to achieve a recovery - and a disaster is possible. 
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Diagnosticity. It can be important to be able to distinguish between 
situations where a complete recovery without any consequences is 
obtained from situations where it is necessary to make a quick fix to 
stabilise the situation. 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Reliability. It may be difficult to make a clear distinction between 
forward and backward recovery in dynamic environments which may 
be related to the fact that the framework originally has been developed 
for static tasks. 
Comprehensiveness. The distinction does not provide any information 
about the successfulness or unsuccessfulness of the error management 
– that is, the outcome of the recovery. 
Usability. The distinction between backward and forward recovery 
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might be a bit subtle – in particular in dynamic environments. Here the 
state of the environment will change as a function of time and it might 
be difficult to determine whether the situation before the occurrence 
has been restored. 
 
3.8.2 Threat and error management  
 
Previously, Helmreich’s model of threat and error management was presented. Below is 
shown graphically the classifications system associated with the model. 
 
Error 
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Intentional Noncompliance 
Procedural 
Communication 
Proficiency 
Operational Decision 
Trap 
Exacerbate 
Fail to Respond 
Error 
Responses 
Error 
Outcomes 
Inconsequential
Undesired Aircraft 
State 
Additional Error
Undesired 
State 
Responses 
Mitigate 
Exacerbate 
Fail to Respond 
Recovery 
Additional 
Error 
Incident / 
Accident 
Undesired 
State 
Outcomes 
 
 
Figure 15: A model of flightcrew error 
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After the production of an error three different kinds of responses may be produced, 
namely trap (error is managed before it becomes consequential), exacerbate (the error is 
detected but the action or inaction leads to a negative outcome) or fail to respond (either 
because the error is undetected or ignored). On the basis of these three responses there are 
three possible outcomes: inconsequential, undesired aircraft state or additional error. If 
the consequence is an additional error this may be the beginning of a chain of errors. If 
the result is an undesired aircraft state this may be mitigated, exacerbated or not 
responded to (i.e. “Failure to respond”). Finally, there can be three different possible 
resolutions of the undesirable aircraft state: recovery, additional error or 
incident/accident. 
 
The model and associated taxonomy presented in this section is directly related to the 
model of threat and error management presented earlier on. Therefore, the main 
conclusions related to the framework can be found in the review of the threat and error 
management model (see section 3.2.2). However, in the current context it suffices to say 
that the framework provides a useful and intuitively logical way of classifying both the 
response and outcome associated with the error management. 
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4 Performance shaping factors 
 
In the discussion of the nature of human error it has been argued that accidents do not 
happen narrowly as the result of human errors (as well as failed recoveries), but can 
instead be seen as instances of human-task mismatches (Rasmussen, 1987). In other 
words, properties of the task environment - including everything from poor design to bad 
management decisions - are important to include when analysing performance 
breakdowns in complex systems. This fact has been highlighted by detailed analysis of 
tragic accidents both within the area of aviation (e.g. Tenerife) and many other domains 
(e.g. Three Mile Island, Bhopal, Zeebrugge). A logical consequence of this insight is that 
features of the context and the work situation should be taken into account when 
analysing the chain of events in critical scenarios. Only in this manner it is possible to 
obtain a comprehensive understanding of the aetiology of the events and, ultimately, to 
be able to enhance system safety. In this section the focus will be on the contextual 
influence on human performance or, in short, Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs).  
 
One of the first areas where the concept of PSFs was used was in the domain of Human 
Reliability Assessment (HRA). The purpose of HRA is to make a risk assessment of a 
given system by analytical and predictive means instead of having to await empirical data 
from incidents and accidents. The risk assessment is achieved through a combination of 
logical “tree” models of a system and human error probabilities which allows an 
estimation of how the system functions might be affected by human error. In this context 
PSFs have been used to modify the human error probabilities (Swain & Guttmann, 1983). 
The exact structure, content and number of PSFs has varied as a function of the chosen 
methodology and the domain in question.  
 
The concept of performance shaping factors was also adopted by Rasmussen (1982) as an 
integrated part of his multi-facet taxonomy for description and analysis of events 
involving human malfunction. It was introduced as a recognition of the fact that it is 
insufficient to only look at the information processing aspects of man-machine 
interaction when analysing the chain of events in situations involving human 
malfunction.  
 
A more recent attempt to integrate the influence of contextual factors on the genesis of 
human errors is found in a model by James Reason (1990), namely the well-known 
"Swiss Cheese" model of human error causation (see below). In this model there are four 
levels of human failure that can each influence the next. The model works backwards 
starting with an accident that was triggered by active failures by the people at the 
frontline. However, these active failures only constitute the last "holes" in the cheese and 
before these three levels of so-called latent failures preceded the active failure. The first 
is psychological precursors of unsafe acts and include factors such as mental fatigue and 
poor communication and coordination practices. The next level is in the model can help 
explain why these precursors were present and is referred to as line management 
deficiencies. Human failures at this level can e.g. be reflected in bad manning practices or 
deficiencies in the training department that can be manifested in a variety of 
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preconditions such as the aforementioned. The final level in the model is fallible 
decisions made at the organisational level. At this level the problems are, in particular, 
related to the trade-offs between the two not always compatible goals, namely production 
and safety. 
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Figure 16: Reason’s multi-layer model. 
 
Reason’s model is of interest because it encourages investigators and analysts to move 
beyond the people at the frontline and to expand the focus to all levels within the 
organisation. A limitation is, however, that it does not define what “the holes in the 
cheese” really are (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1999). That is, in order to be able to make a 
detailed analysis of contextual influence on human performance it is necessary to produce 
a detailed taxonomy that can be used for analysing incidents and accidents. 
 
4.1 Taxonomic considerations 
 
In relation to development of a list of PSFs there are some unique requirements that 
should be taken into consideration: 
 
Positive and negative factors: Traditionally, the focus has been on the negative side of 
the PSFs, namely on factors which could adversely affect the operator's performance (i.e. 
human errors). Even though the PSFs are normally used in this negative context, the 
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concept itself is, in principle, neutral and should therefore cover all factors (both positive 
and negative) that are likely to affect operator's performance (from error to recovery). In 
other words, it should be possible to expand the concept to also encompass positive and 
negative factors that influence the production, detection and recovery of human errors. In 
this context it should acknowledged that there are some difficulties in relation to 
determining and eliciting positive contributing factors. When analysing, for example, an 
incident, it is often possible to enlist a series of factors that contributed in a negative way 
to the events. Here it is possible to use counter-factual logic and state that if these factors 
had not been present or had been different then the incident would probably not have 
occurred. On the other hand, it is far more difficult to identify factors that actually had a 
positive contribution to the course of events and thereby were important in relation to 
averting an even more serious situation. This is because these factors can be seen as 
factors taken for granted - they constitute "the background of the picture". Since these 
positive factors do not stand out in the same way as the negative factors it becomes more 
difficult to identify and classify these "what saved the day" factors. 
 
Categories not mutually exclusive: In contrast to the previous taxonomies the PSFs 
cannot always be mutually exclusive. As it has been emphasised by Rasmussen an 
identification of the root cause to a sequence of events is dependent on the stop rule 
applied in the after-the-fact-analysis. Even though it is probably not possible to produce a 
PSF taxonomy that contains categories that are mutually exclusive, it would nonetheless 
be a strength of the taxonomy if a single category could be chosen in most of the cases 
being analysed. This is related to the fact that if many equally good candidates are 
available in many cases this will introduce randomness in the choice of categories as well 
as the amount categories being picked.   
 
Domain specific issues: Up until now it has been an explicit requirement that categories 
should be generic and task-independent. However, it should be acknowledged that some 
groups/categories will be domain specific. The reason for this is that each domain will 
possess unique characteristics that will be inadequately described by a strictly context-
independent PSF-taxonomy. 
 
Interaction between levels: In Reason’s “Swiss cheese” model it is implied that features 
at one level can affect the following level. In principle this opens up for a series of 
interactions (e.g. between the high-level decision-makers and the line management) that 
ultimately can have consequences for the chain of events leading to a disaster. If all the 
possible interactions should be taking into account it would be a rather daunting task. 
Furthermore, the more removed from the front-line the focus comes the more difficult it 
becomes to establish a link between error or error management and the PSF. For this 
reason it was chosen to restrict the framework to only involve the potential interactions 
between the performance at the frontline and contextual influences. 
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4.2 Overview of frameworks 
 
A few studies have been carried out that have produced some distinctions that are 
relevant and useful in the current context. The studies and associated frameworks will 
briefly be reviewed in the following. Since there exists an extensive amount of such 
frameworks the current review is in no way intended to be exhaustive. Instead the focus 
is on frameworks that have explicitly focused on the domain of the Air Traffic 
Management (or aviation in general) and/or in some way have focused on factors 
influencing the recovery process. The review of these frameworks will be somehow 
limited by the fact that little research literature is currently available to determine their 
utility. 
 
4.2.1 HERA PSFs 
 
One of the most comprehensive PSF taxonomies has been developed in the HERA 
project (Isaac et al., 2000). This project was carried out as a collaborative effort between 
Risø National Laboratory and National Air Traffic Services (NATS) for the European 
organisation for air traffic management (EUROCONTROL). The purpose was to develop 
an approach to ATM analysis to determine how and why humans were contributing to 
incidents. An important part of the HERA approach was the PSF taxonomy that was used 
to capture the context surrounding the ATCO’s task. The taxonomy was developed on the 
basis of a huge database of ATC incident reports (more than 50 actual incident reports 
from different European and non-European countries), a literature survey and input from 
domain experts and, finally, a review of current and future ATM systems to ensure that 
the aspects that are particularly relevant in the ATM system were included. The main 
groups that have been generated on this basis can be seen in Appendix B. 
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Diagnosticity. The PSF framework has been directly aimed at the ATC 
environment and is based on an extensive database of ATC incidents. 
It should therefore be highly relevant for the current project. 
Comprehensiveness. The list of PSFs has been determined on the basis 
of an extensive review of factors influencing incidents in several 
different countries. Furthermore, about 60 per cent of the subjects who 
participated in an evaluation of the framework indicated that they felt 
that the level of coverage within the PSFs was about right (Isaac et al., 
2001). 
Usability. The overall structure of the PSFs is fairly logical and easy to 
understand. 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Comprehensiveness. The taxonomy has mainly been developed to 
structure the analysis of factors that enhance the potential of errors and 
not error management as such. Therefore, it should be transformed and 
adapted to become applicable to the broader definition of PSF. To do 
this it is necessary to rethink many of the identified categories so that 
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the negative phrasing is converted into a neutral phrasing (e.g. 
"abnormal time pressure" can be altered to "time available and degree 
of urgency").  
Comprehensiveness. Even though the subjects who participated in the 
evaluation of the framework indicated that they felt that the level of 
detail was about right the list of PSFs might be too comprehensive and 
the level of detail too ambitious. The problem could, for example, be 
that several categories might apply to the same factor and 
consequently it might be a bit arbitrary which category or categories 
that will be chosen. Furthermore, the framework runs the risk of 
producing many missing values as well as requiring the classifier to 
make some very subtle distinctions. 
Reliability. An extensive validation of the PSFs revealed that analyses 
of errors in incident reports on the basis of these PSFs did not provide 
robust results (Issac et al., 2000). This might partially be a result of the 
high level of detail within the system. 
 
4.2.2 ADREP-2000 
 
ADREP-2000 is a classification system that has been proposed by the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) for structuring the data analysis of aviation accidents 
(Cacciabue, 2001). This highly detailed taxonomy provides the opportunity to subtract 
important human factors insight from accident databases. The foundation of the 
framework is the classical SHEL-model that has been suggested by Edwards (1972). In 
this model the focus is on the human component (i.e. the liveware) and its interaction 
with other main components within a socio-technical system. The components are given 
in the SHEL-acronym: Software, Hardware, Environment and Liveware. The main 
groups available within the ADREP-2000 system generated on the basis of these 
components can be seen in Appendix B. 
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Diagnosticity. Elaborate efforts have been made to ensure that all 
possible contextual factors are included in the framework and it has 
with success been tested out on a number of accident reports 
(Cacciabue, 2001). 
Comprehensiveness. All conceivable factors that could influence 
safety within the area of aviation seem to be included in this very 
comprehensive framework. 
Usability. The fact that the framework is based on a traditional and 
well-accepted overall structure for the framework (namely the SHEL-
model) makes it easier to “navigate” within the taxonomy. 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Comprehensiveness. The level of detail within ADREP-2000 seems to 
be too ambitious. 
Usability. The high level of detail also compromises the usability to 
some extent because it is necessary to walk through a very long list 
 85
before finding a relevant category. At the same time the classifier 
might have to check a lot of other places within the taxonomy to see 
whether some other category might be more appropriate. 
Reliability. The reliability of ADREP-2000 is currently unknown. 
Since many similar categories can be found in the taxonomy this 
might compromise the reliability. For example, it might be difficult to 
distinguish between several categories under the heading of  
“Psychological limitations” such as Perception, Attention, Monitoring 
(attention) and Vigilance. 
 
4.2.3 Recovery influencing factors 
 
A preliminary list of factors that can influence the recovery process has been proposed by 
Kanse & Van der Schaaf (2000c). The list has been developed on the basis of findings 
from a literature survey and an exploratory study that involved incident data from a 
chemical process plant. The factors identified are able to affect all phases of error 
management (which in the current context involve error detection, explanation and 
correction) even though some factors might only affect parts of the error management 
process. The main groups of recovery influencing factors can be seen in Appendix B. 
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Diagnosticity. The framework does provide some unique categories 
relevant for the recovery process and most of the main groups fit 
directly with the structure of the HERA PSFs. 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Usability. Some of the main groups (e.g. “Factors relevant for 
prioritisation of recovery related tasks” and “Occurrence-related 
factors”) are not very intuitively understandable. Furthermore, some of 
the specific categories are probably a bit difficult to directly apply to 
an error management analysis (e.g. “Feeling of responsibility with 
regard to recovery” and “Pride regarding a job well done”). 
Diagnosticity. The list of factors is only designed to describe factors 
that affect the recovery process and not the error production process. 
Comprehensiveness. It should be noted that the list of factors is not as 
comprehensive as the HERA PSFs (and, of course, no Air Traffic 
Control specific groups are included).  
Reliability. The reliability of the categories is currently unknown. 
However, it does contain several categories with subtle differences. 
For example, under the Person related factors, there are several closely 
related factors: “Competency in task concerned”, “Competency with 
regard to specific problem occurrence” and “Competency in problem-
solving tasks in general”. 
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4.2.4 ASAP contributing factors 
 
The ASAP (Aviation Safety Action Programme) incident reporting form has been 
developed by Helmreich and co-workers to obtain both structured and unstructured 
information about events that have the potential of negatively impacting aviation safety 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 2000). In the form there is a list of factors that can influence the 
events in either positive or negative direction. Most of the main groups are specifically 
related to the aviation domain (e.g. operational tasks, aircraft and auto flight system) and 
therefore not relevant in the current context. However, one of the groups, namely 
"Cockpit Crew Factors", could be considered highly relevant in the current context. 
These factors are of interest in so far as they concern crew resources management (CRM) 
issues. The list of ASAP cockpit crew factors is provided in Appendix B (source: ASAP 
Report Form Version 2/24/00, The University of Texas Human Factors Research 
Project). 
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Diagnosticity. The CRM factors seem highly relevant and concern 
social factors that could play a vital role in relation to error and error 
management. Furthermore, these categories are of such a nature that 
they can contribute in both a positive and negative direction. 
Usability. The categories seem easily applicable and refer to issues 
that have been well documented within the research literature. 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Comprehensiveness. It is mainly categories related to social factors 
that are of relevance within this framework. 
Reliability. The reliability of the framework is currently unknown. 
Some of the categories cover issues that share many features and, 
consequently, might not be easily distinguishable. 
 
4.2.5 BASIS 
 
The Human Factors Reporting (HFR) programme is a component of the British Airways 
Safety Information System – in short, BASIS (O’Leary, 1999). The purpose of this 
confidential and voluntarily reporting system was to obtain information concerning why 
flight crew related problems occurred and also how effectively the crew coped with the 
problems. The main groups of categories within the framework are shown in Appendix 
B. 
 
Conclusion 
Advantages Diagnosticity. This is one of the few frameworks that in a 
comprehensive manner deals with a wide range of factors that can 
contribute positively and negatively to safety. 
Comprehensiveness. The framework contains a series of main groups 
that are relevant for understanding aviation safety. 
Usability. The overall structure of the taxonomy is easily 
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understandable and in good concordance with other frameworks. 
Disadvantages/
limitations 
Reliability. No information is available about the reliability of the 
framework. 
Comprehensiveness. A large amount of the categories are specific to 
the domain of aviation and do therefore not apply to ATC. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
As can be seen from the previous sections there already exist different classification 
systems that could be of relevance in relation to developing a PSF-taxonomy. Even 
though there are some variations in the structure of the main groups and the level of detail 
in the individual frameworks their overall structure is fairly similar. The HERA 
taxonomy is the only one of the previously described frameworks that has been 
extensively validated and that has been directly aimed at air traffic control. It is also 
characterised by the fact of having been derived from an extensive amount of incident 
reports. For these reasons it seems useful to start out with this framework. However, 
since the focus is limited to negative factors it could benefit from being modified by other 
PSF-classification systems such as the other considered frameworks since they deal 
directly with the issue of recovery. Another issue that should be taken into consideration 
is the fact that the HERA taxonomy has in an empirical validation yielded only a very 
modest level of inter-rater reliability. The exact reason for this cannot be determined with 
certainty, but a likely explanation is that the system is too comprehensive. Consequently, 
it might be beneficial to reduce the level of detail in the taxonomy to a more modest 
level. 
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5 Enhancing error management 
 
Error management is not just a coincidence but is instead something that can be 
reinforced through different kinds of human factors initiatives (Van der Schaaf, 1995). In 
particular, team training and implementation of new technology seem to be promising 
ways to strengthen the systems' defences against human errors. In the following we will 
explore how research within these two areas could have some beneficial effect in relation 
to enhancing error management within ATC. More specifically, the focus will be on the 
training concept referred to as Team Resource Management and the design concept 
referred to as Interactive Critiquing. 
 
5.1 Training for error management 
 
In spite of the fact that many errors happen on a daily basis in Air Traffic Control 
facilities the rate of loss of separation remains relatively low. This indicates that safety 
nets embedded in the system, in addition to a portion of sheer luck, play a significant role 
for the safety and for breaking the chain of errors that may lead to an accident. Some of 
these safety nets are technologically based whereas others are based more on human 
resources. If improvements in error capture and thereby safety is to be achieved it seems 
obvious to focus on these two mechanisms which are amenable to change. Error 
management promotion based on technological improvements is limited by being both 
time-consuming and costly. On the other hand, human performance and teamwork is 
more adaptable and amenable to change. In the following we will review the relationship 
between effective teamwork and error management - and how controllers through 
training can become better at helping each other in anticipating, detecting and resolving 
potential problems. 
 
Some of the most disastrous accidents in the history of aviation - such as the Tenerife-
accident in 1977 and the Potomac-accident in 1982 - involved situations where at least 
one other person was aware of (or suspicious of) the problem but failed to share critical 
information or generate a response from the appropriate person (Hawkins, 1987). A less 
dramatic but illustrative example of how incomplete teamwork can adversely affect 
safety is given in the following authentic air traffic control incident report. 
 
ATC Example 
The R8-position was at 13.42 split into R8 and D8. When the strips for 
KLM and SAS arrived to D8 he placed the strips in the FPB. The strips 
arrived approximately at the same time. R8 and D8 discussed whether a 
conflict would occur and agreed that this was not going to be the case, but 
decided to follow up on situation. How this should be done was not 
discussed. 
At 14.04 EKDK Planner A co-ordinated with D8 "KLM direct SORLA" 
which D8 accepted and marked SOR on the strip. R8 did not become aware 
of this information. D8 did nothing to bring this information to the attention 
of R8 since this information was considered "routine". In this manner R8 
did not achieve a full picture of the traffic situation. 
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At 14.06 SAS was on TRENT and was cleared ALM direct LEKSI which 
gave SAS a shorter flight route to the east of the planned route. At 14.12 
KLM called on the frequency and was cleared directly to SORLA by R8. 
KLM had gotten this route by EKDK, but as earlier described R8 did not 
know about this. When KLM called he was North of the traffic route that R8 
had expected. R8 did not know this since he focused on the other traffic 
situation to the Northeast. The ATCO in the R8-position said (according to 
the tape recordings) that he had radar contact with KLM. After the incident 
R8 could not recall he had said radar contact or whether in this situation 
he had made any estimation of conflict. In the mental picture of R8 there 
was no conflict in this situation.  
R8 was engaged in a conflict to the Northeast. R8 therefore changed the 
radar picture to be able to see situation better. When this traffic situation 
was solved R8 changed his radar picture back. Some minutes before D8 
was relieved. According to the procedures D8 should now relieve R8. When 
the relieved D8 stood beside the R8-position to relieve, R8 discovered that 
there was a conflict between KLM and SAS. At 14:18:08 SAS was given 
order to descend immediately to FL 270. SAS received traffic information 
and discovered immediately afterwards KLM. The separation was violated. 
[Source: Swedish CAA report # 981115] 
 
In this incident R8 and D8 detected at an early point in time that there was a risk of 
conflict between KLM and SAS, but decided that it would probably not be a problem. 
Incomplete communication and co-ordination between these two controllers - combined 
with the distraction by the other traffic situation that demanded attention - created the 
foundation for not catching this erroneous judgement and thereby not avoiding the 
conflict. In short, if the teamwork had been more effective the incident would probably 
have been avoided. 
 
One approach to improving error management is training programs united under the 
heading of crew resource management (CRM) or team resource management (TRM). The 
goal behind these training programs is to make better use of the human resources with 
specific focus on enhancing inter-personal aspects such as communication, group 
decision-making and leadership. Such issues have been identified in many system 
breakdowns to play a crucial role for safety within the area of aviation as well as other 
safety critical domains. Several generations of crew resource management have evolved 
as new and refined insights have emerged concerning the relationship between teamwork 
and safety. For the most recent generation of crew resource management it has been 
suggested that the overarching rationale for the training should be error management 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 2000). This implies that crew resource management should 
provide countermeasures against error in the form of avoidance, detection and 
management techniques. 
 
Nagel (1988) has concluded that over half of aircraft incidents are the result of 
communication breakdowns. This makes the link between crew resource management 
and effective error management behaviour an important issue seen from a safety 
perspective. Therefore, it is of interest to determine what kind of crew resource issues are 
critical factors for ensuring the control of errors. In a study conducted by Jones (1998) 
team issues related to successes and failures in an air traffic system were investigated. 
More specifically, events related to mishaps, normal operations and exemplary 
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performance were contrasted on the basis of three team related scales, namely task 
management (e.g. contingency planning and workload distribution), information 
exchange (e.g. offering and encouraging sharing of information) and interpersonal 
relationships (interpersonal sensitivity and receptivity). Preliminary results from the 
study revealed that the team issues as reflected in the three behaviour scales played a 
critical and significant role in relation to operational errors. In other words, positive 
scores on the scales were associated with an absence of mishaps.  
 
Even though no firm conclusions can be drawn from the study concerning whether the 
behavioural markers of team skills were positively associated with mainly error 
avoidance or error management (or both) these results highlight in general terms the 
importance of team skills in error containment. Furthermore, it is not difficult see how 
these three team dimensions may relate to error management. The task management 
dimension is primarily related to ensuring a clear workload distribution and preparing for 
a multitude of contingencies. This is exemplified in the incident described above where 
the lack of contingency plans impaired the team's ability to cope with their initial 
erroneous judgement of the situation. That is, even though they knew that the judgement 
of situation could be wrong they did not consider precautionary initiatives. The other 
dimension, namely information exchange, concerns e.g. passing information to 
appropriate persons without being asked, asking questions to clarify ("take nothing for 
granted") and providing periodic updates which summarises the picture. In the incident 
above the data controller could have been more effective in the information exchange to 
ensure that the radar controller became aware of the altered course of one of the aircraft. 
If this have been done the radar controller would have had a more accurate picture of 
situation and perhaps have discovered the emerging conflict at a much earlier point in 
time. The final dimension is interpersonal relations and concerns issues such as 
acceptance of critique and listening actively to ideas and opinions of others. An example 
of how failure to listen to comments from colleagues can jeopardise safety is given 
below. 
 
ATC Example 
A newly checked out ATCO was sitting together with two colleagues in 
approach. Since the ATCO was newly checked out the colleagues were 
extra attentive to him. There was very little to do so the ATCOs were 
talking with each other. The ATCO had two aircraft. The weather was good 
so one of the aircraft from the West was allowed to fly a visual approach. 
He told the aircraft to pass the coastline at 2.500 feet and that he could 
now fly to the final on his own (error #1). The aircraft was then handed 
over to tower. Both of the colleagues of the ATCO knew that to shift an 
aircraft to visual approach so early (the aircraft had 15 to 20 miles left to 
go) then it is almost guaranteed that he will fly a very long visual approach. 
Another aircraft from North which had arrived through Sveda was also 
allowed to fly directly (it is not yet visual but is on radar vectors). This 
aircraft was flying very fast. The two colleagues told the newly checked out 
ATCO - a bit for fun - "Wow - that was early you shifted him to visual 
approach.” So, at first it was just considered an undesirable strategy 
(during training/check-out you learn that you should not shift the aircraft to 
visual approach – you should have the aircraft on your own frequency so 
you can control it). When the aircraft got closer to runway 22L the two 
colleagues started hinting to the ATCO that now it was about time to do 
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something. He did not intervene because he was checked out as an ATCO 
by now (error #2). So, he did not respond and the two aircraft continued 
getting closer and closer. He seemed convinced that everything would be 
all right in spite of receiving these disconfirming information from the 
colleagues. The colleagues now started saying to the ATCO: "You really 
have to do something now - this is not going well!” Still no response was 
made (error #3). In the end the colleagues were almost shouting to the 
ATCO to turn one of the aircraft to the left. No other solutions were 
considered. Not until this point he turns the aircraft from North to the left. 
It might be due to his pride that he did not respond to his colleagues earlier 
on: now he was a fully trained ATCO and he did no longer have to listen to 
others. The aircraft came very close to each other and separation standards 
were violated. 
[Source: Personal interview with an ATCO] 
 
These issues associated with team dynamics are important seen from an error 
management perspective because analyses by National transportation Safety Board of 
commercial aviation accidents in which crew performance was a factor revealed that in 
almost 3/4 of them one crew member made an error and the other either failed to detect 
or correct it (Orasanu et al., 1998). Also in an experimental context it has been 
demonstrated that many errors are less likely to be detected and challenged when they 
involve a person with a higher skill, judgement and competency (e.g. a captain) and the 
risk is high (Orasanu et al., 1998). A consequence of such insights is that the role of 
social dynamics can be significant in relation to whether errors are caught or not. 
 
As shown be the previous paragraphs the ability of individuals to work together as a team 
is vitally important for the containment of human errors. Below are given some examples 
of how team skills and error management capabilities of crews or teams can be enhanced: 
 
Attitude Change. Studies have shown that professional groups such as pilots, controllers 
and physicians have unrealistic self-perceptions concerning their invulnerability to 
stressors such as fatigue and workload (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). This denial of 
vulnerability can result in a failure to use teamwork as a countermeasure to errors and 
stress. Focus should therefore be on enhancing the realisation that human errors are an 
inevitable fact of life and that teamwork is important for trapping and mitigating the 
consequences of errors. Actually, empirical evidence is available that demonstrates that 
such attitudes concerning own limitations can be changed through training (Helmreich & 
Merritt, 1998). A potential benefit of this is that people to a larger extent will rely on the 
redundancy and safeguards that can be provided by other team members instead of 
individual actions. 
 
Team Self-Correction. A way of improving error management of teams is also by 
enhancing through exercises the general understanding of generic factors that affect the 
effectiveness of the team process. The goal of team self-correction is that teams should be 
able to self-correct co-ordination breakdowns. This requires that the team members 
become able to identify which specific team processes that function well and which do 
not. A systematic approach for developing generic team work skills has been suggested 
by Smith-Jentsch et al. (1998) and consists of four stages: (a) focus team members’ 
attention on critical teamwork dimensions (such as information exchange, 
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communication, supporting behaviour and team initiative/leadership) during an exercise 
pre-brief; (b) observe team performance during an exercise; (c) diagnose strengths and 
weaknesses on the basis of the critical crew dimensions after exercise; and (d) guide the 
team through a self-critique of the performance which can then by used as a goal for a 
new round of the training program. Seen from an error management perspective it is 
interesting to note two things. First of all, the researchers behind the program state that 
errors should not be prohibited or corrected by an instructor, but should instead by 
allowed to unfold naturally without interfering with the team co-ordination (or lack 
thereof) during the exercise. Secondly, many of the team process skills that are being 
reinforced within this training program are closely associated with avoiding and 
controlling the effects of errors. Actually, one of the components within this program 
deals explicitly with monitoring and correcting team errors.  
  
Cross Training. Another way of improving team's error management skills is by 
enhancing the understanding of other team member's tasks through a training strategy 
referred to as cross-training (Blickenderfer et al., 1998; Volpe et al., 1996). The idea 
behind this kind of training is that effective co-ordination and communication between 
team members is dependent on individual team members' interpositional knowledge - that 
is, their knowledge about the rules, responsibilities and requirements of other positions in 
the team. To achieve this goal cross-training can be used which means that each team 
member is trained in, or at least provided with knowledge about, the duties of his or her 
team-mates. Dependent on the degree of inter-dependency between team members 
different kinds of cross-training can be used. Several empirical tests have supported the 
benefit of cross-training interventions on variables such as teamwork behaviour, 
communication and task performance (Blickenderfer et al., 1998). In similar vein, other 
researchers have suggested that interpositional knowledge has an important function for a 
team's ability to detect and correct errors within a system (Seifert & Hutchins, 1994). 
 
5.2 New technology 
 
It is clear that new technology and automation will alter the controller’s tasks in many 
ways (Wickens et al., 1998). This evolution will inevitably have many implications for 
the types and amount of errors that will be committed and will also most likely affect the 
opportunities of managing the errors that will occur. To examine in detail the potential 
effects of new technology will not be relevant in the current context. Instead we will limit 
the focus to a specific type of concept that directly deals with the issue of error detection 
and correction, namely what is referred to as interactive critiquing. 
 
The concept of interactive critiquing can be seen as a specific and innovative form of 
decision support system. Traditionally, decision support systems have been designed in 
such a way that a computer tries to solve a given problem for its user and gives its results 
for the user to review. In this manner the human operator is given the role as the one to 
critique the results generated by the computer and decide whether he or she agrees with 
them. 
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There may be several problems associated with this traditional type of decision support 
system. All kinds of automation will be brittle in some situations – in particular, in 
situations that they have not been designed to handle. This can lead to problems if the 
operator blindly trusts the system and the user may be adversely biased by the computer 
in cases where it exhibits brittle performance. The more reliable a given system is the 
more the operator will tend to trust it and the less the chances are that the operator will be 
able to effectively critique the system. In addition, the operator will easily get out-of-the-
loop concerning the underlying processes and assumptions leading to the (potentially 
flawed) results generated by a decision support system and, as a consequence of this, may 
not be able to effectively critique the system.  
 
The traditional decision support tools create basically a dichotomous situation for the 
joint system: Either the machine does the job fully automatic or the operator does it fully 
manual. Interactive critiquing is a concept that has been proposed to overcome the 
problems associated with the traditional cooperative architecture. Instead of having the 
human to critique the computer the computer system will be assigned with the role of 
critiquing the system user’s problem-solving. In other words, it should be able to detect 
and correct human errors without inducing any new errors. 
 
A few empirical evaluations of decision support tools based on the principle of 
interactive critiquing have been made. One of the more recent and rigorous ones has been 
done in the domain of medicine (Guerlain et al., 1997). More specifically, the focus was 
on the design of a decision support system aimed at assisting blood bankers in identifying 
antibodies in patient’s blood. The study produced several interesting results. In scenarios 
where the system was fully competent the participants who used the critiquing system did 
not produce any errors whereas subjects who did not have the system misdiagnosed cases 
33% to 63% of the time. What is even more interesting is that in the cases where the 
system was not fully competent (e.g. brittle) the group that had the system available still 
displayed a superior performance. In short, the system was useful in helping users by 
catching errors and helping users to recover from these errors irrespective of whether its 
knowledge of a given case was complete or not. 
 
To what extent interactive critiquing can be successfully transferred to the domain of 
ATC is currently an open question. Nonetheless, the current trend in the area of ATC is 
towards mid-term and long-term decision aid tools and it seems obvious to consider how 
these technological innovations could be integrated with the interactive critiquing 
concept. In this manner the ATCO could at an early point in time receive critique about 
plans related to the future traffic. The end result might be a higher degree of error 
tolerance within the air traffic system. 
 
5.3 Summary 
 
As can be seen on the basis of the previous sections enhancing the controller’s error 
management capabilities may be achieved through several means such as team resource 
management training and by making intelligently use of technological opportunities. 
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These two solutions have in common that they have the opportunity to strengthen the 
interactive and cooperative resources within the man-machine system. Even though both 
of these solutions could play an important role in relation to enhancing error management 
this issue has been inadequately explored and elaborated in the extant research literature. 
Consequently, insufficient knowledge is available concerning how these concepts can be 
implemented in the domain of ATC and to what extent they might prove useful in 
supporting error management.  
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PART THREE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE TAXONOMY 
 97
6 The framework 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the following pages an analytical framework based on an error management model is 
presented. The focus of the framework is Air Traffic Control, but the core of the 
framework is generic in nature and should therefore be applicable to many different 
domains such as aviation, process control and the maritime domain. With the framework 
it is possible to analyse in detail both the cognitive failure behind the error and the way it 
was managed. In addition, it is possible to identify from a list of Performance Shaping 
Factors (PSFs) the positive and negative contribution of generic contextual factors. The 
framework has been developed on the basis of the previously described literature review 
and it has been further refined and tested on the basis of incident reports, critical incident 
interviews and simulator studies (the results of which will be described extensively in 
later chapters).  
 
6.2 A model of error management 
 
To be able to develop a classification system of the error management process it is useful 
to the have a model that can be used as an organising principle. Currently few models are 
available to describe the generic structure of the error management process. Some of the 
most promising frameworks are to be found in Helmreich (1999) and Kanse & Van der 
Schaaf (2000b). Below is presented a model that tries to incorporate the advantages of 
these models. 
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Performance Shaping Factors (positive or negative)
 OR: Outcome stage
    OR: Execution stage
  Planning stage
Cognitive error types
Detection Correction
Inconsequential/ 
Recovery 
Undesired state Additional error
Trap OR Exacerbate OR
Fail to Respond
Threat Ma agement
A safe flight 
Threat
Error
Detection and
Correction
Response and
Outcome
Performance Shaping Factors
(positive or negative)  
Figure 17: A model of error management 
 
The model starts out with a threat management section which concerns the subject’s 
awareness of aspects of the operational environment that might lead to errors and 
operational problems (e.g. thunderstorm). The subject may try to avoid threats leading to 
problems and errors resulting in a continued safe flight. If the threat is not discovered an 
error might be the result. The error can be analysed on the basis of the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying the error. The error might not be detected, but if it is the 
detection and/or the recovery may happen at different stages in the evolution of the error. 
Different kinds of responses might be produced and the result may vary from being 
inconsequential to an undesired state or a new error. In the case where the outcome is an 
additional error a new error analysis can begin. Even if the outcome is inconsequential or 
an undesired state new errors might still occur in the event sequence. 
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As described in the previous sections, the analysis unit within the framework is the 
individual actor involved in the error production and management. Even though the 
analysis unit is the individual level it is possible – and frequently is the case - that 
different actors are associated different stages in the model. Furthermore, a list of 
contextual factors – so called Performance Shaping Factors - constitutes an integrated 
part of the framework. These factors can be used to expand the analysis beyond the 
individual level to include team and organisational factors that are relevant to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of why the event occurred and how it was prevented from 
developing into an even more serious situation. 
 
A general problem with modelling the relationship between error, recovery and outcomes 
is that these individual components of the error management process are ordered in a 
neatly and simple fashion. Instead it is often case that several errors can occur after each 
other and that it is only on the basis of the total outcome that a problem is discovered. 
That is, several errors and error recoveries might be present at the same time. How to 
structure the analysis of such complex scenarios will be elaborated later on (see section 
8.2.2) 
 
6.3 The main dimensions of the framework 
 
Based on the model presented above an error management taxonomy has been developed. 
The taxonomy provides an opportunity to analyse the cognitive and behavioural activities 
of the individual actors involved in the error management process and the influence 
(positive and/or negative) of a series of contextual factors. The dimensions and 
classifications associated with the individual actions are shown below. 
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THREAT & ERROR 
Threat 
Preparedness 
No Anticipation Anticipation 
 
Unknown 
Cognitive Error 
Type 
Perception Short-term 
memory 
Long-term 
memory 
Decision Response  Unknown 
Threat  
& 
Error 
Procedural 
violation 
Yes No Unknown 
DETECTION & RECOVERY 
Error/state 
detected by  
No 
one 
Producer Co-actor in 
context 
Co-actor out- 
side context 
System Unknown Who: Actor 
 
Error/state 
corrected by  
No 
one 
Producer Co-actor in 
context 
Co-actor out- 
side context 
System Unknown 
When: 
Processes 
Detection  
Stage  
Planning Execution Outcome Unknown 
Detection 
source  
External 
communication 
System feedback  Internal feedback Unknown How: 
Processes 
Error/state 
correction  
Ignore Apply rule Choose option Create solution Unknown 
RESPONSE & OUTCOME 
Error/state 
Response  
Trap/ 
mitigate 
Exacerbate 
 
Fail to respond Unknown What: 
Behaviour 
& outcome Error 
Outcomes 
Inconsequential/ 
recovery 
Undesired state Additional error Unknown 
Table 1: The analysis framework 
 
6.3.1 Threat management 
 
Little is known about how operators use their experience to control threats and risks of 
errors. A threat can be seen as a part of the operational environment which might evolve 
into a problem if not handled in due time. Threat management concerns being prepared 
for these threats and is important insofar as by knowing in advance that certain problems 
might occur it becomes easier to respond in a timely and efficient manner. Below are 
described two types of threat management. 
 
• No Anticipation: In this case no indication of recognition of any threat(s) was 
made by any of the involved ATCOs before it developed into a real problem. 
• Anticipation: A threat (or several threats) in the environment is known by one or 
several ATCOs before it leads to a problem. In some situations no concrete 
attempts are made at prohibiting the threat from developing into an error. In other 
situations explicit attempts are made at controlling it by either preventing it from 
leading to an error or by contingency planning (if-then). 
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6.3.2 Cognitive domain 
 
To analyse the mechanisms behind the individual errors it is necessary to build upon a 
recognised conceptual framework that will allow both analytically useful and consistent 
classifications. An extensive review of existing human error frameworks has indicated 
that the information processing models - such as the one presented by Wickens (1992) - 
seem to correspond conceptually with the tasks of the air traffic controller (see also 
Shorrock & Kirwan, 1998; Isaac et al., 2000; Isaac et al., 2002). Below are shown the 
cognitive failure types that were chosen for the analysis of mechanisms behind individual 
errors. 
 
• Perception: This cognitive domain concerns issues related to picking up and 
understanding information. A typical kind of error associated within this domain 
is hearback error.  That is, a controller fails to pay attention to the content of a 
pilot's read back and hears instead what he/she expects to hear. 
• Short-term memory: This domain concerns short-term storage or retrieval of 
information. For practical reasons it has been decided that short-term memory 
errors are associated with information received during an operational shift5. For 
example, a controller may forget to follow up on a potential conflict between two 
aircraft in spite of having intended to do so.  
• Long-term memory: This domain concerns long-term storage or retrieval of 
more permanent information based on the person's training and experience. For 
example, an ATCO may forget to carry out a specific procedure because he has 
not been using it for a long time. 
• Judgement & decision-making: Controllers are constantly required to make 
projection of trajectories, plan future actions and to make decisions. These 
activities may all be associated with errors.  For example, the controller may mis-
project the future position of two aircraft and consequently not consider any need 
to monitor them further. 
• Response execution: Sometimes people carry out actions that they have not 
intended. A typical example is when a controller gives a clearance to one flight 
level but had intended to give clearance to another flight level. This is often 
referred to as a slip-of-the-tongue. 
 
6.3.3 Procedural violation 
 
Procedural violations are included as a part of the error section and they constitute within 
the framework a subgroup of the decision-making errors. That is, only in the case where a 
decision-making error has been made should the classifier determine whether it was also 
                                                 
5 Please notice that the definition of short-term memory in the current context varies slightly from the one found in the 
research literature where it is normally said that information can only be maintained in the short-term memory store 
for about 10-15 sec (see e.g. Wickens, 1992). However, in the current context this time span is limited and not 
useful insofar as ATCOs are normally expected to maintain task relevant information in the memory for a much 
longer period – e.g. 10-15 minutes (Hopkin, 1995). 
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a procedural violation. It should be emphasised that even though procedural violations 
and errors within some frameworks are considered mutually exclusive (e.g. Reason, 
1990) procedural violations are in the current context viewed as a subgroup of errors 
insofar as intentional violations usually are carried out as a short-cut as to what is seen as 
unnecessary procedures and regulations (Helmreich et al., 2001). The distinction between 
these two types of decision-making errors is of practical interest because a high degree of 
procedural errors might indicate too many or too complex procedures whereas a high 
degree of non-violation decision-making errors may indicate too few procedures (see e.g. 
Helmreich et al., 2001 and Reason, 1997). 
 
6.3.4 Error discovery and recovery 
 
The taxonomy for structuring the analysis of the error discovery and recovery is based on 
following questions, namely the "who"-, "when"-, "how"- and "what"-questions. More 
specifically these questions concern:  
 
1) who was involved in the detection and recovery of the error and/or its 
consequences;  
2) when was the error or its consequences detected;  
3) how was the error and/or its consequences detected and corrected; and finally  
4) what was the behavioural response and outcome?  
 
6.3.5 The "who"-question 
 
Research by Wioland & Doireau (1995) has demonstrated that fellow team members play 
a significant role in the detection of errors. An important finding in this context is, for 
example, that the errors people detect themselves are qualitatively different from the ones 
that are detected by others.  On a more theoretical level it has also been suggested that 
detection by others is dependent on the amount of context sharing between the error 
producer and the error detector (Wioland & Amalberti, 1998; Hutchins 1994).  In the 
ATM domain this would mean, for example, that an error made by a controller is more 
likely to be detected by a colleague than by a pilot. The following are the different 
possible actors involved in the detection and correction of the error or its consequences:  
 
• No one: No one discovered the problem while it was still possible to solve. 
• Producer: The person who produced the error was also the one to discover and/or 
recover the error (or its consequences). 
• Co-actor in context: An observer sharing almost the whole context, goals and 
actions (e.g. two ATCOs or two pilots) discovered and/or recovered the error (or 
its consequences). 
• Co-actor outside context: An observer sharing a significant part of goals, but not 
the context (e.g. an ATCO and a pilot) discovered and/or recovered the error (or 
its consequences). 
• System: Some kind of automated defence – e.g. TCAS or STCA - discovered 
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and/or recovered the error (or its consequences). 
 
It should be noted that the categories “co-actor in context” and “co-actor outside context” 
are meant as generic categories that should be adapted to the specific study that is being 
carried out. 
 
6.3.6 The "when"-question 
 
From a safety perspective human errors are not a problem in themselves as long as they 
do not have adverse consequences on the system (Reason, 1990). Consequently, it is of 
interest to determine the time of which an error was detected. Kontogiannis (1999) has 
suggested three different stages of performance during which error detection may occur.   
 
• The outcome stage: The error is not caught until it has produced some 
consequences on the environment. This does not necessarily mean that an error 
has had serious consequences on system safety but only that an action has now 
been carried out. An example of this is that the planner discovers that he has 
forgotten to update a strip some time after this action should have been carried out 
(e.g. right after a coordination). 
• The execution stage: An erroneous action has been carried out on the system, but 
the error is caught before any consequences have ensued. Typically, detection at 
this stage happens when the controller gives instructions to pilots or when pilots 
read back instructions. An example could be a controller who makes a slip-of-the-
tongue (e.g. giving a wrong flight level) and then immediately corrects the error. 
• The planning stage: Detection at the planning stage is usually associated with 
information-pick-up necessary for later actions or discussions and deliberations 
about what to do (e.g. between radar and planner controller). In other words, 
detection at the planning stage normally occurs before any instructions have been 
given or coordinations have been made. 
 
6.3.7 The "how"-question 
 
The how-question covers both how the error and/or its consequences were detected and 
how it was corrected. 
 
Detection 
 
As a corollary to understanding "when" an error was detected it is also of interest to 
obtain knowledge about the cues or mechanisms of the detection. Various researchers 
(Sellen 1994; Rizzo et al., 1995; Kontogiannis, 1999) have suggested a number of 
partially overlapping classification systems. The mechanisms relevant in the current 
context can be subsumed under the following categories. 
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• External communication: Interaction with other people can provide information 
to detect an error. That is, a problem is discovered because another person says 
something that is either wrong or that reveals the presence of a problem. This kind 
of detection requires that the cues for error detection can be found mainly in 
communication. E.g., a controller gives a wrong instruction to an aircraft and 
discovers this when the pilot reads back the clearance. 
• System feedback: This kind of feedback relies on cues directly found in the 
operational environment. System feedback includes information from the radar 
screen and also visual sighting from either the tower or the cockpit.   
• Internal feedback: This kind of feedback refers to error detection that requires 
no direct feedback from the environment. In the current context internal feedback 
covers following three sub-categories: (a) Error Suspicion. An ATCO is aware or 
has a suspicion of having missed something (e.g. if he fails to hear something but 
knows he did not hear it or recall not having heard or done something). (b) 
Standard check. An ATCO can detect an error without having any prior 
hypothesis about the presence of an error (e.g. one ATCO asks another ATCO if 
he has carried out a required action without knowing whether this is the case or 
not). (c) Spontaneous memory recall. An example could be if an ATCO gives an 
erroneous instruction to an aircraft and discovers it before feedback has been 
received from any external source of information such as the radar screen or 
pilots. 
 
Recovery 
 
In addition to identifying the processes underlying the detection, it is also of interest to 
understand the processes underlying the problem solving and decision-making associated 
with the recovery. Below is presented some distinctions, which are inspired by a 
classification system developed by Orasanu & Fischer (1997) to distinguish between 
different kinds of decision events. 
 
• Ignore: Even though an error has been detected - while there still is a chance to 
do something about it - no response to correct it is chosen. This might be because 
the error is considered irrelevant or because an intervention is expected to 
exacerbate the situation.  
• Apply rule: In many situations there only seems to be one thing to do in order to 
resolve the problem. In retrospect, several potential solutions might be available, 
but in situ only one solution was considered. This corresponds to what is referred 
to as Recognition Primed Decision-making (Klein, 1989). 
• Choose option: In this case several options were considered before deciding on a 
specific solution and more conscious resources are required than the "Apply rule" 
category. In other words, the response is less automatic and does require some 
degree of deliberate resources. 
• Create solution: This group of recovery processes is concerned with situations 
where a completely new response has to be generated since such situations have 
not occurred previously. This is the most resource demanding of the possible 
recovery processes.  
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6.3.8 The "what"-question 
 
The final question concerns what was the behavioural response and the outcome of the 
error.  These issues are based on directly observable phenomena and do not require any 
inferences about the underlying cognitive processes. Based on a model of error 
management developed by Helmreich et al. (1999) the following classifications have 
been derived: 
 
Error/state response contains three groups: 
 
• Trap/mitigate: Error is detected and managed before any consequences have 
developed or the consequences of the error are diminished. 
• Exacerbate: The error is detected but the recovery action worsens the situation. 
This could, for example, be the case if a controller, having discovered an 
emerging conflict, gives avoiding instructions that actually brings the aircraft 
closer together rather than bringing them apart. 
• Fail to respond: No response is produced because the error is either not detected, 
detected too late or simply ignored. Error may be ignored if it is considered 
inconsequential such as not providing traffic information to the involved aircraft 
after the resolvement of a conflict. 
 
Error/outcome contains the following categories. 
 
• Inconsequential/recovery: No negative consequences were observed and 
recovery attempts were successful.  
• Undesired state: The end result was a potentially critical situation, an incident or 
accident. In the current context the most frequent undesired state is violation of 
the prescribed aircraft separation standards. 
• Additional error: Sometimes errors pave the way for new errors and this may be 
the beginning of a chain of errors. The general characteristic of these errors is that 
they negatively affect workload, situation awareness or other task related factors. 
It should be emphasised that additional error refers to a causality not a 
chronology. Therefore, additional error should only be used in the case where 
there is an explicit causal relationship between two errors and it is not enough that 
two errors follow each other. An example of an error leading to an additional 
error is if a controller does not set up the radar in an optimal manner which later 
on enhances the risk of the controller not noticing an emerging conflict between 
two aircraft. 
 
6.3.9 Performance Shaping Factors 
 
Performance Shaping Factors are generic factors that can have a positive or negative 
influence (or both or none) on the course of events. They can be used to give an answer 
to the why-question – namely why did the error occur and why was it successfully or 
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unsuccessfully managed. The main groups of contextual or Performance Shaping Factors 
are shown below6. Please note that some of the factors are domain-independent whereas 
others are specifically related to Air Traffic Control. 
 
Performance Shaping Factors 
What was the influence of these factors (positive, negative, both or none)? 
1.  Traffic, airport and airspace Pos. Neg. 
a) Traffic load/ traffic mix/ R/T workload   
b) Time available and degree of urgency   
c) Call sign similarity   
d) Air space design characteristics    
e) Airport design, facilities, or conditions   
f) Visibility of A/C and vehicles on aerodrome   
g) Temporary sector activities - military, parachuting, student pilot   
h) Weather - clear weather, snow/ice/slush, fog/low cloud, thunderstorm, windshear   
i) Other traffic, airport and airspace factors   
2.  Ambient Environment Pos. Neg. 
a) Sterility of environment (noise, distraction - supervisors, colleagues, visitors)   
b) Lighting – illumination, glare   
c) Other ambient environment factors   
3.  Procedures and Documentation Pos. Neg. 
a) Procedures (availability, compatibility, quality and usability)   
b) Operational materials – checklists/advisory manuals/charts/notices   
c) Regulations and standards   
d) Other procedure and documentation factors   
4.  Workplace design, HMI and equipment factors Pos. Neg. 
a) Radar display (interface properties)   
b) Radar coverage   
c) Transponder factors   
d) FPS (Flight Progress Strips) factors    
e) Communication equipment    
f) Warnings and alarms   
g) Automation    
h) Other workplace design, HMI and equipment factors   
5.  Training and Experience Pos. Neg. 
a) Knowledge/experience   
b) Quality of training   
c) Time since last (re)training in task   
d) Informal work practice   
e) Other training and experience factors   
6.  Person Related Factors Pos. Neg. 
a) Vigilance (fatigue, boredom, alertness)   
b) Risk-assessment/short-cuts   
c) Error coping strategies   
d) Confidence and trust in self/others   
e) Confidence in equipment and automation   
f) Emotional state (calm, chock, panic)   
g) Pride regarding a job well done/feeling of personal responsibility   
                                                 
6 The PSFs are based primarily on TRACEr (Shorrock, S.T. and Kirwan, B., 1998), HERA (Isaac et al., 2000), 
ADREP2000 (Cacciabue, P.C., 2001), ASAP (Helmreich et al., 1995), BASIS (O’Leary, 1999) and research on 
Recovery Influencing Factors (Kanse & Van der Schaaf, 2001). 
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Performance Shaping Factors 
h) Other personal factors   
7.  Social and Team Factors Pos. Neg. 
a) Quality of hand over /take over   
a) Language/phraseology/culture issues   
b) Brevity, timing, accuracy and clarity of communication   
b) Team climate   
c) Authority gradient   
d) Monitoring/cross-checking   
e) Assessing safety threats and planning countermeasures (if-then)   
f) Verbal statements of plans/challenging plans   
g) Review status/modification of plans   
h) Procedures selected   
i) Procedural compliance   
j) Task planning: Prioritisation/task allocation    
k) Other social and team factors   
8. Company, Management and Regulatory Factors Pos. Neg. 
a) Company/commercial pressure - unsafe ops, failure to correct problems   
b) Regulatory – planning, decision making, feedback   
c) Management/Organisation - planning, decision making, feedback   
d) Organisation of work and responsibilities   
e) Training plan   
f) Personnel selection plan   
g) Supervision   
h) Shift patterns and/or personnel planning   
i) Management attitudes towards human error and safety issues in general   
j) Other company, management and regulatory factors   
Table 2: Performance Shaping Factors 
 
An elaboration of the individual PSF-dimensions is given in the following 
 
Traffic, airport and airspace  
This is the only main group that is only concerned with domain specific factors. Some 
examples of relevant factors within this group are traffic load, air space design 
characteristics and weather. Weather is a good example of a factor that can have both 
positive and negative contribution. On the one hand, a strong wind can compromise the 
ATCO’s chances of making reliable predictions of aircraft trajectories. On the other hand, 
a very clear weather can play a significant role for an ATCO’s ability to monitor and 
perhaps recover a situation where the aircraft have gotten too close to each other. 
 
Ambient Environment  
This includes lighting (illumination, glare) and sterility of environment (noise, distraction 
- supervisors, colleagues, visitors). The latter may be particularly important insofar as 
many controllers feel that they "have to put up with unnecessary sources of distraction 
while controlling air traffic" (see Air Traffic Management, p. 26, March/April, 2001). 
 
Procedures and Documentation  
This group includes the availability, quality and the usability of procedures and rules. An 
example of how procedures can support error management is in the case with two aircraft 
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with very similar call signs. In this case a procedure makes it possible to alter one of the 
call signs and thereby minimise the risk of call sign confusion. 
 
Workplace design, HMI and equipment factors  
Traditionally the design of man-machine systems has been considered one of the most 
important Human Factors issues in relation to both avoiding and provoking human errors. 
Only to a far lesser extent has there been focus on how to promote a more error tolerant 
design (but see e.g. Rasmussen, 1984; Rouse & Morris, 1987; Hutchins et al., 1985). 
Some important issues within this group are interface-properties of the radar display 
(e.g. visibility and reversibility of actions) and warnings and alarms (e.g. are they 
reliable or do they generate false alarms and false projections). 
 
Training and Experience  
Knowledge, experience and time since last (re)training can play an important role for an 
operator’s ability to respond in a potential critical situation. Many ATCOs feel that they 
have had insufficient training in handling very rare, but potentially very critical scenarios 
(see e.g. Air Traffic Management, p. 26, March/April, 2001). Experience with such 
situations can be crucial for an operator’s ability to respond in a timely and effective 
manner. 
 
Person Related Factors  
This group contains a series of factors related to characteristics of the individual ATCO. 
They include vigilance (fatigue, boredom or alertness), error coping strategies, 
confidence and emotional state (ranging from calm to chock and panic). Some examples 
of error coping strategies can be found in the section about threat management (see 
section 3.3.3). Trust and confidence is another important issue (Bonni et al., 2001). Self-
confidence is important insofar as it concerns believing in your own abilities which helps 
making fast decisions. Self confidence should, however, not lead to a macho attitude (e.g. 
"they will not catch me saying 'no' to those aircraft" or "I do not need any help from 
others"). Similarly, confidence and trust in others is essential to the job. At the same time 
it is also important doubting and double-checking and sometimes disagreeing with 
decisions made by other controllers. In short, both trust and mistrust in others play a 
significant role in the work of the controller.  
 
Social and Team Factors  
"Social and team factors" is a very important group of PSFs - in particular in relation to 
error recovery – and is concerned with exchange of information between two or more 
people (in the current context team should be understood in the broad sense including 
both ATCOs and pilots, see Wickens et al., 1997). Many of these factors are issues that 
are given attention during Team Resource Management (TRM) training programs such as 
monitoring and crosschecking each other, clearly stating plans and challenging potential 
flawed plans. Manifestations of good and bad teamwork can be found in critical 
situations.  In some cases ATCOs are not very good at receiving critique. It might be all 
right if they are sitting two together in the situation, but they do not want any interference 
from a third person (for example, an ATCO from a neighbour sector) unless the situation 
is very extreme and dangerous. In other situations a much more positive attitude toward 
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co-operation is displayed. This includes monitoring and crosschecking each other. In 
particular if an ATCO is not so busy and a colleague is busy the ATCO might monitor 
the situation in the colleague's airspace (D’Arcy & Della Rocco, 2001). So, in the case of 
an emerging conflict an approach ATCO might contact an area ATCO to check whether 
he or she is aware of a specific situation: "Do you have control of these two?” In a 
constructive team climate the attitude would be appreciable of such helpful comments.  
 
Company, Management and Regulatory Factors  
This group is perhaps the most abstract group of the PSFs and their influence on the 
course of events is often more subtle than the other groups, but can nonetheless be very 
important. This is because they can affect the whole working climate in which the 
controller operates. Some good examples of how organisational factors can influence the 
error and error management process are given in the following. 
 
Management attitudes towards human error and safety issues in general 
Different ATM organisations vary in the extent to which they assign blame to individual 
ATCOs. In those organisations which are characterised by having a punitive attitude 
towards human errors many attempts will be made at covering up the errors that 
invariably will happen. The consequence of this is, first of all, that the organisation will 
not have the opportunity to learn from these errors and the result might be that similar 
errors will occur again in the future and perhaps this time with a less fortunate outcome. 
Another problem is that people might engage in initiatives to cover up errors that might 
actually have negative consequences on safety. A good example of this can be found in 
the reluctance of ATCOs to use the term "avoiding action" on the radio (in similar vein, 
pilots are also reluctant to call mayday or pan-pan when having problems). The purpose 
of this statement is to maximise the chances of the pilots responding immediately to 
avoid an upcoming conflict. The problem is, however, that if this term is used on the 
radio then an official investigation will be made and the ATCO is likely to be blamed 
(and perhaps even sanctioned) for the incident. As a consequence of this ATCOs are 
willing to go very far to save a situation without the pilots discovering that they were 
close, because then no report will be made. When saving the situation in a non-dramatic 
way (e.g. "descent immediately" instead "avoiding action") no one will know. This is 
unfortunate because by stating “avoiding action“ the pilot knows immediately what to do 
and that there is no room for arguing. If, for example, the pilot is just instructed to 
descend to 2000 feet the pilot might ask: "Confirm 2000 feet - we are established". By 
then it might be too late.  
 
Management/Organisation: Safety-efficiency tradeoffs 
Safety is normal stated as the primary goal in any ATM organisation. Even though safety 
is the primary goal, efficiency is also important and these two goals do not always 
correspond with each other. In an increasingly competitive environment it is the 
management's - and as well as the customer's - wish that as many aircraft as possible are 
started and landed. This message can be conveyed to the people at the frontline in 
different ways. If, for example, the traffic level is below a certain desired level (for 
example, due to weather conditions or the fact that airspace might be lent out to military 
or other purposes) questions might be raised by the administration. Another example is 
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the reduction in the required safety standards (e.g. to go below the three miles to 2½ 
miles when commencing on final approach) that has been possible due to increased 
precision in the tracking of aircraft. This can be seen as an indirect pressure to land more 
aircraft. The end result of such pressures to be more effective is that the safety margins 
are gradually made smaller and smaller. This pressure reinforces a tolerance among 
ATCOs to let the aircraft get closer and as a consequence of this the reaction time and the 
possibilities to counteract errors have become smaller.  
 
Organisation of work and responsibilities 
Personnel planning is another example of how organisational factors can affect the safety 
at the frontline. It is, for example, regulated how many days in a row that an ATCO is 
allowed to work. To follow these regulations can be important to avoid that ATCOs 
become excessively worked-out and fatigued. However, in periods with a shortage in 
manpower (e.g. due to the illness, holidays or insufficient amount of employees) then it 
might be necessary to call in staff members who have already reached their limit 
concerning how many days they are allowed to work. The results of this can be a 
decrease in vigilance that might negatively affect both the error likelihood and also the 
chances of detecting errors.  
 
6.4 Analysis of a case – an example 
 
To get a more concrete impression of how the framework can be applied to an analysis of 
a concrete event we will in the following do a walk-through analysis of an authentic ATC 
episode. 
 
ATC Example 
This event occurred at a big international airport in the Middle East. A 
local trainee was being checked out. When there was less activity at the 
airport - that is, at noon and in the afternoon - IFR-training was being 
carried out. The radar coverage was not very reliable. The trainee had just 
given a clearance out of the airport to a Gulf Air aircraft. The aircraft 
would climb straight ahead of runway 31 and climb to 2,000 feet. A 
helicopter was flying in a holding pattern at 3000 feet. The helicopter 
disappeared from the radar display because the radar was located on the 
field that causes a cone of silence. The Gulf Air aircraft called and the 
ATCO gave clearance to continue climb to flight level 160 (Error #1). The 
instructor was alert and knew that the helicopter was still there even 
though it could not be seen on the radar. He therefore told the pilot to 
disregard the instruction and maintain 2,000 feet. When the helicopter re-
emerged on the radar display the two aircraft were very close to each 
other. The aircraft did not pass 2,000 feet (2,000 feet is a low altitude for 
such a big passenger aircraft - so the aircraft would have liked to have 
continued the climb directly) so the vertical separation was never violated. 
The instructor was particularly alert in the situation due to several 
circumstances. First of all, he was alert to the fact that the helicopter 
disappeared from the radar display and had been used to working with a 
radar with a much better track. Secondly, the fact that it was a local 
controller being checked out made the instructor much more vigilant since 
they in general were much less skilled and qualified (instructors were 
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directly told by colleagues and supervisors that when you have one of the 
locals on checkout you should be extra alert - many of these were totally 
‘green’ and had had very little training before check-out). If the aircraft 
had continued the climb the two aircraft would most likely have gotten very 
close to each other. 
[Source: Personal interview with an ATCO] 
 
The analysis of threat, error and error management is described in the following (please 
notice that the free text included in the individual boxes below is an excerpt from the 
event description). 
 
ERROR EVENT # 1 
THREAT & ERROR 
“The instructor was particularly alert in the situation due to several circumstances. First of all, he was alert to the 
fact that the helicopter disappeared from the radar display and had been used to working with a radar with a much 
better track. Secondly, the fact that it was a local controller being checked out made the instructor much more 
vigilant since they in general were much less skilled and qualified (instructors were directly told by colleagues and 
supervisors that when you have one of the locals on checkout you should be extra alert - many of these were 
totally "green" and had had very little training before check-out).” 
… 
“The Gulf Air aircraft called and the ATCO gave clearance to continue climb to flight level 160.”  
If threat(s) present: 
Threat 
Preparedness 
No anticipation  Anticipation X U/K  
Cognitive 
Error Type 
Perception  STM X LTM  DM  Response   U/K  
If decision-making error: 
Threat 
&  
Error 
Procedural 
violation 
Yes  No  U/K  
 
In the current case there were two threats that preceded the error. The first one was that 
the radar coverage was incomplete and the second threat was the lack of qualification of 
the local controllers. Both of these threats were anticipated and the instructor was ready 
to react immediately in the case one of these threats would lead to an actual problem. The 
error was committed by the local controller and the error type was a short-term-memory 
(STM) failure insofar as the controller forgot about the aircraft that currently could not be 
seen on the radar display. Since the error was not a decision-making error no selections 
should be made in the procedural violation row. 
 
DETECTION & RECOVERY 
Detection 
“The instructor was alert and knew that the helicopter was still there are even though it could not be seen on the 
radar.”  
Recovery 
“He therefore told the pilots to disregard the instruction and maintain 2,000 feet.” 
Outcome 
“When the helicopter remerged on the radar display the two aircraft were very close to each other. The aircraft did 
not pass 2,000 feet (2,000 feet is a low altitude for such a big passenger aircraft - so the aircraft would have liked 
to have continued the climb directly) so the vertical separation was never violated.” 
Who Error/state 
detected by 
No 
one 
 Producer  ATCO X Pilot  System  U/K  
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 Error/state 
corrected by 
No 
one 
 Producer  ATCO X Pilot  System  U/K  
 If detector ‹› "No one" or "System": 
When Detection 
stage 
Planning  Execution X Outcome  U/K  
Detection 
source 
External 
communication 
X System feedback   Internal 
feedback 
 U/K  
If corrector ‹› "No one" or "System": 
How 
Error/state 
correction 
Ignore  Apply rule X Choose 
option 
 Create solution  U/K  
RESPONSE & OUTCOME 
Error/state 
Response 
Trap/ 
mitigate 
X Exacerbate 
 
 Fail to respond  U/K  What 
Error 
Outcomes 
Inconsequential/ 
recovery 
X Undesired state  Additional error  U/K  
 
The instructor was the active part in the detection and correction of the error. Therefore, 
the detector and corrector is “ATCO” (i.e. an ATCO different from the error producer). 
The error was detected immediately when it was carried out (that is, “Execution” stage) 
on the basis of the communication made by the local controller to the pilot (that is, 
“External communication”). Since no other option was considered the decision-making 
type is “Apply rule” and the response is “Trap/mitigate”. The error did not have any 
consequences insofar as the instructor intervened immediately and the outcome is 
therefore “Inconsequential/recovery”. 
 
Below is shown the different kinds of Performance Shaping Factors identified in the 
incident. For each of these it is possible to determine a specific PSF category based on 
the previously described list and to determine the type of influence (positive or negative). 
 
DESCRIPTION OF PSFs  (WHOLE INCIDENT) 
1. “The helicopter disappeared from the radar display because the radar was located on the field which 
causes a cone of silence.” 
PSF code 4B: Radar coverage 
Influence Positive  Negative X U/K  
2. “The instructor was alert and knew that the helicopter was still there even though it could not be seen on 
the radar.” 
PSF code 6A: Vigilance (fatigue, boredom, alertness) 
Influence Positive X Negative  U/K  
3. “… the fact that it was a local controller being checked out made the instructor much more vigilant since 
they in general were much less skilled and qualified (instructors were directly told by colleagues and 
supervisors that when you have one of the locals on checkout you should be extra alert - many of these 
were totally "green" and had had very little training before check-out).” 
PSF code 6A: Vigilance (fatigue, boredom, alertness) 
Influence Positive X Negative  U/K  
4. “… the fact that it was a local controller being checked out made the instructor much more vigilant since 
they in general were much less skilled and qualified (instructors were directly told by colleagues and 
supervisors that when you have one of the locals on checkout you should be extra alert - many of these 
were totally "green" and had had very little training before check-out).” 
PSF code 5B: Quality of training 
Influence Positive  Negative X U/K  
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7 Validation and methodology 
 
In the previous chapters the state of knowledge with regards to error management was 
described. A conceptual framework was developed on the basis of this literature review 
and analyses of error events in different kinds of data material. The next stage is to 
validate the framework on the basis of authentic data. This is important because even 
though the framework may appear theoretically consistent and comprehensive, it might 
be difficult to apply to real-life situations. In the following we will elaborate on the 
concept of validation and present the methodology used to evaluate the framework.  
 
7.1 Validation 
 
Validity is related to the degree to which a framework accurately reflects or assesses the 
specific concept that a researcher is attempting to measure. Validity is therefore an 
important concept in any research study: Without validity the results of a study become 
meaningless. A key concept in relation to validity is the issue of “truth” which is 
particularly important in qualitative and quantitative studies within the area of social 
sciences. In many of these studies the purpose is to build a bridge between theoretical 
concepts – e.g. classical psychological concepts such as memory, attention, motivation 
and attitudes – and observable manifestations of these concepts. One main problem is that 
these concepts cannot be directly observed and the scientific challenge is therefore to find 
a way to obtain good-enough observable manifestations of these not-directly observable 
constructs.  
 
In the current context, the goal is not to operationalise a theoretical construct, but instead 
to develop a conceptual framework. As a consequence of this the issue of validity has 
here a slightly different meaning compared with many other studies in the area of social 
science. Since there can be developed many different kinds of conceptual frameworks to 
describe a given phenomenon it also becomes difficult to say whether or not a given 
framework is close to the “truth”. A practical example can be useful to highlight this 
point: Does Reason’s classical distinction between planning- and execution errors reflect 
the “true” nature of errors or would it, for arguments sake, have been more appropriate to 
distinguish between errors on the basis of which day of the week they occurred? Each of 
these classifications could, in principle, be accepted as an appropriate reflection of 
different types of errors. Nonetheless, common sense would lead most people to conclude 
that the first of these two ways of classifying errors is the one that provides most utility. 
 
Several types of validity have been suggested. Some of these can be analysed 
quantitatively and others qualitatively. A research study should, in particular, be 
concerned with two types of validity, namely external validity and internal validity. 
External validity is related to the extent to which a study can be generalised to other 
contexts. Internal validity, on the other hand, concerns the extent to which the study is 
valid within a particular setting. The most important types of internal validity are: 
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• Face validity: Does the framework seem reasonable using common sense? This can 
be determined by having “experts” to review the contents of the framework to see if 
they find it useful and relevant on the basis of its face value (Reber, 1985). This issue 
is directly related to the evaluation criterion referred to as “usability”. 
• Content validity: The important issue in relation to content validity is the 
comprehensiveness of the framework. In other words, are all the major and important 
issues within a given research topic covered. This issue is directly related to the 
evaluation criterion referred to as “comprehensiveness”. 
• Criterion Validity: A criterion can be seen as an already validated and accepted 
standard to which a measurement or methodology can be compared. This issue is 
directly related to the evaluation criterion referred to as “diagnosticity”. 
• Construct Validity: Construct validity is probably the most difficult type of validity 
to establish and cannot be done within a single research study7. It refers to the extent 
to which evidence points to the construct or concept being useful in a scientific 
endeavour. 
 
In addition to these issues it is also very important that the framework satisfies some 
reliability standards. Reliability refers to the extent to which a framework or measuring 
instrument yields the same result on repeated trails. There are basically two kinds of 
reliability that are important in a scientific enquiry, namely inter-rater- and intra-rater 
reliability. Inter-rater reliability is the consistency across judges or classifiers. Intra-rater 
reliability is consistency of the same judges or classifiers over time. It can be expected 
that a slight variation may occur in both cases, but in general the confidence in the results 
increases as the stability increases. It should be noted that inter-rater reliability is 
considered the most crucial type of reliability and is therefore also the one that will be 
given most credence in the current context. 
 
Steps towards validity 
In the model below is illustrated three important steps in relation to achieving reliable and 
valid analyses in a given classification study, namely the information elicitation, the 
segmentation and classification stage. For each of these stages there are some factors that 
can affect the results from the given stage. The model is not meant to portray the 
development of a conceptual framework, but instead the stages of importance when 
conducting an analysis on the basis of an already developed framework. In the 
development of a conceptual framework it is not necessarily such that one stage is 
completed before the second stage is initiated. Instead it will often be necessary to jump 
back and forth between the stages, because results from one stage often will have effect 
on the other stages. 
 
                                                 
7 The concept of construct validity and criterion validity are closely related to each other. In the current context 
criterion validity can be seen as an operationalisation of construct validity. That is, even though construct validity 
cannot be measured as such it is possible to enlist some criteria concerning how the framework should behave on 
the basis of theory and existing research. 
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 Information elicitation 
Segmentation 
Classification 
Segmentation principles Domain input/verification 
Classification principles Conceptual definitions 
Definition of threat, error 
and management 
A conceptual model 
 
Figure 18: Main steps toward validity. 
 
• Information elicitation: In this phase it is important that sufficient information is 
derived from the available data sources (e.g. interviews, video-recordings and 
think-aloud-protocols) so that later detailed analysis can be carried out. To 
achieve this goal it is important to have some sort of conceptual model that can 
help guiding the search for information. It is also important to have a clear 
definition of the central concepts within this framework – in the current context in 
particular what is meant by the concept of threat, human error and error 
management. 
 
• Segmentation: This phase is about breaking the event description down into 
groups that fit into the conceptual model. The importance of the segmentation 
phase is related to the fact that complex real-life events are often characterised by 
having several people involved in both creating and resolving a potential critical 
situation (actually, in some cases different people might have divergent influence 
on the recovery). If such events should be segmented in a way that permits 
carrying out statistical analyses it is desirable that the events can be adapted into a 
workable format and at the same time avoid loosing information. It is important 
that the segmentation of events is done on the basis of logical and consistent 
principles. In this context it can be useful to obtain input from domain experts to 
ensure that, for example, the identified errors also are errors according to their 
judgement. 
 
• Classification: It is important to have principles that can be used in the analysis of 
the segmented events. The definitions of the individual concepts within the 
framework (as well as examples of their application) are also important in this 
context. 
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7.2 Methodology 
 
There are several potential ways of obtaining authentic data to develop and refine the 
taxonomy: 
 
• Incident/accident reports. Such reports contain detailed information of critical events 
and analysis of why they happened. They can be useful in relation to analysing 
human errors and factors that may have provoked their occurrence. However, only 
limited information concerning error management can be derived from such reports 
(in particular accident reports, because they to a lesser extent will contain error 
management initiatives). Therefore, incident and accidents reports can, in themselves, 
only be of limited value in the development and evaluation of an error management 
taxonomy. 
 
• Critical incident technique. This technique can be described as a retrospective 
interview strategy with the goal to elicit information about non-routine incidents 
(Flanagan, 1954).  This knowledge elicitation technique is done by the use of a semi-
structured format to probe different aspects of the process and circumstances of an 
incident of interest. A variation of this technique has been applied in the study of 
human errors (Jensen, 1997). The advantage of this method is that it is possible to 
obtain naturalistic data derived from everyday life and that it is possible to elicit 
detailed information about the error management events. Even though the method can 
be useful in obtaining detailed information about error management events, it would 
probably require a significant amount of resources to produce a comprehensive 
database on the basis of this technique (in particular because the interview should 
ideally be carried out shortly after the occurrence of the incident to obtain reliable 
information). 
 
• Real-time studies. Real-time studies consist of simulator experiments and real 
operational task.  Such studies can be useful in relation to studying error management 
in realistic circumstances and it is normally possible to obtain many different sources 
of information to support the analysis (such as a/v recordings, recordings of eye 
movements, etc.). The disadvantages are: (1) a considerable amount of domain 
knowledge is required to be able to analyse the errors and recoveries and (2) a high 
level of resources must be invested in relation to data collection and analysis. 
 
• Diary studies. By having people to do self-reports of errors committed and recovered 
it is possible to obtain a rich source of descriptions that can be used in the 
development of an error management taxonomy.  Furthermore, it is easy to administer 
and does not require as many resources.  A potential disadvantage is that the quality 
of the data obtained is to a large extent dependent on the conscientiousness and 
willingness of the people filling out the diary reports. Furthermore, we cannot be sure 
with regards to the representativeness of the frequency of the errors and recoveries 
reported in diary studies.  Even though the quantities of different categories should be 
treated with some caution, diary studies can be useful as "wide-gauge trawl nets" to 
 119
catch a qualitatively representative sample of important distinctions (Reason & 
Lucas, 1984).  
 
Clearly, the different methodological approaches described above have both advantages 
and disadvantages. In the table below is provided an overview of some of the important 
differences in strengths (i.e. ‘+’) and weaknesses (i.e. ‘-‘) of these approaches. 
 
 Many types 
of data 
material 
available 
Represen-
tativeness of 
errors and 
ma-
nagement 
types 
Details 
about error 
manage-
ment 
Realistic 
setting 
Limited 
resource 
require-
ments 
Incident/ 
accident 
reports 
+ - - + + 
Critical 
incident 
technique 
- - + + - 
Real-time 
studies 
 
+ + + (+) (-) 
Diary 
studies 
 
- - + + + 
Table 3: Advantages and disadvantages of different methodological approaches 
 
The individual items in the table are elaborated below: 
 
• Many types of data available: Some types of data material are based on a series of 
different kinds of information sources whereas other kinds are only based on a 
single source of information. By having several sources of information available it 
is much easier to verify information and to get a comprehensive understanding of 
the episodes being examined. For example, incident reports are normally based on 
several types of information such as radar and voice recordings, interviews with 
ATCOs and sometimes also pilot reports. In similar vein, a real-time study can 
e.g. include video recordings and post-hoc interviews. In contrast, both the critical 
incident technique and a diary study rely heavily on memory recall. Since human 
memory is unreliable there will be some limitations concerning how accurate 
information that can be obtained. 
• Representativeness of errors and management types: Different kinds of data 
material might be associated with different kinds of biases and therefore 
conclusions from such studies should be considered with precautions. In 
particular, incident reports and the critical incident technique might not contain a 
representative sample of error and error management events. On the other hand, 
 120
real-time studies should provide a more accurate picture of error and error 
management events as they occur during normal operational practice. 
• Details about error management: This item is concerned with the extent to which 
information about error management is available or can be obtained. In this 
context incident reports might not contain detailed description of the processes 
underlying the error management. On the other hand, in the three other types of 
studies it is possible to obtain a more detailed description of these processes. 
• Realistic setting: The more realistic the setting is in which the study is carried out 
the better are the chances of generalising the results outside the context being 
studied. All of the studies contain a high degree of realism. The only type of 
studies where the realism can be slightly reduced is in the case of simulator 
studies (a subgroup of real-time studies). 
• Limited resource requirements: This item is related to the amount of resources 
required for conducting a study based on the specific type of data material – in 
particular in relation to obtaining the basic data. In the case of incident reports and 
diary studies other people carry out the data production. In contrast, in the case of 
real-time studies far more resources must be invested in obtaining the data 
material. 
 
An initial attempt to use diary studies was attempted but failed because no one filled out 
the diary report forms. As a consequence of this it was decided to focus on the three other 
types of studies. Real time studies, incident studies and the critical incident technique 
could all be useful in the development of an error management taxonomy, because they 
allow gathering of a large corpus of error management events. In the current context it 
was chosen to start out with incident reports, because this method allows gathering of 
naturalistic data from operational activities over an extended time frame. At the same 
time the method does not require a large amount of resources in the basic data collection 
process. Therefore, this approach seems most appropriate in this initial stage of the 
taxonomy development. However, since the completed incident reports will not allow 
additional inquiries concerning specific issues of interest, the incident approach will be 
supplemented with a real-time study and some interviews based on the critical incident 
technique.  
 
In addition to these studies aimed at applying and developing the framework it was also 
decided to do a questionnaire study where the goal was to get some input from human 
factors experts concerning the relevance of the individual dimensions and the overall 
structure of the framework. Hereby it would be possible to get an indication of the face 
and content validity of the framework. 
 
7.3 Hypotheses 
 
As mentioned before criterion validity concerns whether the framework is able to 
produce results that is in conformity with pre-established hypotheses. Some a priori 
hypotheses about error and error management and the relationship between dimensions 
within the framework are given below. These are mainly based on existing empirical 
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results but to some extent also on theoretical inferences. The empirical studies in this 
thesis will be used to explore whether the framework can verify these statements. 
 
Error: 
  
• Hypothesis 1: Long-term memory errors will be more frequent among novices. 
The argument for this is basically that long-term memory (LTM) errors most 
frequently are the result of insufficient experience with a certain task. Therefore, 
experienced controllers should be less susceptible to LTM errors compared with 
novices. 
 
Error and error detector: 
  
• Hypothesis 2: Response Execution errors are most frequently self-detected. A 
series of studies have previously established this relationship (see e.g. 
Nooteboom, 1980; Woods, 1984). For example, in a study from an ATC 
microworld it was shown that the errors most frequently recovered were slips and 
to a far lesser extent rule- and knowledge-based mistakes (Wioland & Amalberti, 
1998). The explanation for this is that the criteria for successful performance are 
to a large extent directly available in the head of the error perpetrator. The 
chances of discovering response execution errors may, on the other hand, be more 
difficult for external observers because they do not have access to the intentions 
underlying the behaviour (Wioland & Doireau, 1995). 
 
• Hypothesis 3: Decision-making errors are either not detected at all or detected by 
others. In an experimental study of emergency scenarios in a nuclear power plant 
by Woods (1984) it was determined that none of the diagnostic errors (i.e. a 
subgroup of decision-making errors) were noticed by the operators themselves. 
On the other hand, the diagnostic errors that were detected were discovered by 
external agents with “fresh eyes”. In a study by Wioland & Doireau (1995) where 
pilots and instructors viewed video recordings of scenarios where actor pilots 
committed errors it was demonstrated that only a small part of the inserted errors 
were discovered by the observers. However, those errors discovered had a 
tendency to be associated with problem solving and decision-making (i.e. rule- 
and knowledge-based) rather than slips. In short, both of these studies indicate 
that decision-making errors will be difficult to discover and if they become 
discovered this will frequently happen through the assistance of others. 
 
• Hypothesis 4: Long-term memory errors are either not detected at all or detected 
by others. LTM errors share some of the characteristics with decision-making 
errors and are therefore also expected frequently to either not be detected or be 
detected by others. However, LTM errors are probably easier to discover (and 
agree upon) than decision-making errors by a trained observer insofar as a 
standard for determining successful performance might be more readily available. 
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•  Error detection by others depends on the amount of context-
sharing. As previously described, several researchers have suggested that the 
amount of context-sharing is critical for the chances of discovering errors 
committed by others (Wioland & Amalberti, 1998; Hutchins, 1994; Seifert & 
Hutchins, 1994). 
Hypothesis 5:
 
Error and detection stage: 
 
•  Response Execution will be more frequently detected at the 
execution stage. Basically, if people have a clear expectation concerning what 
action they intended to carry out it should be easy to detect their execution errors 
by comparing the action carried out with what they felt, saw or heard. Studies 
have shown that response execution errors are frequently caught and corrected by 
a direct feedback-checking (e.g. Rabbitt, 1966). 
Hypothesis 6:
 
• Hypothesis 7: Errors found in incident reports will have a tendency to be more 
frequently detected at the outcome stage compared with errors committed in 
normal operations. Errors that are detected at the planning or execution stage will 
tend to be omitted from incident reports, because they are not considered relevant 
for the investigation. That is, since the focus is on factors that directly or 
indirectly affected the incident – and not factors that could have affected the 
situation if not caught at such an early stage – they will not be described in the 
incident report. Instead, these fast and effective corrections will only be apparent 
when observing normal operations. 
 
Error correction and problem solving: 
 
• Hypothesis 8: The problem-solving process associated with error recovery will 
vary in such a way that ‘Ignore’/’Apply rule’ will be most frequent and ‘Choose 
option‘/‘Create solution’ the least frequent. The reason for this expectation is that 
the taxonomy is here very similar to Rasmussen’s SRK-model. Within the SRK-
framework it is postulated that the behaviour of experienced operators will most 
of the time be controlled at the lower resource demanding levels (skill- and rule-
based level) and only rarely it is required to move up to the resource intensive 
level (knowledge-based level). In the current framework the “Ignore” and “Apply 
rule” are the cognitive processes that require the least mental resources – that is, a 
straightforward recovery solution is available in the situation. On the other hand, 
the categories “Choose option” and “Create solution” are associated with an 
increasingly more cognitively demanding recovery situations. 
 
• Hypothesis 9: The errors that are ignored and tolerated are frequently 
inconsequential. In a study based on an ATC microworld by Wioland & 
Amalberti (1998) it was demonstrated that with increased expertise – and thereby 
better knowledge of the system and its risks – the subjects tolerated a larger 
degree of errors without consequences. This is most likely related to the fact that 
the subjects learn that certain errors are without consequences and consequently 
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they can save resources by not correcting them. In similar vein, in a study by 
Orasanu et al. (1999) carried out in a full-mission flight simulator it was 
demonstrated that more errors were missed (i.e. not corrected) by both captains 
and first officers when risk was low than when risk was high. It does not follow 
directly from these studies that errors ignored will have a larger tendency to be 
inconsequential than errors responded to insofar as the results from these studies 
only concern the errors not-responded to. Nonetheless, it is the expectation that 
errors (including procedural violations) that are ignored will tend to be less 
serious than errors that are judged to require some action to maintain control of 
the situation. 
 
Errors and their consequences: 
 
• Hypothesis 10: Response execution errors (including speech or action errors) 
should be easier to detect than other errors (e.g. lapses and mistakes). This is 
related to the fact that there is a direct discrepancy between intention and 
corresponding action or outcome and, consequently this should be easy to 
discover. 
 
• Hypothesis 11: Decision-making errors are more often associated with undesired 
states. This is, for example, supported by a study by Wiegmann & Shappell 
(1997) that showed that decision or response selection errors (in the current 
context just referred to as decision-making errors) were more frequently 
associated with serious accidents. Conversely, minor accidents were associated 
more with response-execution errors than with major accidents. Also Klinect et al. 
(1999) have shown that operational decision errors as well as proficiency errors 
were the most difficult for the flightcrews to manage and, consequently, were the 
ones that most often had consequences. The explanation for this is that for 
decision-making errors (including reasoning, judgement and diagnosis) the 
criterion for detection is not directly available in the head of the individual, but 
instead the correct solution is only available in the external world and is often not 
clearly recognisable in advance (Reason, 1990). 
 
• Hypothesis 12: Most errors in everyday-life situations will be inconsequential. 
For example, in an observational study of pilot crew errors during normal 
operations it was found that about 85% of the crew errors were inconsequential 
(Klinect et al. 1999). Therefore, a larger amount of consequential errors is 
expected to be found in incident reports compared with real-time observation. 
 
• Hypothesis 13: Procedural violations will frequently be inconsequential. A study 
by Klinect et al. (1999) based on real-time observation of pilot’s behaviour 
showed that intentional non-compliance errors (i.e. procedural violation errors) 
were the most frequently committed and also the least consequential. It can be 
speculated that the reason for this is that people develop a meta-knowledge based 
on experience concerning which violations that are consequential and which are 
not. This would be in agreement with studies indicating that people develop 
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natural risk-talking abilities and that their main goal is not to avoid errors, but 
instead to maintain cognitive control (Wioland & Amalberti, 1996). 
Consequently, many “minor” violations might be accepted, because the risk is 
considered small or absent. 
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8 Study 1 – Incident reports8 
 
In order to expand on the existing knowledge about human error capture a series of Air 
Traffic Control incident reports from the Swedish CAA (Civil Aviation Authorities) 
containing both consequential and non-consequential controller errors have been 
reviewed and analysed. The reason for focusing on incident reports as a basis for the 
analysis is, first, that a relatively large number of fairly detailed reports are available 
which is important in relation to statistical analysis and, second, that the reports provide a 
high level of operational fidelity compared with, for example, laboratory based research 
(Wickens & McCloy, 1993). Furthermore, since some error compensation behaviour to 
hinder an accident is normally present in incident reports, the recovery aspect will often 
be conspicuous in such reports (van der Schaaf et al., 1991). Even though the incident 
reports are also associated with inherent problems and biases (as will be discussed in 
more detail later on) they constitute a useful starting point for analysing human error 
recovery events. 
 
Since little research has been done in relation to using a comprehensive error capture 
analysis framework to dynamic and complex real-life scenarios, the current study is 
explorative in nature. Being explorative, the goal of the study is, first, to get an indication 
of the robustness of the core of the classification system (that is, can consistent and 
reliable classifications be obtained by different judges?) so as to improve the taxonomy.  
Second, the goal is to determine whether the framework can be used in relation to 
uncovering error and recovery patterns in the database material.  
 
The agenda for the remainder of this chapter is as follows. First, a presentation of the 
dimensions of the framework that will be used in the current study is given. Only the 
dimensions of the core of the framework that can be usefully applied to the current data 
material are included. The description of the framework is followed by an empirical study 
aimed at applying and evaluating the usefulness of the taxonomy.  Finally, a discussion of 
the results and the chosen methodological approach will be made.  
 
8.1 The analysis framework 
 
There are two main dimensions in the core of the framework: the first main dimension 
concerns classification of the error itself (analysis of threat anticipation/management and 
recovery-planning is not included in this study due to insufficient information in the 
incident reports but will be explored in study 4). The second dimension concerns what 
happens after the error, namely the detection and recovery of the error. An overview of 
the part of the framework used in this chapter is shown in the table below containing an 
                                                 
8 The chapter is based on Bove, T. & Andersen, H.B. (2000): "Types of Error Recovery in Air Traffic Management". 
3rd International Conference on Engineering Psychology and Cognitive Ergonomics. 
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example from one of the reports analysed9. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF ERROR AND RECOVERY # 1 
"When SAS asks for clearance to flight level 310, R1 could have discovered the risk for a conflict insofar as the 
strips for SAS and SCW were available. The conflict was detected by a relieving ATCO when the separation 
standards between the two aircraft were violated."  
ERROR 
Error Cognitive Domain Perception Memory Decision Response 
DETECTION & RECOVERY 
Error/state detector  No one Producer Colleague Pilot System Who:  
 Error/state corrector No one Producer Colleague Pilot System 
If detector is "No one" or "System" then go to “What”: When: 
Time of detection Planning Execution Outcome 
How: Detection cue(s)  External communication System feedback  Internal feedback 
RESPONSE & OUTCOME 
Error/State Response Trap/mitigate Exacerbate Fail to respond What:  
Error/State Outcomes Inconsequential/recovery Undesired state Additional error 
Table 4: The analysis framework (study 1) 
 
Please notice that if “No one” or “System “ is chosen in the identification of the detector 
then the When- and How-questions should be omitted (i.e. they are cognitive 
classifications and are only applicable to situations where human actors are involved in 
the process). 
 
8.2 Method 
 
In the following is reported an empirical study aimed at applying and evaluating the 
usefulness of the taxonomy. More specifically, the goals of the study are (1) to determine 
the reliability of classifications made by the use of the framework; and (2) to apply the 
framework to the analysis of a database of ATM incident reports to uncover error and 
recovery patterns. 
 
8.2.1 The data material 
 
Altogether 45 Swedish Air Traffic Management incidents (1997-98) were used for the 
study. Each of the incidents has been investigated and reported by the Swedish CAA 
(Civil Aviation Authorities, Air Navigation Services Dept.). The Swedish reports are 
particularly informative not least because the Swedish ATM provider is regarded as 
having largely succeeded in developing a no-blame culture and, therefore, these incident 
reports are often rich in detail and appear to be candid. In general, an incident will first be 
                                                 
9 Please notice that in this study it was chosen to collapse short-term memory and long-term memory. Hence 
“Memory” concerns both short-term and long-term storage or retrieval of information. The reason for this was that 
the data material used in this chapter would frequently not allow determining whether the person had the right 
intention but forgot to carry out a task (i.e. short-term memory) or if the person could not recall more permanent 
information based on training and experience (i.e. long-term memory). 
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reported to the Air Navigation Services branch on a reporting form by one or several 
controllers involved in the incident. On the basis of this report it is decided whether or 
not an investigation should be carried out. If so, the report along with radar and voice 
recordings, interviews with the involved controllers, and possibly pilot reports, form the 
material on the basis of which the investigator generates a narrative description and an 
analysis of the course of events, draws conclusions about the involved precursors of the 
incident (and, of course, the recommendations that follow from the results of the 
investigation). Normally, an incident report will describe several human errors as well as 
human and organisational factors that may have negatively affected human performance.  
Most of the incidents involved violation of separation standards, but only in very few 
cases there was an imminent risk of collision. 
 
8.2.2 Procedure 
 
The 45 Swedish Air Traffic Management incident reports were reviewed and a total 
amount of 144 controller errors were identified10. Even though many pilot errors were 
also observed they were not included in this analysis because the focus was on controller 
errors (for comparable studies focused on the pilot side please refer to Degani et al., 1991 
and Sarter & Alexander, 2000). The analysis procedure was divided into two phases: (1) 
a calibration trial where the incident reports from 1997 were coded by two judges 
(independently) and afterwards any problems and disagreements in the classification 
principles were clarified and resolved; (2) a test trial where the incident reports from 
1998 were independently coded by two judges on the basis of the lessons learned from 
the calibration trial. The results presented in this chapter concern, first, the reliability of 
applying the error management framework (and the data behind this inter-rater reliability 
derive from the 81 events of the 98-incidents); and second, the frequency tabulations that 
derive from applying the error management framework (the data behind the frequency 
tabulations derive from the 144 events of the 97- and 98- incidents). 
 
When analysing error and error capture in a complex domain such as air traffic 
management some difficulties will inevitably arise that require general decisions 
concerning how the analysis of the data material should be carried out. Some important 
questions and issues revealed during the calibration trial (and previous experiences with 
analysing human errors) are how the segmentation of the events should be carried out and 
which principles should underlie the classification of identified error and error 
management events. First, however, we will briefly examine the limitations associated 
with the information elicitation. 
 
Information elicitation 
 
The data material used in the current study is already completed incident reports. 
Consequently, it was not possible to obtain any additional information. This puts some 
limitations on the analysis that can be done on this basis. In particular, little information 
                                                 
10 The identification of errors was done by the author of the thesis on the basis of a set of pre-determined principles. 
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will be available in relation to the processes underlying the error management since the 
investigators have had the main focus on errors and their causes rather than what 
occurred after the error and they have not had any conceptual error management 
framework to guide their information elicitation. 
 
Segmentation 
 
In this section we will examine some principles related to ensuring a consistent 
segmentation of the incidents. Some important questions are: (1) Which principles should 
govern the identification of error events? (2) Which principles should underlie the 
segmentation of error management events when errors have different causal effect on the 
course of events? (3) How should the error management be segmented when several 
interacting errors are only discovered when leading to an undesired outcome? 
 
Principles for error identification 
 
The following are issues that should be clarified in order to make a consistent 
identification of human errors. 
 
• How many errors in one action?  
 
Problem: A single act or non-detection (an inaction) may well consist of a chain of 
failures - for instance, a controller may have a strong expectancy about an aircraft's flight 
level (FL) and then overhear FL from pilot (wrong hearback), fail to check strips and fail 
to monitor radar. Thus, the controller misses several opportunities for correcting the 
erroneous FL.  
Solution: Each single failure - to conduct right hearback, to check strips, to monitor radar 
- involved in a single inaction should be classified as an error; so in this case, three 
individual errors are involved, each of them influenced by "expectancy bias".  
 
• How many errors should be counted when two controllers share an error?  
 
Problem: What should we do when two controllers share an error? For instance, if the co-
ordination between two controllers in a relief situation has been carried out in a hasty 
manner and each of them, had he or she followed procedures and good working practice, 
would have carried it out much more thoroughly - is this one or two errors?  
Solution: We count errors by individuals since the framework used is cognitive in nature 
- so if two controllers are involved in the transmission of information and there is no 
evidence that one of them made a single mistake that explains the flawed information 
sharing, we count this as two instances of error. 
 
The principle of causal relationship 
 
Another segmentation principle of a more complicated nature is related to the fact that 
incident scenarios often involve several errors with variable effects on the course of 
events. Some errors have a direct causal effect on the course of events whereas other 
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errors have a more indirect effect or no effect at all on the situation. For these different 
kinds of errors it is necessary to determine the stopping rules for the individual error 
management analysis and thereby also which actor (if any) who should be associated 
with the error capture. Below three kinds of causal groups and their respective stopping 
rules in relation to the error management analysis are described. The general principle 
behind these stopping rules is that the relevance of an error event depends on the 
membership of the different causal groups.  
 
• Direct causes: If the error had not been made the incident would most likely not 
have occurred or at least been less serious. Therefore, even though mitigating 
actions are initiated the end outcome is normally an undesired state. An example 
could be a controller not detecting a conflict between two aircraft on the flight 
strip board. Stopping rule: If an error has direct causal consequences for the 
situation it is reasonable to continue the analysis until the point where either no 
recovery is any longer possible or where recovery initiatives have been 
successfully implemented.  
 
• Indirect causes: The error enhanced the potential for additional errors. This kind 
of error is normally not discovered and corrected by anyone until additional errors 
have occurred. An example is a radar controller who does not request assistance 
from a planner in spite of an increasing workload and thereby enhances the risk of 
new errors occurring. Stopping rule: The natural stopping point in the error 
management analysis for errors whose main function is to pave the way for new 
errors seems to be when these errors have had their probable consequences, 
namely provoking additional errors.  
 
• Non-causal: The error did (most likely) not play any role in the incident. Such 
errors may, for example, be caught at the planning or execution stage (and thereby 
be prohibited from affecting system safety and performance) or simply be of a 
noncritical nature. An example of the latter is in the case where a controller does 
not provide the aircraft with traffic information immediately after a conflict is 
over. Stopping rule: Since errors of this kind do not affect the course of events in 
any detectable manner the error management analysis is continued until the end of 
the incident description. 
 
The problem of multiple causes 
 
Most incidents and accidents are the results of multiple errors interacting with each other. 
This fact has direct consequences on the analysis of error management. If only a single 
error occurred in each error scenario it would be a simple matter to link the error with the 
consequences, but when several errors are present it becomes more difficult to untangle 
the effects of the individual errors and recoveries because they are often tightly 
intertwined. This is especially the case when errors are not discovered until they have 
adverse consequences. In such situations several causal errors may share a common error 
management history. This may impose some problems when adding up error 
management data because the same error management events may be included in the 
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material several times11, but it seems to be the only viable solution. 
 
Classifications 
 
In this section we will examine some principles that can enhance the chances of using 
consistent classification principles in the error management analysis. In particular we will 
examine two questions: (1) What should be done in those cases where more than one 
classification seems appropriate for a specific error event? (2) Which principles should 
underlie the classification of error detector and corrector? 
 
Dual classifications 
 
The categories in the analysis framework have been selected on the basis of being 
mutually exclusive. There are important reasons for this. First of all, it is difficult to 
produce a statistical index of inter-rater reliability if categories are not mutually 
exclusive, simply because the statistical test relevant for this task - Cohen's kappa - 
requires that the categories are mutually exclusive. Second, if the categories within a 
given dimension are not mutually exclusive it becomes more problematic to make trend 
analyses and analyses of interactions between variables. Even though the categories are 
mutually exclusive some cases occur where the classifier may feel that several categories 
can apply and it is therefore necessary to decide what to do in these situations. In the 
current context it was decided that all dual classifications would be omitted from the data 
material analysed. Even though this means losing some information it was considered the 
best solution in order to avoid the above-described problems.  
 
Classification of error detector and corrector 
 
A consistent identification of the error detector and corrector is actually a very significant 
part of the error capture analysis process. This is related to the fact that all the following 
steps in the error capture analysis are directly dependent on who is assigned to these two 
roles. If, for example, disagreements between different analysts should occur due to some 
inherent ambiguities in the data material or inconsistencies in the applied classification 
principles, this will directly undermine the reliability of the classifications, because the 
choice of actor determines which perspective the error management analysis will be made 
from. The identification of actors associated with the error detection and correction has 
therefore been governed by some pre-determined situationally driven classification 
principles.  
 
                                                 
11 It is interesting to note that among those studies that have focused on classifying error detection and recovery 
episodes, there has been a tendency to use scenarios that involve a single error and behaviour aimed at mitigating the 
error (e.g. Sellen, 1994; Degani et al., 1991; Sarter & Alexander, 2000). Furthermore, in those studies where several 
errors could occur within a single scenario (e.g. Bagnara et al, 1989; Wioland & Amalberti, 1998) no explicit 
explanations or comments are made in relation to this problem concerning multiple causes and error management 
analysis. 
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• The principle of first involvement: First of all, the error detector and corrector are, 
in general, assigned to the one who was the first to discover and recover the error. 
For example, if the error producer discovers an error and afterwards a colleague 
also (independently) discovers the error, it is the error producer who will be 
chosen as the error detector. 
 
• The principle of involvement importance: Different parts of the consequences may 
be recovered (or attempted to be recovered) by different actors. In some situations 
the first response is not necessarily the most relevant one (for example, if an 
ATCO gives an avoiding instruction to a pilot and the pilot responds in the 
opposite way). In cases where the principle of involvement importance is in 
conflict with the principle of first involvement, the first overrules the latter. 
 
• The principle of active involvement: The third principle is that the actor should be 
actively involved in the process. If, for example, a controller detects an emerging 
conflict on the basis of a conflict alert this detection would be attributed to the 
system and not the controller, because the latter is only a transducer in the 
process.   
 
• The principle of involvement opportunity: Finally, an error detection and 
correction can only be attributed to a system or human actor as long as it is 
discovered in due time to be able to initiate some recovery initiatives. Therefore, 
if an error induced problem is not detected until, say, two aircraft have passed 
each other and are no longer in conflict, it will be analysed as not detected by any 
one. 
 
8.3 Results 
 
8.3.1 Reliability analysis 
 
Kappa is a statistical measure that is commonly used to determine the reliability of 
classifications made by independent judges and which is corrected for chance agreement 
(Cohen, 1960; Fleiss, 1971, 1981). In this section we report the results of the kappa 
analysis for each of the main dimensions in the framework. The data material used for 
this analysis is those classifications of error events where each of the raters has used one 
and only one category in the classification system. Only the reports from 1998 (that is, 
“81 error events”) were used for the reliability analysis, since the reports from 1997 were 
used as a means to attune and refine the classification scheme.  
 
During the analysis it became clear that for two of the dimensions - namely the when- 
and the how-dimension - it was necessary to collapse categories to be able to make 
consistent classifications. Finer grained distinctions were not possible to make in relation 
to these process dimensions because insufficient information was available in the incident 
reports. Therefore the following categories were collapsed: (1) For the when-dimension 
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the planning and execution stage were collapsed since these stages concern detection 
before any consequences have ensued. (2) For the how-dimension the categories external 
communications and system feedback were collapsed to external feedback so that the 
main distinction is between internal and external feedback. The following table displays 
the results of computing the chance corrected coefficient of agreement between two 
independent raters12.  
 
Error 
Cognitive domain 
Kappa 0.81 P-value<0.001 
Detection and recovery 
Who – detection 
Kappa 0.64 P-value<0.001 
Who – correction 
Kappa 0.62 P-value<0.001 
When 
Kappa 0.56 P-value=0.005 
How 
Kappa 0.62 P-value=0.025 
Response and Outcome 
What – response 
Kappa 0.45 P-value<0.001 
What – outcome 
Kappa 0.51 P-value<0.001 
Table 5: Inter-rater kappa coefficients and P-values for each of the main dimensions 
in the framework (study 1) 
 
The interpretation of the level of agreement (above chance) obtained by independent 
raters is, by convention, nearly always stated along the lines suggested by Fleiss (1981) 
or Landis & Koch (1977), who differ only slightly. They suggest that levels below 0.40 
show poor or merely fair agreement, and this figure remains a conventional cut-off point 
(rather as the interpretation of a p-value at or below 0.05). Fleiss proposes that levels 
above 0.75 show strong agreement, and Landis & Koch suggest that levels between 0.41 
and 0.60 indicate moderate agreement, between 0.61 and 0.80 substantial, and above 0.80 
almost perfect agreement. As can be seen from the table each of the dimensions in the 
framework produced kappa values that lie between 0.45 and 0.81. Therefore, all the 
dimensions in the framework produced results ranging from a fair/moderate to a strong or 
substantial level of agreement.  
 
It is interesting to note that the kappa values for the cognitive domains are significantly 
higher than the kappa values from the error management analyses. There may be several 
                                                 
12 The two independent judges were the authors of the paper Bove & Andersen  (2000) who rated the target material - 
the Swedish ATM incident reports - independently for the reliability data (all 98-reports). 
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reasons for this. The most important reason is probably that analysis of the mechanisms 
behind the individual errors can be carried out by examining a very limited part of the 
incident description. On the other hand, analysis of the error management process 
requires to a larger extent integration of the whole incident description to be able to 
derive the error capture classifications.  
 
8.3.2 Pattern analysis 
 
For the analysis of patterns in the incident reports only the part of the data material where 
consistent classifications were independently obtained by the two raters are used. All the 
reports from 1997 and 1998 were used in this analysis (that is, 144 “error events”). For 
the statistical analysis of the distributions is used an exact Goodness-of-Fit test based on a 
uniform distribution (i.e. the observed distribution is compared with a distribution where 
each of the categories has an equal likelihood of occurring). 
 
Below is shown the distribution of categories for the cognitive domain. As can be seen in 
the figure, a large majority of the errors were either decision and judgement errors 
(61.5%) or perception errors (26.9%). The differences are highly significant, Χ2(3, 
N=104)=86.54, P<0.001.  
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Figure 19: Distribution of cognitive domains  
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The results in relation to the actor associated with the error detection (Χ2(4, 
N=80)=42.89, P<0.001) and error correction (Χ2(4, N=86)=87.00, P<0.001) are shown 
below. It is interesting to note that a very large part of the errors are not detected at all 
(42.5%). Among those errors that are detected it is primarily the producer of the error 
who eventually also detects the error (30% of all the errors or 52.5% of the errors 
detected). Nonetheless, colleagues also play an important role in the error detection 
(18.8% of all the errors or 32.6% of the errors detected). These results are in good 
concordance with other studies (e.g. Wioland & Amalberti, 1998) and goes to highlight 
the importance of other people in the error management process. It may appear surprising 
that pilots are only involved in a small part of the error detection, but this is related to the 
fact that pilots only have access to a small part of the larger traffic picture and therefore 
only have a limited possibility for discovering errors. Another interesting result of the 
analysis is that warning systems do not play any significant role in relation to the error 
detection. A somewhat similar picture emerges when examining the actors associated 
with the error correction (the reason why the graph shows that no corrections at all were 
initiated by pilots is that the numbers are based on agreed classifications and each of the 
classifiers only identified, but did not agree on, a couple of errors which where corrected 
by pilots). This is a reflection of the fact that the one who detects the error or problem is 
usually also the one who is the active part in the correction (87% of the time the error 
detector was also the error corrector). 
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Figure 20: Distribution of error detector and corrector  
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As mentioned previously it is desirable that errors are caught at an early point in time. 
However, as can be seen in the chart below, a large majority of the errors is not caught 
until the outcome stage, Χ2(1, N=46)=32.14, P<0.001. Seemingly, this is in conflict with 
the often-cited statement that most errors are caught before having any consequence. This 
high number of errors that are not caught until at the outcome stage is to a large extent the 
product of the data material used in this study, namely incident reports. These reports are 
only written in the case where the system safety has been jeopardised and normally by 
domain experts who have en tendency to only consider something as an error if it has 
consequences. Consequently, there is a strong bias towards consequential errors. 
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Figure 21: Distribution of detection stages 
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Below can be seen whether the error detection was cued internally or externally. In this 
context external feedback (i.e. system feedback and external communication) is clearly 
the most significant source in the error detection process, Χ2(1, N=58)=46.62, P<0.001. 
This is not surprising because internal feedback is mainly (but not exclusively) relevant 
in relation to memory failures and response execution failures - and since these two 
groups of errors were the least frequent in this study it follows that also the number of 
errors detected by the use of the internal feedback mechanism should be low. 
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Figure 22: Distribution of detection sources 
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The final two tables are related to what occurred on the external level, namely the error 
response and outcome. In relation to the first group the most frequent response was to 
trap or mitigate the error. So, even though many errors are not detected until the outcome 
stage - that is, when some consequences have ensued - many errors are nonetheless 
averted from developing into an even more serious situation (please notice that no cases 
of exacerbation were observed in the incidents). The differences in the frequencies were 
significant, Χ2(2, N=94)=50.86, P<0.001. 
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Figure 23: Distribution of error responses 
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As can be seen in the table below the errors identified in the data material contained a 
very small part of inconsequential errors. Almost 90% of the errors led to either an 
undesired stage or an additional error. Again, this can be seen as a product of the 
particular type of data source used in this study. The differences in outcome were 
significant, Χ2(2, N=70)=34.40, P<0.001. 
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Figure 24: Distribution of error outcomes 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter part of the conceptual framework has been applied to the analysis of ATM 
incident reports. The goal of this study was, first, to get an initial indication of the 
robustness of the proposed error capture taxonomy. The results, based on the kappa 
analysis, indicated that all of the dimensions in the framework produced reliability ratings 
that, on the standard interpretation, lie between fair/moderate and strong/substantial. 
These results are promising because this is the first attempt to formally test the 
framework on authentic ATC error events. 
 
A second goal of the study was to uncover trends in the identified error events. Several 
interesting conclusions were made in this context such as the fact that most of the errors 
discovered are detected by the error producer and that most of the error detection is based 
on externally derived cues. It should be noted that in the current context only patterns 
related to the individual dimensions were analysed. Additional interesting trend 
information may be uncovered by examining interactions between individual dimensions 
(for example, is there any relationship between the type of errors and the cues used for 
detecting the errors). These issues will be explored in more detail in the following 
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empirical studies. 
 
The current study used incident reports as a data material for studying error and error 
management. In spite of the many advantages of incident reports there are also some 
inherent limitations in using incident reports as data material: 
 
• The errors found in incident reports are normally not described in psychological 
terms or in sufficient detail to derive the psychological mechanisms. This disrupts 
the chances of obtaining highly reliable classifications. The problem is even more 
prevalent when analysing the error capture processes since the error resolvement 
is often described in vague terms (and consequently it was necessary to collapse 
some of the process categories and no classifications of the problem-solving could 
be made). This may be related to the fact that historically human factors safety 
initiatives have mainly focused on avoiding the occurrence of errors and not 
controlling the consequences of errors. 
 
• Since the incident reports are to a large extent based on self-reports, the reports 
may be associated with inherent biases and, consequently, statistical conclusions 
should be treated with caution. For example, practitioners have a tendency to only 
accept something as an error if the error has direct consequences for the course of 
events. Human factors specialists, on the other hand, consider errors as equally 
important irrespective of the outcome of the errors (Amalberti & Wioland, 1997).  
Since ATM professionals write the incident reports it may be expected that 
inconsequential errors will be underrepresented in the data material. 
 
A potential solution to overcome these two limitations is to apply the analysis framework 
to other data sources such as interviews based on the critical incident technique 
(Flanagan, 1954) and real-time studies. Interviews are of interest because they will allow 
obtaining detailed information about critical incidents and thereby provide a more solid 
foundation for making inferences about the underlying error and recovery mechanisms. 
Similar advantages can be obtained with real-time studies. In addition, these may contain 
a large (and unbiased) variety of categories of the framework and thereby be better suited 
for testing aspects of framework that were less prevalent in the incident reports.  
 140
9 Study 2 – Real-time study 
 
Several researchers have suggested that there has been too little emphasis on normal 
operations when analysing error and error management (Helmreich et al., 2001; Maurino, 
1999). This is unfortunate because studies of normal operations might be a significant 
and vital source of information to obtain knowledge about safety critical issues involving 
human performance. As a part of the Ph.D.-project it was therefore decided to do a small-
scale study of how errors are captured in everyday operational situations. There are in the 
current context in particular two arguments for focusing on normal operations in the 
evaluation of the error management framework. First, it was a general requirement to the 
framework that it should be applicable to both normal and abnormal situations. Second, it 
can be expected that other types of error management might be more prevalent in this 
kind of material compared with, for example, incident reports. In particular, most errors 
from everyday situations will have a tendency to be captured much sooner and perhaps 
also by different mechanisms. 
 
Real-time studies can be accomplished by either using a real operational situation (e.g. 
checkout of controllers) or using a simulated setting. There are advantages and 
disadvantages with each of these possible approaches. The advantage of using real 
operational situations is that it becomes possible to the study the phenomena in a situation 
with a high degree of ecological validity and contextual richness. The disadvantage is, 
however, that such a study would need to be carried out over an extended amount of time 
to achieve the required corpus of events. Furthermore, practical constraints related to 
obtaining permission to recording and analysing errors from real operational situations 
can be a problem due to the sensitive nature of this subject.  
 
The study presented in this chapter was carried out on the basis of a simulator study of En 
Route Air Traffic Control with video recordings. The simulator study was done as a part 
of the ATCO trainee’s education referred to as the Radar Module. This module 
constitutes the last part of their basic training and at this point in time they have acquired 
a basic level of skills necessary for carrying out the controller task (afterwards they will 
start on on-the-job-training). The recordings from the simulator trials were carried out as 
a part of another Ph.D. independently of the current Ph.D.13 After having reviewed a 
series of tapes from these scenarios it was decided that they could constitute an 
interesting foundation for the current project insofar as they contained a number of minor 
errors and it was therefore decided to study these events in detail by the use of the error 
management framework. 
  
                                                 
13 Hauland, G. (2002): Measuring Team Situation Awareness in Training of En Route Air Traffic Control – Process 
Oriented Measures for Experimental Studies. Ph.D. Thesis. Risø National Laboratory, Roskilde, Denmark.  
 141
9.1 The analysis framework 
 
An overview of the framework used in this study is shown in the table below. Some 
minor changes have been made in relation to study 1. First of all, different kinds of error 
producers are included: Radar and Planner are the radar and planner controller involved 
in the experiment (for a description of their respective tasks see section 1.3); Pilot is the 
“ghost”-pilot involved in the experiment and Other is an ATCO that is not directly a part 
of the experiment. Second, Instructor has been added to the detector and corrector 
dimension insofar as an instructor was sitting behind the radar and planner controller in 
the simulator scenarios.  
 
DESCRIPTION OF ERROR AND RECOVERY # 1  
"When SAS asks for clearance to flight level 310, R1 could have discovered the risk for a conflict insofar as the 
strips for SAS and SCW were available. The conflict was detected by a relieving ATCO when the separation 
standards between the two aircraft were violated."  
ERROR 
Producer Radar Planner Pilot Other Error 
Cognitive Domain Perception Short-term 
memory 
Long-term 
memory 
Decision Response 
DETECTION & RECOVERY 
Error/state detector  No one Producer ATCO Instructor Pilot System Who:  
 Error/state corrector No one Producer ATCO Instructor Pilot System 
If detector is "No one" or "System" then go to “What”: When: 
Time of detection Planning Execution Outcome 
How: Detection cue(s)  External communication System feedback  Internal feedback 
RESPONSE & OUTCOME 
Error/State Response Trap/Mitigate Exacerbate Fail to respond What:  
Error/State Outcomes Inconsequential/Recovery Undesired State Additional Error 
Table 6: The analysis framework (study 2) 
  
9.2 Method 
 
9.2.1 The data material 
 
The simulator recordings were obtained from an experiment that was conducted using a 
real-time ATC simulation facility at the Danish CAA in Kastrup. In total, 56 unique team 
combinations of air traffic controllers consisting each of one Radar and one Planner 
controller participated in training exercises in an En Route Centre simulator. In addition, 
"ghost pilots" participated in the scenarios when communications were made between air 
traffic control and the aircraft. 
 
The trainees were required to carry out some different scenarios that could be expected to 
elicit some of the main error categories in the taxonomy. Each scenario lasted between 30 
and 45 minutes and consisted of three probes. These are inserted events that are typical of 
normal everyday tasks of a controller and involved coordination requirements: 
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• Probe 1: This event occurred right after the hand-over where an unknown fighter 
calls Radar controller. The fighter pilot requests to change from VFR to IFR pick-up 
to do ILS training at Brande (IFR is necessary to be able to make an ILS). 
• Probe 2: This event occurred about 10 minutes after the hand-over. A fighter requests 
to change flight level (FL) from sector B to A as a part of a test flight. The pilot 
would like to do an IFR test flight at FL 280 which involves following a route with 3 
fixpoints and then after the test flight to return to VFR. 
• Probe 3: This event occurred about 20 minutes after the hand-over (in the case of 
abnormal scenarios just after abnormal) where an aircraft requests a diversion in 
sector B. The reason for the diversion is either (a) company request or (b) change of 
flight plan.   
 
In addition, some of the scenarios included one of two types of abnormal events: 
 
• Emergency descent: Emergency descent starts at a high level in sector B. Scenario 
example: shortly after hand over from A to B emergency descent begins to FL 100 
(with max. Rate Of Descent 4.000-5.000 ft/min). The aircraft turns 30 degrees to the 
left. SSR is shortly afterwards set to 7700. No reply is made at the first call from the 
ATCO, but a little later it is reported that: "(callsign) -- executed emergency descent 
due to loss of cabin pressure". At FL 100 it is reported that: "(callsign) -- request 
clearance to (EKBR/EKDA) at this level. Request priority landing due to smoke in 
the passenger cabin. 1 passenger has been injured. Request medical assistance at 
arrival". 
• Fuel dump: Fueldumping due to hydraulic failure. Starts at a high-level in sector B. 
Scenario example: shortly after hand-over of frequency from A to B or shortly after 
hand-over of frequency from B to A the pilot calls the ATCO and says: "Due to 
hydraulic failure request clearance to an area for fuel dumping and then clearance to 
EKBR". The pilot will be able to make a normal landing and the radio transmission is 
normal during fuel dump. The duration is 6 min. and the amount is 30 tons. At 
landing the fuel will be 100 tons. 
 
Each of the scenarios began with the instructor giving a hand-over and finished about 30 
minutes afterwards. The human activities were videorecorded to provide continuous 
record of events (incl. head-mounted camera on radar and planner controller, overview of 
the scene, and radio communication) and strips from the simulator scenarios were 
obtained.  
 
A total number of about 60 scenarios were initially available. The recordings included 
helmet-mounted video recordings from both the radar and planner controller and all audio 
communication (both controller-controller and controller-pilot). Among these 10 
scenarios were selected to be used for further analysis. The scenarios were selected on the 
basis of the fact that for this subset of scenarios an instructor was present which was 
considered important because they would often comment on things that were not clearly 
visible on the video recordings. It should be noted that the scenarios were not chosen on 
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the basis of any theoretical considerations, but it was expected that the scenarios would 
reflect a broad range of errors and recoveries from the taxonomy. 
 
9.2.2 Procedure 
 
In the following we will review the procedure associated with the information elicitation, 
the event segmentation and the classification. The information elicitation and 
segmentation phase are partially overlapping in this study and are therefore described 
under one heading. 
 
Information elicitation and segmentation 
 
The scenarios were segmented into a number of errors, each of which was relatively self-
contained descriptions. For these errors both the information related to the 
communication between actors and, when relevant, contextual information was added to 
give an understanding of what was going on. It should be emphasised that there were 
some limitations in relation to this initial identification of errors: 
 
• We do not have access to mental activities underlying the behaviour of the controllers 
and it therefore puts some limits on the precision with which we can analyse the 
cognitive foundation of the errors and their recovery. Nonetheless, since there was 
both Radar and Planner controller (and an instructor) present in the position in all the 
scenarios it meant that there was a larger chance of externalising their plans and 
considerations. 
 
• Even though the helmet camera from the radar controller could give a fairly accurate 
picture of the traffic situation it was not possible to read the labels of the individual 
aircraft due to the resolution of the camera. Nonetheless, it was possible to get rough 
picture of the location and callsign of the main aircraft insofar as the eye-tracking 
made it possible to see which aircraft the controller was looking at when talking about 
a specific aircraft. All the original strips from the individual scenarios were also 
available which made it easier to get a picture of the traffic. 
 
In many cases the video recording did not give sufficient information for an observer to 
determine the complete context of the error or the underlying mental activities. In 
particular, it was necessary to have a high level of domain knowledge to be able to 
determine deviations from an optimal performance. In order to get a more complete 
understanding of the scenarios – and in particular the error events - it was decided that it 
would be useful to have some "ATC-experts" present - i.e. instructors - to review the 
video tapes and comment on central episodes within each of the scenarios. The 
instructors were associated with the same facility as the air traffic controllers used in the 
experimental sessions. Hereby it was possible to avoid that variations in local procedures, 
practices and knowledge would influence the error identification. Also, the instructors 
were, of course, highly familiar with what the trainees were taught and could therefore 
easily identify errors committed. 
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Hence, the instructors were given the opportunity to comment on the trainee’s 
performance and the thoughts lying behind the behaviour. All of their comments were 
recorded on one sound channel on a separate videotape containing the original pictures 
from the simulator trials so it was hereby possible to preserve both their comments and 
the associated simulator context. For each of the selected scenarios the instructors were 
before reviewing the videotape given a paper with a short transcript of the identified 
errors and a copy of all the strips that had been used in the scenario. The main focus was 
on the error events and the discovery and recovery of errors or, in general, the handling of 
any problems encountered. During the review of the simulator scenarios some new errors 
were discovered and some of the previously discovered were abandoned as being errors 
because the instructors did not consider the events erroneous. In this manner the 
identification of errors was calibrated and at the same time additional information 
concerning the pre-identified errors was obtained. On the basis of this process a total of 
250 errors were identified. 
 
An example of the product of the above-described procedure is shown below. In the 
example the Radar controller (R) creates a conflict between two aircraft that is 
immediately discovered by the instructor sitting behind the ATCO. 
 
Communication 
R: Birdsong 17, left turn inbound ODIN 
Pilot: Birdsong 17, left turn inbound ODIN. Confirm 
R: Birdsong 17, left turn inbound ODIN 
Instructor: Won’t it lead to two aircraft hitting each other? 
R: Yes. Birdsong 17, turn left heading 270 immediately. SAS 633, Turn right heading 
360 at once (traffic information is then given to SAS 633) 
Contextual Information 
The pilot must now have initiated the turn since it is necessary to make an avoidance 
response and provide traffic information. 
Instructor's Comments 
She (i.e. the Radar controller) creates a conflict. It is birdsong that was flying towards 
Brande that suddenly wants to do some airwork at ODIN. She probably wants 
Birdsong to go south of the holding, but as a consequence of her instruction it heads 
directly towards an aircraft in the holding (i.e. SAS 633) which she has probably not 
seen. 
 
As can be seen in the example three types of information were elicited. The first is 
“Communication” and is a verbatim transcription of the relevant communication 
associated with the error (the “Instructor” in the text is the instructor who was sitting 
behind the ATCOs in the scenario). The second is “Contextual Information” and is 
elaboration of what is going on in the situation. The final field is “Instructor’s 
Comments” and is the comments from the instructor who reviewed the videotape after 
the experimental trials (and is therefore not the same instructor as the one who actually 
was present in the scenario). 
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Classification 
 
The classification part of the study was divided into three sub-phases: (a) Initial 
classification – First, all the error events were classified twice by the author with one 
month’s interval and on this basis a consensus classification was produced; (b) 
Calibration phase - The second classifier was trained in the use of the taxonomy. In order 
to achieve reliable and valid categorisations the classifier was given feedback concerning 
the "correct" classification as a part of the training (based on the author’s classifications) 
and potential misunderstandings in the use of the taxonomy were calibrated. The first 
four scenarios containing 98 error events were used for this purpose; (c) Test phase - On 
the basis of the transcripts from both the simulator episodes containing errors and 
instructors’ comments to these errors the trained observer was asked to classify the 
remaining errors and error recoveries observed in the simulator trials.  
 
In some cases it was difficult to choose between two seemingly equally good candidates 
when classifying the error events. In order to maintain as much information as possible, 
and at the same time avoid statistical problems associated with analysing dual 
classifications, it was decided to use a rank-based dual-classification principle. The idea 
is here that it is allowed to use dual classifications in those situations where more than 
one category may apply. However, to be able to single out one particular category as the 
chosen classification they should be ranked according to their estimated applicability14. 
 
For the study it was considered useful to develop guidelines to enhance consistency in the 
classifications of error events. The guidelines based on the experience from the analysis 
of the simulator scenarios are briefly described in the following. 
 
Cognitive domain 
 
In some situations the choice between some of the cognitive domains may be associated 
with difficulties. The most prevalent ones are elaborated below. 
 
1. Long-Term Memory vs. Decision-Making errors. Long-Term Memory (LTM) 
errors are closely related to Decision-Making (DM) errors. An important 
distinction is, however, that LTM errors occur when learned information is not 
triggered in memory. So, if we can reasonable assume that the ATCO had learned 
what to do – e.g. a procedure or some standard phraseology - but did not do it 
then it is a LTM error. DM errors are, on the other hand, less standardised and are 
more a question of bad judgement, reasoning or prioritisation. 
2. Long-Term Memory vs. Short-Term Memory errors. If an ATCO forgets to carry 
out some learned procedure this is a LTM error. If he/she forgets information 
obtained during shift then it is a Short-Term Memory error. 
 
                                                 
14 Please notice that this procedure is slightly different from the one used in Study 1 where all dual classifications were 
omitted altogether from the analysis. The procedure was modified in this study to maintain as much information as 
possible. 
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The Who-Question 
 
In the choice of detector and corrector there are some rules-of-thumb that are useful to 
make a consistent selection: 
 
1. Error suspicion. If an ATCO knows that something is wrong but not the exact 
nature of the problem he/she is the detector. So, you might only have a suspicion 
that you misunderstood or misheard something.  
2. Overlap between detection and correction. Sometimes the detection is also the 
correction. If, for example, an ATCO points out to his colleague that something 
has not yet been done, he thereby also tells what should be done. So, in this case 
he is both the detector and corrector. 
3. An active ‘no-choice’. If a deliberate choice to do nothing is made - while it is still 
possible - it is still considered an active choice. The person deciding to do nothing 
is here the corrector. If an error is detected selection of “No one” in the corrector 
field will only occur if the correction is forgotten (so it is unintentionally not 
carried out) or information not adequately transferred from person A to person B 
(perhaps due to some team dynamics). 
 
The How-Question – Detection 
 
1. Slips. In many cases when making slips during communication people correct 
their own errors immediately without any help from the environment. In such 
cases the detection can only occur through internal feedback. In other cases when 
interacting with equipment people discover and correct their own errors 
immediately because they cannot carry out the action (often referred to as a 
“Forcing Function”). In such cases the detection occurs through system feedback. 
2. Internal feedback vs. external communication. Detection through external 
communication means that the error is detected directly on the basis of on-going 
communication. Detection through internal feedback is related to previous 
communication or when a communication-not-made is detected (in neither of the 
cases cues for the error detection are available in the environment). 
3. System feedback vs. external communication. When an ATCO discovers an error 
while discussing plans with another ATCO the detection will be on the basis of 
external communication (even though they also use the system feedback as a 
source). 
 
The What-Question – Outcome 
 
The concept of “Undesired state” is in this study expanded to not only include incidents 
and separation violations. Basically, undesired states are all episodes that could have 
potential negative safety implications. This was done because no incidents as such 
occurred in the simulator trials. Some examples of undesired states related to 
coordination with other sectors and communication with aircraft are provided below: 
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Coordination with other sectors: 
 
a) Omission of a required coordination before aircraft is handed over (e.g. that 
aircraft flying at “wrong flight level” or flying via another route than the planned) 
or wrong information is provided during a coordination (so the other ATCO, for 
example, expects that the aircraft flies another route than it is actually doing). 
b) No hand-over is made before the aircraft leaves the sector. 
c) An aircraft diverting to a new airport is not coordinated with the new airport (so 
they do not know about the aircraft before it arrives at their airport). 
 
Communication with aircraft: 
 
a) No instructions concerning transfer of frequency to another sector is given to the 
pilot (so the pilot enters another sector where the ATCO cannot get in contact 
with the aircraft). 
b) A wrong frequency or flight level is given to a pilot and implemented. 
c) Aircraft are given instructions that bring them in direct conflict with each other. 
 
9.3 Results 
 
The main goal of this study is to test the validity and reliability of classifications based on 
the error taxonomy.  
 
9.3.1 Reliability 
 
In the following is reported the results from the intra- and inter-rater analysis. 
 
Intra-rater reliability 
 
The same cases were analysed twice by the same observer (i.e. the author) with a one-
month interval. The obtained Kappa coefficients and P-values are shown in the table 
below. 
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Error 
Error producer 
Kappa 0.90 P-value<0.001 
Cognitive domain 
Kappa 0.86 P-value<0.001 
Detection and recovery 
Who – detection 
Kappa 0.94 P-value<0.001 
Who – correction 
Kappa 0.88 P-value<0.001 
When – detection stage 
Kappa 0.89 P-value<0.001 
How – detection source 
Kappa 0.84 P-value<0.001 
Response and outcome 
What – response 
Kappa 0.94 P-value<0.001 
What – outcome 
Kappa 0.74 P-value<0.001 
Table 7: Intra-rater kappa coefficients and P-values for each of the main dimensions 
in the framework (study 2) 
 
As can be seen a very high level of agreement was achieved across all dimensions (both 
measured on the basis of the Kappa-values and the P-values). A particularly interesting 
result is that the When- and the How-question received a very high level of agreement in 
this study compared with the study focusing on Swedish incident reports (Study 1) and it 
was not required to collapse any categories. So, even though no interviews with the 
participants in the experiment were made and no think-aloud protocols were available it 
was still possible to obtain very robust classifications for these two dimensions.  
 
Inter-rater reliability 
 
Before being able to make a Kappa analysis of the inter-rater reliability it was necessary 
to give the second rater some training in applying the classification. As described 
previously, the first 4 out of 10 scenarios in the data material were used for this purpose 
and disagreements related to lack of familiarity with the taxonomy were resolved. 
 
Below are shown the results of the inter-rater reliability analysis of the remaining 6 
scenarios containing a total of 152 error events.  
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 Table 8: Inter-rater kappa coefficients and P-values for each of the main dimensions 
in the framework (study 2) 
Error 
Error producer 
Kappa 0.95 P-value<0.001 
Cognitive domain 
Kappa 0.69 P-value<0.001 
Detection and recovery 
Who – detection 
Kappa 0.81 P-value<0.001 
Who – correction 
Kappa 0.69 P-value<0.001 
When – detection stage 
Kappa 0.60 P-value<0.001 
How – detection source 
Kappa 0.68 P-value<0.001 
Response and outcome 
What – response 
Kappa 0.80 P-value<0.001 
What – outcome 
Kappa 0.50 P-value<0.001 
 
The results indicate a high level of agreement across all dimensions applied in this study. 
The Kappa-values are a bit lower than for the intra-rater reliability analysis. It is not 
surprising that, in general, a lower level of reliability is obtained for the inter-rater 
measurements compared with the intra-rater measurements. There are at least two reasons 
for this: 
 
• Basically it is easier to agree with yourself than others! 
• Due to practical limitations one of the observers was given a fairly short training 
in using the framework and, if had been given more training, would probably 
have been able to apply the framework even more consistently. 
 
Both for the intra-rater and the inter-rater analysis a somehow lower level of agreement 
was achieved for the outcome-dimension. A reason for this is that a more broad definition 
of “undesired state” was applied in this study as a consequence of the fact that no 
incidents occurred in the observed scenarios. Even though a list of events that constituted 
undesired states was developed before the classifications there was still some room for 
interpretation concerning what constituted an undesired state. The problem here is related 
to getting a robust operationalisation of what is meant by “consequences”. Whether 
specific types of situations should be considered consequential or not would probably be 
best determined by having a group of domain experts working together on analysing a 
battery of concrete situations and on this basis come up with a list of “undesired states”. 
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9.3.2 Pattern analysis 
 
A total of 250 errors were identified in the 10 scenarios. As previously described the 
data-set was analysed twice by the same classifier (to get a measure of intra-rater 
reliability) and once by a second classifier (to get a measure of inter-rater reliability). In 
order to get a comprehensive database it was decided to combine these analyses. First, on 
the basis of the two datasets used for the intra-rater reliability study were compared and 
all disagreements were resolved by either deciding on one appropriate classification or 
for the cases where the category could not be resolved the event was classified as 
“Unknown”. Second, the consensus dataset from the intra-rater analysis was compared 
with the dataset from the second classifier and on this basis a final consensus dataset was 
generated. 
 
In the following is reported the results from the pattern analysis. First, we will review the 
main effects of the analysis of the individual dimensions. For the statistical analysis of the 
main effects an exact Goodness-of-Fit test based on a uniform distribution will be used. 
Secondly, we will examine interaction effects between the dimensions within the 
framework. For the test of independence is used Pearson’s Exact Test. In those instances 
where interaction is found we will explore which specific cells that contribute to this 
effect. 
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Main distributions 
 
In the figure below is shown the distribution of the error producer. As can be seen a large 
majority of the errors observed were made by the Radar Controller (57.6%) and a smaller 
amount was committed by the Planner Controller (31.2%). The difference in error 
producer is significant, Χ2(3, N=250)=189.26, P<0.001. 
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Figure 25: Distribution of errors for each error producer. 
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In the figure below is shown the distribution of cognitive domains. The differences in 
cognitive domain are significant, Χ2(4, N=233)=11.14, P=0.025. One thing that is 
particularly noteworthy is the amount of Long-Term Memory (LTM) errors (27,5%). 
This high amount of LTM-errors is directly related to the fact that the study was focused 
on training scenarios and it can therefore be expected that there will be a significant 
amount of novice-errors.  
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Figure 26: Distribution of cognitive domains. 
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In the figure below is shown the distribution of actors involved in the detection and 
correction. The differences in frequencies are statistically significant (Detector: Χ2(5, 
N=243)=125.05, P<0.001; Corrector: Χ2(5, N=248)=146.40, P<0.001). As can be seen, 
the detector and corrector is most often the producer of the error – a result that is in good 
concordance with the previous study. However, ATCOs different from the error producer 
and the instructor were also involved in a significant part of the error detection and 
recovery. In a large majority of the cases the error detector was also the error corrector 
(72%). The results also correspond well with the previously described notion about errors 
having a larger chance of being discovered by other people if these share a large part of 
the context (i.e. another ATCO or instructor). It might seem surprising that the instructor 
does not detect and correct a larger part of the errors than is the case. There are two 
explanations for this: (1) the instructor might consider some errors more important to 
correct than others; (2) the instructors were encouraged to limit their intervention in the 
experimental scenarios. 
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Figure 27: Distribution of error detector and corrector 
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In the figure below is the cognitive stage at which the errors were detected. The 
differences in frequencies are highly significant, Χ2(2, N=192)=17.09, P<0.001. As can 
be seen most errors were detected before the outcome stage – namely at the planning 
stage (26.6%) or execution stage (47.4%). This is in concordance with the notion that 
many errors are detected at an early stage of the error evolution. It is also interesting to 
note that in comparison with the incident study the distribution of detection stages is 
much more varied. This indicates that the distinction between different kinds of detection 
stages might have a larger analytical power when applied to a normal everyday setting 
compared with incidents. 
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Figure 28: Distribution of detection stages. 
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In similar vein, the results from the analysis of the detection source reveal a more varied 
pattern than the study of incident reports. Actually, system feedback is the least prevalent 
source of feedback (20.6%) whereas internal feedback (46.1%) and external 
communication (33.3%) account for a large majority of the cases. The differences in 
frequencies are highly significant, Χ2(2, N=180)=17.63, P<0.001. 
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Figure 29: Distribution of detection sources. 
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As can be seen in the figure below the most frequent response was to trap/mitigate the 
error or its consequences (71.6%). Conversely, the data revealed that a minority of the 
error events were not responded to (28.0%). Only in one case was the response an 
exacerbation of the situation. The differences in the distribution of response were 
significant, Χ2(2, N=250)=193.30, P<0.001. 
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Figure 30: Distribution of response types. 
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In the final figure is shown the outcome of the individual error and error management 
events, Χ2(2, N=248)= 323.19, P<0.001. As can be seen a large majority of the errors 
were inconsequential (87.1%). This is a reverse pattern compared with the incident 
reports which corresponds with the notion that only a small amount of the errors 
committed will end up in incident reports – namely the ones that lead to serious negative 
consequences. It is also interesting to note that the results showing that 87 per cent of the 
errors were inconsequential is in good concordance with another study by Klinect et al. 
(1999) based on observations of pilots during normal operations which revealed that 
about 85% of the observed errors were inconsequential. 
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Figure 31: Distribution of outcome types. 
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Interactions 
 
In the following we will examine the interaction between different dimensions within the 
framework15. These interactions can be of interest insofar as they are less vulnerable to 
biases and distortions compared with the data presented above. It should be noted that for 
the analysis of interaction only data related to errors committed by either the Radar 
controller or the Planner controller will be included. For the analysis Pearson’s Exact 
Test will be used to determine whether different dimensions are independent or not. In 
addition, adjusted residuals (AR) will be used to determine which cells contribute most 
toward the effect16. 
 
                                                 
15 A note should be made concerning how “missing values” (i.e. instances where no categories are determined) are 
dealt with in this project. Several approaches are available. One solution was to exclude all observations where a 
category was not determined within one or several of the dimensions. Another solution was to include all 
observations irrespective of whether some values might be missing within some of the dimensions. In the current 
context the latter solution was chosen – i.e. to maintain as much data as possible in relation to the analysis of main 
effects and interaction effects. Consequently, a summation of instances within a single dimension might not be 
exactly the same for the main and the interaction analyses. In principle, it could have been possible to exclude all 
instances where one or several values were missing, but this was not decided insofar as this would reduce the data 
material. Furthermore, it was expected that these missing values constituted random “holes” in the data material 
and a reduction of the data material was therefore deemed unnecessary. 
16 According to Agresti (1996), the standardised residual (also called the 'Pearson' residual) is calculated by dividing 
the raw residual (i.e. the difference between the observed and expected counts) by the estimated standard deviation. 
These residuals follow an approximately normal distribution when the sample size is large. The Pearson residual is 
divided by its standard error to get the adjusted Pearson residual (a.k.a. the 'standardised Pearson residual') which 
follows a standard normal distribution (which is similar to the z distribution). Agresti (1996) states: "Adjusted 
residuals larger than about 2 in absolute value are worthy of attention, though one expects some values of this size 
by chance alone when the number of categories is large" (p. 91). More precisely, the cut-off point should be at 
values below –1.96 or values above 1.96 in the case of a two-tailed test at the 0.05-level. 
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In the chart below is shown the relationship between Error Producer and the Detection 
Stage (in the table below the chart is shown the observed counts and, in parenthesis, the 
expected counts). The dependence between the two dimensions is significant, Χ2(2, 
N=165)=8.52, P=0.016. The main contribution to the dependence is that Planner has a 
relatively higher amount of errors that are detected at the planning stage (AR=2.88). 
Conversely, the Radar detects a less than expected amount of errors at the planning stage 
(AR=-2.88). This can be related to the fact that the Planner normally has a longer time 
frame to carry out his/hers tasks. That is, the Planner works on a more strategical level 
whereas the Radar is working on a more tactical level.  
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Figure 32: Interaction between error producer and detection stage. 
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In the chart below is shown the interaction between the Cognitive Domain and the Error 
Detector. There is a high level of dependence between the two dimensions, Χ2(16, 
N=202)=129.35, P<0.001.  
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Figure 33: Interaction between cognitive domain and error detector. 
 
Some of the interesting relationships are:  
 
1. Perception errors are rarely detected by “No one” (AR=-2.68) and are often 
detected by the ATCO colleague (AR=2.79).  
2. Short-term memory errors are also rarely detected by “No one” (AR=-2.14) and 
frequently detected by the ATCO colleague (AR=3.26).  
3. Long-term memory errors are most frequently detected by “No one” (AR=6.28) 
or the Instructor (AR=2.80). On the other hand, they are rarely detected by the 
producer (AR=-5.46) or the ATCO colleague (AR=-3.23). The actor most 
frequently involved in the detection was the instructor (AR=2.80). These results 
make sense insofar as the producer has little chances of detecting errors that have 
occurred due to incomplete experience or knowledge. On the other hand, an 
important part of instructor’s task is to monitor such errors and correct them. 
4. Decision-making errors are rarely detected by the error producer (AR=-2.57), but 
are frequently detected by the instructor (AR=2.10). In this manner the decision-
making errors are very similar to long-term memory errors.  
5. Response execution errors are frequently detected by the error producer 
(AR=7.64) and rarely by “No one” (AR=-3.78). That is, the error producer has a 
larger tendency to detect his/hers response execution errors. On the other hand, 
these are rarely detected by the instructor (AR=-4.08) (at least there are no 
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indications that they are detected by instructor). This corresponds with the 
previously described hypothesis about response execution errors would frequently 
be self-detected. 
 
In the chart below is shown the distribution of Detection Stage as a function of Cognitive 
Domain (it should be noted that only errors that were detected while it was still possible 
to do something about them are included in this analysis). The interaction is statistically 
significant, Χ2(8, N=156)=99.17, P<0.001.  
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Figure 34: Interaction between cognitive domain and detection stage. 
 
Some interesting contributions to the interaction are the following:  
 
1. Perception errors are frequently detected at the planning stage (AR=2.10). In 
other words, they are frequently caught very early and will have limited chances 
of affecting system safety. 
2. Short-term memory errors are more frequently detected at the outcome stage 
(AR=6.46) and rarely at the execution stage (AR=-4.70). 
3. Decision-making errors get detected more frequently at the planning stage 
(AR=3.98) and rarely at the execution stage (AR=-3.04). The detection tends to 
happen when the ATCOs are discussing plans for the air traffic and before they 
are actually implemented. 
4. The largest contribution to the dependence is that response execution errors are 
most frequently detected at the execution stage (AR=7.98). 
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The relationship between Cognitive Domain and Detection Source is shown in the figure 
below (again, the presented data is restricted to the instances where an error detection 
happened while it was still possible to do something about it). The dependence between 
the dimensions is statistically significant, Χ2(8, N=146)=41.07, P<0.001.  
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Figure 35: Interaction between cognitive domain and detection source. 
 
The important contributions to the interaction are: 
 
1. Long-term memory errors are rarely detected through internal feedback (AR=-
2.16). 
2. Another important contribution is that decision-making errors are more frequently 
detected through communication (AR=2.98) and rarely through internal feedback 
(AR=-3.45). In other words, external communication plays a vital role in relation 
to containing decision-making errors. 
3. The main contribution to the dependence is that response execution errors are 
most frequently detected through internal feedback (AR=5.52) and rarely through 
either communication (AR=-3.09) or system feedback (AR=-3.14). Most of the 
response execution errors were slip-of-the-tongue and, consequently, only the 
perpetrator’s knowledge of the correct response could be used for the detection. 
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The relationship between Cognitive Domain and Response is shown in the table below, 
Χ2(8, N=208)=43.70, P<0.001.  
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Figure 36: Interaction between cognitive domain and response. 
 
The following interactions were found: 
 
1. Short-term memory are rarely not responded to (AR=-2.63) and frequently 
trapped/mitigated (AR=2.68).  
2. On the other hand long-term memory failures are often not responded to 
(AR=5.43) and rarely trapped/mitigated (AR=-5.31). 
3. An important contribution to the dependence is that the ATCOs rarely fail to 
respond to response execution errors (AR=-3.80) and that these have a tendency 
to be trapped or mitigated (AR=3.86). 
 
In sum, the interaction analysis provided some interesting insights concerning the error 
management patterns associated with the different kinds of cognitive errors: 
 
• Perception errors are frequently detected and the detection frequently happens by 
the aid of a colleague. When they get detected it is frequently at the planning 
stage. Basically, these errors have a high chance of getting discovered at an early 
point in time and by the assistance of others. 
 
• Short-term memory errors are frequently detected and a colleague frequently 
initiates the detections. The detection normally occurs at the outcome stage and 
the errors are frequently trapped/mitigated. Consequently, short-term memory 
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errors are frequently discovered and other people play a significant role in relation 
to controlling the effects of this kind of error. 
 
• Long-term memory errors are frequently either not detected or detected by the 
instructor. The fact that they are rarely detected also means that they are rarely 
trapped/mitigated. This kind of error is in general difficult to discover by the error 
producer insofar as people with this type of error do not have a standard for 
comparing their own behaviour with (even though they might have meta-
knowledge concerning the limits of their current knowledge and experience). 
 
• Decision-making errors are rarely detected by the error producer, but frequently 
detected by the instructor. When they get detected it is frequently at the planning 
stage and this happens frequently through external communication. This result is 
highly interesting because it is an integrated part of many TRM and CRM courses 
to encourage the participants to clearly state their plans and intentions so it is 
possible for other people to be in the loop and be able to criticise potentially 
flawed plans. The results from this study provide support to the importance of this 
philosophy in relation to containing decision-making errors.  
 
• The error producer frequently detects response execution errors. The detection 
normally occurs at the execution stage and through internal feedback. The errors 
are frequently trapped/mitigated. These results clearly show that people contain 
robust internal mechanisms to control this type of error. 
 
9.3.3 Validity 
 
The issue of validity of the framework will be explored in detail in chapter 12. In the 
current context the focus will be on the content validity or the comprehensiveness of the 
framework based on the results from the simulator study. A way to get an indication of 
this is by looking at the amount of “Unknown” classifications within the individual 
dimensions of the framework. The amount of “Unknown” classifications are shown in the 
table below: 
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Error 
Error producer 
0 (250) 0,0 % 
Cognitive domain 
11 (250) 4,4 % 
Detection and recovery 
Who – detection 
1 (250) 0,4 % 
Who – correction 
1 (250) 0,4 % 
When – detection stage 
2 (195) 1,0 % 
How – detection source 
7 (195) 3,6 % 
Response and outcome 
What – response 
0 (250) 0,0 % 
What – outcome 
0 (250) 0,0 % 
Table 9: Amount of “Unknown” classifications for each dimension (study 2) 
 
As can be seen from the table only a very small percentage of the classifications could 
not be determined. The dimensions that had the highest rate of unclassifiable events were 
Cognitive Domain (4,4%) and Detection Source (3,6%)17. Hence, the application-rate of 
the categories within the individual dimensions of the taxonomy seems to support that the 
framework covered the observed events in a comprehensive manner. 
 
Another way to get a picture of the content validity is the extent to which the variety of 
categories within the framework was used. In the current context it is of particular 
interest to note that the classifications associated with the detection processes (i.e. the 
when- and the how-question) resulted in a much more varied pattern than in the previous 
study based on incident reports and, consequently, all of the categories within these 
dimensions revealed their relevance.  
 
                                                 
17 It should be emphasised that the “Unknown” categories can be split into two different kinds of groups. The first 
group concerns cases where the information in the data material is in itself incomplete and it is therefore not 
possible to determine the underlying causes of a given phenomenon (e.g. the cognitive foundation of an error). The 
second group is related to situations where, even with all the information available, it would not be possible to 
determine one specific category. For example, an ATCO may decide that he will follow up on a potential conflict 
between two aircraft later on, but fails to do so with the result that a separation violation occurs. In this case the 
error might be attributed to forgetting to carry out the intended action. However, it could, in principle, also be a 
perception error insofar as the ATCO does not discover the emerging conflict when it gradually becomes more and 
more salient. In the current context there are not made any attempts at distinguishing between these two sources of 
indeterminacy. 
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A dimension that did not display much variation in this study is the what-dimension. 
Within the response-dimension the “exacerbate”-category was only used once and the 
relevance of this category could therefore be questioned. In response to this it should, 
first of all, be stated that it is fortunate that the response following an error is rarely 
leading to an even worse situation. Secondly, the category seems relevant to maintain 
within the framework to cover all possible types of responses that can be produced and it 
might be useful to give particular focus to errors that become exacerbated insofar as they 
might constitute an especial safety risk that could require intervention (i.e. they contain a 
higher probability of incident or accident). The other part of the what-dimension, namely 
the outcome, also resulted in a limited variation. However, this is a direct consequence of 
the type of error material used.  
 
9.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter error events in ATC simulator training scenarios were analysed. In the 
study a high degree of reliability was found across all of the examined dimensions within 
the framework. This was both for the intra- and the inter-rater reliability analysis. As 
expected the intra-rater analysis yielded higher results than the inter-rater analysis. 
Nonetheless, across all dimensions of the framework robust analyses could be obtained. 
These results are promising – in particular, because it was in this study not necessary to 
collapse any of the categories within the dimensions of the framework. 
 
The only dimension where a somehow lower (but still acceptable) agreement was 
achieved was the outcome-dimension. This result was due to the fact that in this study it 
was chosen to apply a broader definition of “undesired state” compared with the study 
with incident reports in study 1. This was necessary because no cases occurred where the 
separation standards were violated and therefore a list of less serious “undesired states” 
was developed. The list of undesired scenarios used in this study was in no way complete 
and to get more comprehensive list of generic types of undesired states it would be useful 
to include subject matter experts.  
 
Since this study focused on normal everyday errors it was expected to see some 
deviations from the error and error management patterns found in the incident reports. 
This expectation was also confirmed. For example, the simulator study showed a much 
more equal distribution of errors (with a slight majority of long-term errors due to the 
inexperience of the ATCOs) compared with the incident reports where a large majority of 
errors were decision-making error. In similar vein, a much more varied distribution of 
detection stage and detection source was found in the data from the simulator scenarios. 
 
Also many interesting types of interaction were found between categories from the 
different dimensions. It was, for example, shown that different kinds of cognitive errors 
had a tendency to become detected by different actors (if any) and, furthermore, these 
errors were detected through different kinds of detection sources and at different kinds of 
detection stages. The results were in good concordance with the a priori established 
hypotheses (which will be elaborated later on) and at the same time new insights were 
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produced. Of new insights can be mentioned that decision-making errors have a larger 
tendency to be detected through communication than other errors. It was also 
demonstrated that both perception and short-term memory errors have a tendency to be 
more frequently detected than other errors and the detection frequently happen by the 
assistance of the colleague. 
 
A limitation in the study that should be mentioned is related to the classification of errors. 
One of the two classifiers was also the one who originally made the descriptions under 
the heading of "contextual information” (see section 9.2.2). Ideally, it would have been 
more optimal if the one making the descriptions and the people classifying the error 
events were completely independent. This was, however, not possible due to pragmatic 
reasons (i.e. resource limitations). 
 
Another limitation in the current study is that no information was ever elicited from the 
trainees involved in the training scenarios. All the information elicitation was done on the 
basis of the video recordings, the communication and comments from the instructors. 
Therefore, there were some inherent limitations in the amount and quality of information 
that could be obtained to understand the underlying processes of the behaviour and it was 
necessary to make assumption concerning the knowledge and intentions of the ATCOs. 
Furthermore, errors that did not result in observable behaviours or verbalisations could 
not be identified and analysed. If it had been possible to use think-aloud protocols 
(retrospective) it would have been possible to gain more detailed insight into the 
cognitive processes underlying the behaviour of the trainees and, most likely, it would 
have been possible to get a better foundation to base the classifications on. 
 
Even though it was not possible to get information from subjects involved in the 
scenarios subject matter experts had a very important contribution to the study in the 
identification and explanation of many error events. In particular, a large part of the long-
term and decision-making errors could not have been identified and understood without 
the help of these subject matter experts. This fact clearly illustrates that for any study that 
tries to tap into the underlying cognitive processes of human behaviour in a complex 
domain such as ATC it is important to include domain experts in the analysis because 
they have a much better understanding of the context. 
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10 Study 3 - Expert evaluation 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study was to get an expert evaluation of the framework. This was 
considered important feedback insofar as it could be used to get some indication of the 
strength and weaknesses of the framework seen from both a theoretical and practical 
point of view. The focus of this study is on obtaining input concerning the face/content 
validity of the framework from human factors experts who have experience with 
developing and/or applying conceptual human factors frameworks. Furthermore, these 
researchers bring along experiences from many different domains which is useful when 
considering the more general usefulness of the framework (and which modifications 
should be considered if the framework should be used in other domains). 
 
10.2 Method 
 
10.2.1 Subjects 
 
For the study a series of relevant participants were selected on the basis of the fact that 
they had been involved in research that was highly relevant in relation to this project. 
This included other conceptual and empirical work related to human error and error 
management. Also researchers who had been involved in development of comprehensive 
conceptual human factors frameworks were considered highly relevant for the current 
project. A total of 21 researchers were identified and 11 of these responded to the 
questionnaire (response rate: 52.3%). A few additional responses were received in the 
form of informal comments. 
 
10.2.2 Questionnaire 
 
Each of the participants in the survey received two documents. The first contained a short 
description of the framework and its main components. The second contained a 
questionnaire where they were asked to give their opinion of both the components and the 
overall structure of the framework. The main focus was on the relevance of the individual 
items within the framework. This was done, first of all, on the basis of a rating scale from 
one to four (1=Irrelevant, 2=Somewhat irrelevant, 3=Somewhat relevant and 4=Highly 
relevant). In addition, the subjects were encouraged to give free-text comments to the 
individual items. The questionnaire could be filled out electronically and e-mailed back 
to me. 
 
 169
10.3 Results 
 
In the questionnaire the participants were asked to give both quantitative and qualitative 
feedback concerning the framework. 
 
10.3.1 Quantitative results 
 
In advance it was decided that average ratings below 3 would be considered critical for 
the relevant item and, consequently, the item might have to be dropped from the 
framework. In the figure below is shown the average rating of the main dimensions 
within the framework on the basis of the questions in the questionnaire. As can be seen in 
the chart all of the average ratings were between “somewhat relevant” and “highly 
relevant”. In other words, the experts found all of the items relevant. The dimension that 
received the lowest rating was “detection stage” (the when-question). 
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Figure 37: Ratings for core components of the framework 
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In the next chart is shown the ratings of the main groups of PSFs. Also in this case the 
dimensions received a high average relevance rating. The two dimensions receiving the 
lowest rating were “ambient environment” and “person related factors”. 
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Figure 38: Ratings for PSF-components of the framework 
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Finally, the overall ratings of the PSFs and the framework in general are shown below. In 
concordance with the previous ratings the experts rated both the PSFs and the overall 
framework high on relevance. 
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Figure 39: Summary ratings of the framework 
 
In conclusion, it can be stated that the experts gave high ratings on all of the dimensions 
within the framework and its overall structure. This has a positive and a negative aspect. 
The positive side is that the framework has a high degree of expert acceptance. In 
particular, it is encouraging that all of the dimensions, which have been given only 
limited attention in the existing literature, actually were well accepted by the subjects. 
The negative side is that the responses contained a limited variability and, consequently, 
the diagnosticity of the ratings is also reduced. To gain a more detailed understanding 
about strengths and weaknesses we will now turn to the qualitative comments. 
 
10.3.2 Qualitative results 
 
In the following is reviewed some of the qualitative results that were elicited through the 
questionnaire. It should be noted that different researchers might have different focus of 
interest and different experiences. It would therefore be impossible to completely 
accommodate all their comments into the framework. Nonetheless, many very useful 
comments were made. If several researchers displayed a similar view on a certain subject 
only one of these will be included. The comments presented in the following are 
structured according to the individual items on the questionnaire (and, hence, the 
individual dimensions of the framework). 
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Threat Management 
 
“The difficulty lies in knowing whether or not people really have 
anticipation. Hindsight may not be accurate.” 
 
In relation to retrospective analyses it is correct that some degree of hindsight bias may 
distort the results that can be obtained from this dimension. That is, people would like to 
present themselves in a favourable light and therefore might tend to exaggerate the extent 
to which they were aware of task relevant properties (i.e. threats). This problem is less 
likely to be present in studies based on real-time analyses. For example, studies at 
University of Texas have been successful in conducting observational studies of pilot 
crews’ threat management behaviours (Helmreich et al., 1999). 
 
“Preparedness (lack of) is important in the causal development of 
maritime accidents, but it is difficult to examine empirically in the 
everyday routine work since it is not always reflected in the 
behaviour or communication.” 
 
Even though it is not easy to study details related to threat and error management without 
insight into the processes underlying the overt behaviour it does not mean that it is not 
possible. Again, studies at University of Texas have demonstrated that it is possible to 
train observers in analysing threat management of flight crews. 
 
 “Related to training, task familiarisation - quite relevant” 
 
Threat management is definitely an issue that should be addressed in training courses. For 
example, in NavCanada they have already initiated ATC training courses with the goal 
that “the participants will develop strategies to manage threats and errors in the 
operational environment” (Down, 2001). 
 
 “I believe that threat management is highly relevant to the whole 
process of error management especially where anticipation is 
involved. This is part of the actors being aware of all the threats 
within their enviroment that can lead to errors.” 
 
 “A majority of maritime accidents is actually caused by lack of 
anticipation, confirmation bias or lack of situational awareness at 
this very early stage or level. However, I think this problem is 
also a matter of perception and attention.” 
  
The observation is correct that threat management is closely related to other theoretical 
concepts such as situation awareness (Endsley, 1994). Both of these concepts are related 
to having a appropriate understanding of the task-relevant elements of the environment 
and being able to make anticipations about the future state of the environment. The 
concept of threat management is a bit more comprehensive since it also covers successful 
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and unsuccessful responses associated with the comprehension of the task-relevant 
elements and their future state (see the definition of threat management in section 3.3.2). 
 
 “You could also treat this as a performance shaping factor, 
related to training and also to experience etc. I have actually also 
singled out a few performance shaping factors about which I 
specifically record information for the incidents I have analysed. I 
think it is hard to decide which factors are the most important, 
especially since they may vary from case to case.” 
 
It is true that threat anticipation, in principle, could be analysed as a PSF. Nonetheless, 
the reason for not choosing this solution is that effective threat management may result in 
no error occurring at all. Since important lessons can be learned from analysing how 
threats are effectively or ineffectively managed, it seems reasonable to include the threat 
part as an integrated part of the core of the framework. 
 
“It is important whether anticipation results in prevention or in 
contingency planning, as you have commented in your full text.”    
 
This point is relevant because even though errors and associated problems might be 
anticipated to some extent it is not necessarily the case that the controller will respond 
effectively in advance by either avoiding these problems from occurring or being 
prepared with solutions if problems should occur (i.e. contingency planning). 
Consequently, it is relevant to consider whether the anticipation-category should be 
subdivided in such a way that it is possible to distinguish between anticipation associated 
with precautionary initiatives and anticipation not associated with any precautionary 
initiatives. By including the potential response into the distinctions the categories become 
in better concordance with the definition of threat management (see section 3.3.2). 
 
“…One aspect I was not sure of though, and it is obviously 
central to the framework you’re proposing, is the 'threat 
assessment'. I'm not too much aware of this concept and its 
rationale, and was not sure how this bit gets used. Now I know 
that Bob Helmreich has been doing this for a while, but I've not 
properly understood its application. As an example, would you 
consider 'wrong threat identified?' and 'partial threat identified', 
and of course 'threat misunderstood' - we get into error analysis 
of error analysis here, but that could be useful.” 
 
The problem with this suggestion is that if we start analysing different ways in which the 
threat might be incompletely or inappropriately managed this will introduce some 
redundancy into the classification system insofar as the next stage in the framework is 
concerned with the analysis of the error. 
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Error – Cognitive domain 
 
“The devil is in the detail. At this level of description, I'm not sure 
what can be usefully deduced. In other cases, however, this is all 
you can deduce from incident reports etc. These domains are the 
same as TRACEr Lite [i.e. the precursor to HERA], which is 
being used in Manchester Area Control Centre for incident 
investigation. However, they are broken down into several error 
modes and error mechanisms - about half as many as HERA and 
TRACEr.” 
 
 “Why is 'interpretation' missing ?” 
 
The above comments are related to the level of detail and the comprehensiveness of the 
cognitive error analysis. Concerning the level of detail it is clear that the different 
cognitive domains can be broken down in much more detail (as in the case of the HERA 
framework). Whether this is a good idea or not is dependent on a several factors. First of 
all, the level of detail should be dependent on how much information that can be obtained 
from the data material and the extent to which it is possible to make reliable distinctions 
between subcategories. Secondly, the practical use of breaking down of a highly detailed 
analysis of the cognitive mechanisms underlying the cognitive domains should be 
weighted against the extent to which an adquate amount of examples of subcategories can 
be obtained so that it would possible to make meaningful statistical analysis. 
 
 “I think we talked about this before: you only study recovery 
from errors (that is, human errors) and not just any kind of 
failure.”  
 
Even though the focus in this project has been on the management of errors it should, in 
principle, not be a problem to adapt the framework to management of faults as such 
(actually, faults can be considered as a specific subgroup of threats). 
 
“This is a psychological definition of human errors.  You can also 
use an operational definition of human errors along the lines of J. 
Rasmussen. In the latter case you have: observation errors, 
identification errors, interprepation errors, decision errors, 
planning errors and response errors. Because, your framework is 
big, you should better use one or the other classification.”     
 
The choice between different types of human error taxonomies has been discussed in the 
literature review section and will therefore not be repeated here. 
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Who was involved in the detection and recovery of the error and/or its 
consequences? 
 
“Obviously, may be several of above. Word 'context' will not be 
familiar to investigators though.” 
 
It is correct that sometimes several of the possible actors might apply to the same 
situation insofar as the ATC environment is a distributed system where several actors are 
involved in the process and can, in principle, carry out several independent recovery 
related activities (actually there are examples where pilots do not respond according to 
the instructions by the ATCO or sometimes even do the opposite which makes the 
analysis difficult). However, on the basis of the segmentation and classification principles 
previously described it should, in most cases, be possible to identify a single actor (please 
note that the segmentation and classifications principles were not described in the paper 
sent out to the participants). In relation to the word “context” it was the intention that the 
distinction between “co-actor in context” and “co-actor outside context” should be 
adapted to the specific study at hand and not, for example, be left to the investigator’s 
judgement to decide when an co-actor is within or outside the context. 
 
 “Think this is important - many cognitive errors are due to 
fixation, and therefore it is important to see who produced the 
error in relation to who detected/corrected it.” 
 
This is a correct observation insofar as fixation-errors are most frequently detected by a 
person different from the error producer. 
 
“I think, that it is important to collect data about "why" the actor 
did or did not detect/correct the error or state. Otherwise you 
could not draw any conclusions from the data collected in (3) [i.e. 
The Who-Question]. Example: Why did the system not 
detect/correct the error or state: Not designed for it, out of order, 
not operated according to instructions or procedures etc.” 
 
It is true that it is of critical importance when analysing error management events to 
obtain information about the underlying causes of a successful or unsuccessful detection 
and recovery. However, what is referred to as the “why”-question above is to a large 
extent covered in the Performance Shaping Factors taxonomy. 
 
 “I think it is difficult to decide how many different types of actor 
to distinguish. For example, it may also be relevant to look at the 
other involved actor's role with regard to the one who committed 
the error (co-worker, supervisor, trainer, etc.).” 
 
Different domains may differ with regards to how many types of actors that could be 
involved in the error management. In the ATC context it seems to be a relatively 
restricted amount of groups of actors that can be involved in the error management. 
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“Another comment is that you don't seem to record anything 
about the stage where the problem is defined and the causes are 
identified (explanation phase). I realise that this phase does not 
always occur, but in some cases it may have a very important 
role, also because of the negative consequences of being wrong 
during this phase.” 
 
The concept of error identification was deliberately chosen not to be included in this 
framework. This was done because the identification phase is rarely carried out before the 
correction (and therefore not relevant for the correction). Even more important in the 
current context is that error identification does not seem to be relevant when it comes to 
solving problems in ATC. This issue might be different for other domains (e.g. in the 
medical domain or in the process control industry) and the relevance of the phase should 
therefore be carefully considered when analysing other domains. 
 
When was the error or its consequences detected? 
 
“I also use these stages in TRACEr (full version) - basically from 
Sellen [1994], etc. - but in practice it is hard to classify, or else 
all are 'Outcome'.” 
 
This is a relevant comment insofar as the analysis of the incidents has indicated that only 
a very limited distribution of the categories can be obtained within this dimension (see 
Figure 21). On the other hand, the analysis of real-time data has indicated a much more 
varied distribution of data (see Figure 28). Hence, the relevance of this dimension seems 
to be dependent on the type of material used in the analysis. 
 
 “’When’ is may be not as interesting as how? When detected 
should also be seen in relation to when it was recovered.” 
 
“…don't you think it is also interesting to look at when a problem 
is recovered - people may delay their response for a while after 
detection as other things may be more urgent or the potential 
consequences won't occur for quite a while or are not so 
serious?” 
 
In most cases the detection and the correction will occur at the same stage. However, it is 
true that sometimes they may occur at different stages (e.g. when choosing to postpone 
the correction). Therefore, it could be of relevance to include both the detection and 
recovery in the analysis of the “when”-question. 
 
 “This is somewhat relevant as timely action can have an effect on 
outcome.” 
 
 177
 “Just to share some of my findings with you: only for human 
error it seems to make sense to look at the performance stage in 
which the error is detected. Other failures are most often only 
detected in the outcome stage.” 
 
If the framework should be expanded to also include technological faults it is clear that 
the detection stages would not be applicable to those events. The detection stage 
taxonomy is based on cognitive stages and is therefore only intended to be analysed for 
the recovery of human errors. However, it should be emphasised that in the current 
context the focus is on the management of errors and not faults in general.  
 
How was the error and/or its consequences detected? 
 
“Again, there is a link between this part of your framework and 
the performance shaping factors” 
 
This comment seems to be suggesting that the detection source should be included under 
the PSF section instead of a part of the core of the framework. Which aspects to be 
included as performance shaping factors and which to be included in the core of the 
framework is a choice that is dependent on the researcher’s discretion and goals. In the 
current context it was chosen to be included as an integrated part of the core because the 
detection source was considered an issue of general importance for all cases of error 
recovery. 
 
“Does system feedback also include operating procedures? Many 
errors are detected through systematic work routines/ go through 
procedures.” 
 
It is very uncommon to look up procedures in ATC so this issue has not been encountered 
during the ATC studies. However, in many other domains such as process control and 
aviation the use of checklist procedures is much more common. In cases where errors are 
detected on the basis a standard checklist that is required being carried out in specific 
situations it would seem reasonable to classify these as detection on the basis of system 
feedback. However, it should be noted that system feedback is a fairly broad category so 
it might make sense to divide it into sub-groups (perhaps dependent on the specific 
domain being studied). 
 
“I think - as far as the maritime domain is concerned - that the 
"system feedback" should be divided into "automation feedback" 
and "environment feedback". It is worth knowing if the cues were 
found in the automation system or by "looking out of the window". 
It is often said that information from the automation system 
should be cross-checked visually, and it would be interresting to 
know if that makes sense at all when it comes to the detection of 
errors." 
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There seems to be two important points in this comment. First, it is suggested to 
subdivide the system feedback into two categories dependent on whether the information 
is derived from the system interface or directly from the physical surroundings. In 
principle, such a distinction could also be applied to the ATC environment insofar as 
error detection can occur when a tower controller or a pilot looks out of the window. 
Nonetheless, the distinction would not make any sense for the approach and en route 
position insofar as they have to depend on mediated sources of information (i.e. they have 
no direct sighting of the aircraft). In the comment it is also suggested that crosschecking 
or verification of information should be a separate category. This corresponds to the 
category previously referred to as “standard check”. As it was discussed then the category 
does not fit very well with the ATC environment, but it is a category that could be of 
more relevance in many other contexts. This issue is also addressed by some of the 
following comments from another human factors specialist. 
 
“You must add another three mechanisms of error detection:  
(1) ROUTINE CHECKS  (2) SUSPICIOUS CHECKS and  
(3) CONTINGENCY PLANS.” 
 
This comment was further elaborated in a separate response to me. Here it was suggested 
that there are in total six different ways of detection. 
 
1) Communication  
2) System feedback  
3) Inner feedback  
4) Routine check  
5) Suspicious check  
6) Contingency plan  
Communication - system feedback - inner feedback are PASSIVE 
BEHAVIOURS because the Air Traffic Controller (ATCO) does 
not initiate a check or he is dependent upon the performance of 
the system or his colleagues. You definitely need to have some 
ACTIVE BEHAVIOURS in your framework. In my paper in Safety 
Science, I call them planning behaviours because the ATCO must  
be vigilant and take initiatives to inspect the products of his own 
work.  
Routine check can be a standard check, a revision plan or an 
external plan comparison.  You should better group them all as 
"routine check".   Examples are when the ATCO occasionally 
makes a standard check of his progress towards his goal (i.e., put 
all aircraft in a sequence, so that all are landed with 5 minutes 
difference).  ATCO and pilots follow checklists (external plan 
comparison).   I guess that many errors are detected by pilots 
when they use their checklists! Finally, ATCOs under stress tend 
to revise their work to see if they have missed something out.   
How often should ATCOs review their plans? This is an important 
issue. Expert ATCOs know this so that they can catch any error 
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without spending too much time on their plans. So you must have 
a category ROUTINE CHECK here.  
Suspicious check refers to what I call "error suspicion and 
curiosity". Sarter & Alexander [2000] also use this category.  
They have found some data for pilots and you may find some data 
for ATCOs.  A suspicious check is different from a routine check 
because the former does not necessarily mean following 
checklists.   
A contingency plan is similar to a suspicious check but different 
in some respect.  For instance, a contingency plan means that the 
ATCO has decided in advance WHEN and HOW he is going to 
review the situation and check for errors.  Contingency planning 
is similar to anticipating errors on his own. In your model, you 
have THREAT ANTICIPATION as a starting box.  You can have 
ERROR ANTICIPATION as an error mechanism. Error 
anticipation is contingency planning.  
Careful.  A suspicious check is different than a contingency plan.  
The ATCO does not make any planning in a suspicious check.  In 
fact, an ATCO can be suspicious because he has not made any 
good anticipation or because he has no contingency planning.   
The fact that an ATCO is suspicious may imply "lack  
of contingency planning".  
When you find some "near miss reports” or any simulator data, it 
is better to keep your list of detection mechanism open.  My guess 
is that it would be difficult to find how contingency plans 
contribute to error detection. Only if you have simulator data, you 
will be in a position to make an in depth analysis of detection 
mechanism.  
  
These are very detailed and interesting comments about error detection mechanisms. In 
particular, the distinction between active and passive detection mechanisms seems to 
make a lot of sense. The main problem with the active detection mechanisms is that it can 
be associated with some problems applying them directly to the domain of ATC. An 
example is routine check: In principle, the ATCO is monitoring the situation all the time 
(it is an integrated part of their work to do a "sweep" around the radar) and it is therefore 
difficult to say that an error was detected on the basis of standard check. Another 
example is suspicious check: If, for example, an ATCO sees two aircraft getting in 
conflict with each other he does not have a suspicion about a problem - he can tell for 
sure (this is related to a more general issue, namely that the concept of diagnosis - in 
contrast to many other safety critical domains - is not applicable to ATC). Even though 
these two types of detection mechanisms are not expected to be frequent in the domain of 
ATC they have been included under the category of “Internal feedback” to ensure that the 
framework is comprehensive (see section 6.3.7). In relation to the last type of “active 
behaviour” - namely contingency planning – it is true, as described in the comment 
above, that this factor is directly related to the issue of threat anticipation and 
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management. Therefore, to also have this as a separate factor under detection mechanism 
would introduce redundancy in the framework. 
 
How was the error and/or its consequences corrected? 
 
“Makes sense to me, but not so much to controllers and 
investigators. Depends on who is classifying. Apply rule, choose 
option and create solution could be interchangeable though.” 
 
“I had difficulty distinguishing between the ‘apply rule’ and the 
‘choose option’ – would suggest a better explanation on these…” 
 
These comments are related to the reliability and mutual exclusivity of the cognitive 
categories. Empirical data in the next study will be used to get a measurement of the 
reliability of these distinctions. Nonetheless, the concepts were chosen because they 
appeared intuitively understandable and did not seem to require any theoretical 
understanding to be applied. 
 
“This is for me an interesting phase. But: cognitive errors could 
also be corrected by the automatic system, by a change in the 
environment, by chance, etc. Have you chosen to leave out all 
solutions that are not cognitive related in your framework? If so, I 
don't find anything wrong with it, as long at the persons using the 
framework are aware of this. I also think that it is important to 
distinguish between application of actual rules (like procedures, 
work orders, etc) and mental rules (work models).” 
 
Concerning the first comment the answer would be that the classifications related to the 
problem-solving are only relevant in the cases where a human operator is actively 
involved in process (the rules for transitions between the dimensions in the framework 
were not explained in the document that was sent to the participants in this study). The 
distinctions do not make any sense when an automated agent is the active part in the error 
correction. In relation to the second comment it could be interesting to distinguish, as 
suggested, between responses based on formalised procedures and automated responses 
based on a high degree of experience with certain types of situations. However, in the 
domain of ATC which is, as previously described, less proceduralised this distinction is 
less relevant. 
 
“I like this part a lot, I also think the categories you have chosen 
capture all the different possibilities.”  
 
“This is very good and useful!” 
 
 181
What was the behavioural response? 
 
“Again important information is missing if the question "why" is 
not asked. It is for example important to know if the lack of 
response is caused by (1) error not detected, (2) error detected to 
late or (3) simply ignored.” 
 
It is true that the dimension in it self does not give an answer to the why-question. 
Nonetheless, when combining it with other dimensions (e.g. error detector, problem-
solving associated with error management and the PSFs) these questions can be 
answered. 
 
What was the outcome? 
 
“There seems to be an overlap between the “what” and the 
“when” process.” 
 
The main difference between the what- and the when-question is that the when-question 
is a cognitive classification whereas the what-question is related to the consequences. 
Nonetheless, the observation that the two dimensions are partially overlapping is correct. 
Consequently, it seems reasonable to consider whether it is relevant to keep both of these 
dimensions in the framework. 
 
“In case of an undesired state or an additional error the severity 
should be evaluated. The undesired state or additional error 
could actually be less severe than the initial state and thereby be 
an improvement. Or they could be more severe and thereby 
leading to a situation that is worse than the initial situation.” 
 
There are several aspects in this comment. First of all, as mentioned before it could be 
relevant to have more exact details concerning the severity instead of just using 
“undesired state”. This could either be on an ordinal scale (e.g. ranging from 1 to 5) or by 
having a list of general undesired situations (as has been done in the LOSA system at 
University of Texas). Concerning the second issue in the statement – about being able to 
obtain information concerning whether the recovery action affected the situation in a 
positive or negative way – it seems obvious to combine results from the two what-
dimensions, namely response and outcome. For example, the combination of 
trap/mitigate and undesired state means that an error was not prevented until an undesired 
state did occur, but it was eventually prevented from developing into an even worse 
situation. In similar vein, the combination of "exacerbate" and "undesired state" means 
that the response to an error (or its outcome) created an even more sever situation. 
 
“In my own research I have recorded more details regarding this 
question (severity and type of remaining consequences etc.) but 
this may be a bit 'over the top'. I agree that well-intended 
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recovery actions may lead to additional error. But I have not been 
able to collect information about such cases... have you?” 
 
The issue of remaining consequences and the recovery of these might be of relevance in 
some domains (in particular, process control). However, it makes less sense in ATC to 
talk about remaining consequences insofar as things here tend to be more discrete. Either 
a situation is resolved without any physical consequences (either spontaneously or 
through some kind of intervention) or a disastrous and unrecoverable situation occurs. In 
neither case there does not seem to be any “remaining consequences”. In relation to the 
question about “additional error” the relevance of this category has been supported by the 
two previous studies (see Figure 24 and Figure 31). 
 
Performance Shaping Factors 
 
“I think that they are all relevant when it comes to the 
identification of causes for human error and their avoidance and 
recovery. But I also think, that you would find, that they play very 
different roles, and contribute very different to the overall 
causality behind these phenomena.” 
 
It can be expected that different PSFs might have different effects on error production, 
detection and recovery (as also suggested by Van der Schaaf & Kanse, 2000). 
Furthermore, they might vary concerning their tendency to contribute positively or 
negatively to error events and safety in general. Therefore, it is of importance to include 
information about both the stage that they affect and the kind of influence they have on 
the analysed events. 
  
“Too many PSFs? It might be difficult to rate positive/negative 
contribution for some of them. Also feel that some of them are at 
different levels. A bit difficult to see a clear connection between 
this and the rest of the framework. I think that PSFs are important 
per se, but some PSFs may e.g. be negative in the detection phase 
and positive in the correction phase - it is not possible to 
illustrate this as the framework is now.” 
 
There are several points in this comment. First of all, whether there are too many PSFs or 
not is an open question. The list that the participants in this study was presented with was 
a boiled down version of contextual factors found in other frameworks. Nonetheless, 
further condensation might be possible (e.g. the “Ambient Environment” dimension 
might be moved insofar as it contains few categories and received relatively lower expert 
ratings than the other dimensions). In addition, empirical data from the critical incident 
study might give an indication of whether it is possible to boil it even further down. 
Concerning the relationship between the PSFs and the core of the framework it was 
deliberately determined not to try depicting this in this model insofar as they can affect 
all stages in the model and to try to depict this would compromise the overview that the 
model provides. 
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“If the list of PSFs is going to be used in the maritime domain, it 
should be expanded in certain categories. The category number 6 
[i.e. Person Related Factors] should for example be expanded 
with items covering deprivation from family and domestic issues 
and concerns.” 
 
It is clear that adaptation will be necessary when applying the PSFs to different domains. 
The is a direct consequence of the fact that PSFs described major aspects of the 
operational context and some of these contextual factors will inevitably be unique to the 
specific domain of interest. However, the example mentioned in the comment is perhaps 
not a factor that can easily be associated with a specific error and consequently might not 
be a very diagnostic factor to include in the PSFs.  
 
“…distinctions between different levels of flexibility should be 
made. Some factors can be easily changed or corrected leading to 
improved performance while other factors are more or less stable 
and unchangeable or dependent on parameters which can not be 
manipulated ("outside reach").” 
 
This is a very valid point. The current framework is mainly focused on identifying factors 
that contribute positively or negatively to the error episodes. However, if safety-
enhancing initiatives should be generated some additional information might be required 
to make an effective prioritisation of which PSFs that should be targeted. In particular, 
safety managers might benefit from information about the severity and changeability of 
the individual factors (as has been suggested by the Human Factors Research Laboratory 
at University of Texas). 
 
“If you wouldn't cluster the long list of factors, it would be very 
difficult to use, so grouping is important. 
Another point I would like to make is that there are direct and 
indirect influences, some of these factors influence recovery via 
another factor.” 
 
It is true that several layers of factors might affect each other in a way similar to Reason’s 
Swiss Cheese model. However, as previously described the more distant the factors 
become the less direct influence they have and consequently the more difficult it becomes 
to estimate their contribution to individual errors. Furthermore, to establish relationships 
between several distant layers on the basis of errors observed at the front-line seems to be 
a daunting task.  
 
“There are many ways to "cut the cake" here! It is very difficult to 
say what is the most useful classification scheme for PSFs.  Yours 
is Okay.” 
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The overall framework 
 
“I expect that the user of the framework will have the table 
displayed in a way that makes it easy to fill it in. Are you thinking 
of using the framework on-line in simulator studies/training, or 
more as an analysing tool?” 
 
Whether the framework can be used or not to do on-line scorings is difficult to answer. 
However, the table with the framework is fairly simple to fill-out and comparable 
frameworks (such as the LOSA) have been successful in conducting on-line analyses of 
error and error management events. For on-line analyses to be successful it would require 
that the observer has received extensive training in using the taxonomy and at the same 
time it is necessary to have a high-level of domain knowledge. 
 
“Is it supposed to be a purely classification system, or do you 
plan to develop it into an HRA methodology, assigning numbers 
to the different boxes?” 
 
Currently, it is just intended to be a descriptive classification system. Whether it can be 
adapted to a HRA methodology is an interesting issue, but outside the scope of this 
project. 
 
“Of course I think the framework is very relevant for the analysis 
of recovery processes…I can definitely apply this to the chemical 
process industry domain. The main things I miss are the 
explanation phase, and timing of the recovery steps after 
detection. Also, what do you do if multiple corrective steps are 
involved in recovery from one error, involving different actors at 
different times?” 
 
Some of these issues have been covered in previous responses. In relation to the issue of 
“multiple corrective steps” the answer would be that it is correct that several corrective 
steps might be carried out by different actors and with different effects on the situation. 
However, as previously described, to enhance the chances of obtaining useable results 
from the error management analysis some segmentation principles have been introduced 
(see e.g. section 8.2.2). The main purpose behind these principles is to provide a 
consistent and logical way to structure the segmentation so that the event description can 
be adapted to a traditional “flat” table. If the recursive nature of these recoveries should 
be maintained this would seriously compromise the chances of carrying out statistical 
analyses on an error management database and, consequently, the practical utility of the 
framework would be reduced. 
 
“All [items] are relevant and valid in my opinion, but not all so 
useful in practice.” 
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“Generally I think the framework looks promising. You have put 
together work from different researchers in a neat way, and made 
it applicable. I absolutely think that the framework, at least the 
general part of it, is applicable to many different domains.” 
  
“I find that this work you are doing is very relevant to many 
domains and I can see it being applied to the maritime domain 
with a few modifications.” 
 
“I find your approach very relevant and interesting.  
It is both thorough and wide, and takes into account the different 
aspects of error management.” 
 
“I think your work looks interesting, and it is very good to know 
that there are other people working in this same area. Personally, 
I find the field of recovery/ error management very interesting, 
and the work you are doing here I think a lot of people will find 
interesting and useful.” 
10.4 Lessons learned 
 
Many interesting comments were provided on the basis of this study. In particular, many 
suggestions were provided in relation to issues that should be taken into consideration if 
trying to apply the error management framework to other contexts. In relation to the 
current project and the ATC context some useful comments were made in relation to 
refining the framework:  
 
• In relation to threat management it was suggested that the taxonomy should not 
only reflect the anticipation, but also the potential response associated with 
managing the threat. Therefore, it was decided to include analysis of whether the 
anticipation was followed by an avoidance response or not. 
 
• Some of the respondents were a bit critical concerning the usefulness and 
relevance of the detection-stage dimension. This was reflected both in quantitative 
and qualitative results. Consequently, this is a dimension which relevance should 
be given some consideration. 
 
• In relation to the PSFs it was suggested that the list was too long and, 
consequently, some effort to condense the framework should be considered. 
“Ambient environment” was the main group that received the lowest rating and 
was also a group that contained a very limited range of categories. Hence, it might 
not be reasonable to maintain this as a main category.  
 
• Also, it was suggested that not only the influence (positive or negative) of a PSF, 
but also the performance stage (error, detection and recovery) should be identified 
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when conducting analyses of the PSFs. These issues will be explored in the next 
study. 
 
10.5 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of the study reported in this chapter was to get expert input to the 
framework. In particular, the goal was to get a quantitative evaluation of the relevance of 
both the components of the framework and its overall structure. Furthermore, more 
qualitative impressions were elicited insofar as the participants could comment in free-
text on strengths and weaknesses of the framework. 
 
An acceptable response rate was obtained. The results on the quantitative part of the 
questionnaire revealed a high average expert acceptance on all of the main dimensions of 
the framework (all average ratings were somewhere between 3 and 4 which corresponds 
to somewhere between relevant and highly relevant). In this manner an overall high 
degree of face/content validity was obtained. 
 
The qualitative comments from the participants were very interesting in relation to 
highlighting the extent to which the framework could be applied to other domains – such 
as the maritime domain and process control - and which issues that should be taken into 
consideration if trying to adapt the framework (i.e. external validity). For example, the 
extent to which checklist procedures are an integrated part of a domain’s problem solving 
and recovery should be taken into consideration when trying to apply the framework to 
other domains.  
 
A criticism that could be raised in relation to this study is that no operational people were 
involved in the survey. That is, the focus was on human factors experts and not domain 
experts as such. The reason for this choice is that many of the concepts within the 
framework are very theoretical and would require some familiarisation before they are 
properly understood. Furthermore, by using human factors experts from many domains it 
became possible to get some input in relation to the relevance and applicability of the 
framework to a number of other safety critical domains. 
  
Another potential criticism is that the respondents in the survey did not try to apply the 
taxonomy themselves to error events and without this hands-on experience they might not 
have had a good chance of evaluating the framework. Ideally, it would have been nice if 
the respondents also had had the chance to get practical experience with the framework 
before providing feedback. However, due to practical constraints this was not feasible. 
Nonetheless, on the basis of the constructive and highly relevant comments made by the 
respondents it seems not to have been a huge obstacle for them. That is, they seemed to 
be able to provide useful feedback even though they had not tried the framework on real 
cases. This may be a result of the fact that all of the participants had had previous 
experience with developing and applying conceptual frameworks related to the area of 
human error and/or error management. 
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A more comprehensive version of this study could, in principle, have been carried out 
where a series of additional questions could have been posed to the participants. In 
particular, it would have been relevant for each of the dimensions to obtain a rating of its 
usability, comprehensiveness and diagnosticity. The approach was not chosen in the 
current context simply because an excessive amount of questions might negatively affect 
the response rate (and the time required to read through the description of the framework 
and to answer the questionnaire was already a concern). Furthermore, it was judged that 
the question of relevance would encompass several of these issues and the free-text 
answers would give some insight into these issues. As the results also showed this 
expectation was to a large extent fulfilled. 
 
In sum, the approach taken to obtain input from human factors experts seemed 
worthwhile and productive. In particular, when having been involved in the development 
with all of the details of the framework it can be difficult to be effective in evaluating it 
and by having some fresh eyes to look at it can provide very useful feedback. 
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11 Study 4 – The critical incident technique 
 
In the previous chapters the error management framework was applied to the analysis of 
error events in incident reports and in a simulator study. However, it was not a 
comprehensive version of the framework that was used in these previous studies and 
there were some potentially important aspects of the error recovery process which 
constitute an integrated part of the framework that were not examined. This includes the 
following three issues. 
  
1. One of these issues is the area of threat management. Traditionally, studies of error 
and error management neglect this aspect of human performance, namely the fact that 
people can be aware of some of the threats that may lie ahead and might even have 
some strategies for coping with these threats either before or after they have led to an 
error. 
 
2. A second issue is the problem-solving or decision-making process underlying error 
recovery. Just as important as it is to understand the processes lying behind the 
discovery of a problem is it to know how the chosen resolution came about. This is an 
important issue insofar as even a timely detection does not guarantee an optimal 
correction. 
 
3. A final issue is to develop a list of Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) that can 
positively or negatively affect the error and error management process. There has 
been a tendency to view PSFs from a negative point of view (i.e. how they increase 
the risk of human errors) and to a lesser extent how they also can contribute in a 
positive way to human performance (i.e. how they can support error recovery). 
 
To be able to evaluate the comprehensive version error management taxonomy it was 
necessary to obtain some descriptions of authentic episodes where the issue of error 
management was important. For this purpose it was chosen to use the critical incident 
technique. Here it is possible to obtain descriptions of potential critical episodes and to 
elicit information about recovery related aspects of these situations that are rarely 
described in the incident reports. The limitation of this method is that it will only be 
possible to obtain direct information from the people being interviewed. So, it is not 
possible to get the story seen from the perspective of the other ATCOs or pilots involved 
in the incident. 
 
11.1 The framework 
 
In this study a comprehensive version of the framework will be used. The components of 
the core of the framework are presented below. 
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DESCRIPTION OF ERROR AND RECOVERY #1  
"When SAS asks for clearance to flight level 310, R1 could have discovered the risk for a conflict insofar as the 
strips for SAS and SCW were available. The conflict was detected by a relieving ATCO when the separation 
standards between the two aircraft were violated."  
THREAT MANAGEMENT 
Any threats Yes No 
If “Yes”: 
Types(s) Internal External 
Anticipation Anticipation No anticipation 
If “Anticipation”: 
Threat 
Management Yes No 
ERROR 
Producer ATCO Pilot 
Cognitive Domain Perception Short-term 
memory 
Long-term 
memory 
Decision Response 
If “Decision-making”: 
Error 
Procedural violation Yes No 
DETECTION & RECOVERY 
Error/state detector  No one Producer ATCO Instructor Pilot System Who:  
 Error/state corrector No one Producer ATCO Instructor Pilot System 
If detector <> "No one" or "System”: When: 
Time of detection Planning Execution Outcome 
Detection cue(s)  External communication System feedback  Internal feedback 
If corrector <> "No one" or "System”: 
How: 
Decision-making Ignore Apply rule Choose option Create solution 
RESPONSE & OUTCOME 
Error/State Response Trap/mitigate Exacerbate Fail to respond What:  
Error/State Outcomes Inconsequential/recovery Undesired state Additional error 
Table 10: The analysis framework (study 4) 
 
Please notice that a few additions have been made to the original framework in relation to 
threat management. The threat management types have been expanded so there is a 
distinction between anticipation of threat without any associated initiatives to counteract 
the threat and management where a threat is both anticipated and initiatives are made to 
counteract it (without necessarily being effective). Another addition is the threat types 
where we distinguish between internal and external threats. Internal threats are threats 
that originate within the ATC environment (e.g. an inexperienced ATCO) and external 
threats originate outside the ATC environment (e.g. a pilot that does not comply with an 
instruction or weather problems). This dimension was added as an exploratory 
component of the framework. 
 
Below is shown the PSF-taxonomy: 
 
Performance Shaping Factors 
What was the influence of these factors (positive, negative, both or none)? 
1.  Traffic, airport and airspace Pos. Neg. 
a. Traffic load/ traffic mix/ R/T workload   
b. Time available and degree of urgency   
c. Call sign similarity   
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Performance Shaping Factors 
d. Air space and airport design characteristics    
e. Temporary sector activities – military, parachuting, student pilot   
f. Weather - clear weather, snow/ice/slush, fog/low cloud, thunderstorm, windshear   
g. Other traffic, airport and airspace factors   
2.  Procedures and Documentation Pos. Neg. 
a. Procedures (availability, compatibility, quality and usability)   
b. Operational materials – checklists/advisory manuals/charts/notices   
c. Regulations and standards   
d. Other procedure and documentation factors   
3.  Workplace design, HMI and equipment factors Pos. Neg. 
a. Interface properties - radar display    
b. Radar and transponder factors   
c. FPS factors    
d. Communication equipment    
e. Warnings, alarms and automation   
f. Other workplace design, HMI and equipment factors   
4.  Training and Experience Pos. Neg. 
a. Knowledge/experience   
b. Quality of training   
c. Time since last (re)training in task   
d. Informal work practice   
e. Other training and experience factors   
5.  Person Related Factors Pos. Neg. 
a. Vigilance (fatigue, boredom, alertness)   
b. Strategies: Risk-assessment/short-cuts   
c. Confidence and trust in self/others   
d. Confidence in equipment and automation   
e. Emotional state (calm, chock, panic, stress)   
f. Other personal factors   
6.  Social and Team Factors Pos. Neg. 
a. Quality of hand over /take over   
b. Language/phraseology/culture issues   
c. Brevity, timing, accuracy and clarity of communication   
d. Sterility of environment (noise, distraction - supervisors, colleagues, visitors)   
e. Team climate and authority gradient   
f. Monitoring/cross-checking   
g. Verbal statements of plans/challenging plans   
h. Review status/modification of plans   
i. Other social and team factors   
7. Company, Management and Regulatory Factors Pos. Neg. 
a. Company/commercial pressure - unsafe ops, failure to correct problems   
b. Regulatory – planning, decision making, feedback   
c. Management/Organisation – planning, decision making, feedback   
d. Organisation of work and responsibilities   
e. Training plan   
f. Personnel selection plan   
g. Supervision   
h. Management attitudes towards human error and safety issues in general   
i. Other organisational factors   
Table 11: Performance Shaping Factors (study 4) 
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Some minor adjustments have been made in comparison with the original PSF-taxonomy. 
Some of the comments in study 3 indicated that even though the taxonomy was 
condensed on the basis of the reviewed taxonomies it might still be too comprehensive. 
Therefore, efforts were made to bring the amount of categories even further down. In 
particular, the group category entitled “Ambient environment” – which received the 
lowest expert rating - has been removed and the “Sterility of environment”-category was 
moved to “Social and Team factors”. Another change made on the basis of comments 
from study 3 is that for each of the PSF classifications the classifier should determine the 
performance phase that it affected – that is, the error, the detection or the correction phase 
(this is not shown in the table above). 
 
11.2 Method 
 
11.2.1 The critical incident technique 
 
The critical incident technique was originally developed by Flanagan (1954) as a 
systematic effort to gather incidents of effective and ineffective behaviour with respect to 
a designated activity. Initially the focus was on developing countermeasures to the 
increasing numbers of aircraft crashes during and after the Second World War, but the 
technique was soon adapted to many other areas. The data were normally collected by 
asking people about any critical incident that they had been involved in (or observed) and 
the circumstances of the incident. On the basis of descriptions of situations in which good 
or poor performance was revealed it was possible to subtract useful information in 
relation to both solving practical problems and developing broad psychological 
principles. 
 
A summary of Flanagan's Critical Incident Technique is:  
 
“A set of procedures for collecting direct observations of human 
behaviour which have special significance and meet systematically defined 
criteria. An incident is an observable type of human activity which is 
sufficiently complete in itself to permit inferences and predictions to be 
made about the person performing the act. To be critical it must be 
performed in a situation where the purpose or the intent of the act seems 
fairly clear to the observer and its consequences are sufficiently definite 
so there is little doubt concerning its effects.”  
(Flanagan, 1954, p. 327)  
 
The assumptions behind the technique are that the descriptions of performance in specific 
situations should allow inferences about the competence involved and that the behaviour 
observed should have a significant contribution, positively and/or negatively, to the 
general aim of the activity. In other words, the critical incident technique can be seen as a 
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standard qualitative research methodology to obtain descriptors of human behaviours that 
make a significant difference (that is, are critical) to outcomes within a defined area of 
interest.  
 
There are some limitations in Flanagan's definition of the critical incident technique. First 
of all, in the definition it is stated that method relies on "direct observation" which does 
not have to be the case. Actually, many critical incident studies rely on retrospective 
accounts as the main source of information. Another limitation of Flanagan's definition of 
the critical incident technique is the emphasis upon "behaviours". This is based on the 
assumption that information contained in critical incident reports should be objectively 
anchored and potentially verifiable. This view is limited because the underlying 
mechanisms behind the behaviour may be equally or more important to understand and 
by focusing exclusively on "behaviours" puts unnecessary constraints on the information 
that can be elicited from such studies. Instead it is useful to let the respondents reflect on 
their own strategies and the cognitive bases of their judgement and decision-making.  
 
The critical incident technique has been found very useful in relation to the obtaining 
information about both self-made and observed errors (see e.g. Jensen, 1997). It is 
therefore reasonable to try and apply the technique to the area of error management (Van 
der Schaaf, 1988). A potential advantage of doing this is that, in comparison with e.g. 
incident reports, the critical incident technique makes it possible to make more detailed 
inquiries about the specific error management events.  
 
11.2.2 Subjects 
 
In relation to the subjects it seems appropriate to select experienced controllers because 
they are most likely to have encountered one or several critical situations during their 
professional career. No specific preferences concerning the operational positions were 
made. 25 ATCOs were interviewed and all the participants were from Scandinavian 
countries. 
 
11.2.3 The data material 
 
The 25 ATCOs were interviewed and their narratives were recorded on tape. From these 
people 43 episodes were elicited. Each of the episodes was after the interview carefully 
converted into a coherent written description of the event and only information 
exclusively obtained from the interviewee was included. In some cases the interviewees 
were contacted again concerning information that was either missing or was unclear. 
 
The focus of the interviews was on so-called critical incidents. These incidents were 
characterised by the following common features (the first three are associated with the 
content of the descriptions and the last two the quality of the anecdotes). 
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• Potentially undesirable outcome. A critical incident was defined as an occurrence that 
might have led (if not discovered in time) or did lead, to an undesirable outcome. 
• Error induced. The incident must have been caused by an error made by a controller 
and it had to be clearly preventable 
• Extreme behaviours. In relation to selecting the situations of relevance an advise from 
Flanagan was followed to focus on "extreme behaviours", either outstanding effective 
or ineffective (or a combination) with regards to attaining the general aim of the 
activity. Such incidents have the advantage of being most memorable.  
• Accuracy. It had to be described in detail by a person involved in or who had 
discovered the incident. To avoid problems related to the accuracy of the reporting it 
was chosen on an a priori basis to only consider reports as accurate if full and precise 
details could be provided. 
• Recent events. It is also recommended that the focus should, as far as possible, be on 
recent incidents that are fresh in mind. This recommendation may not necessarily be 
compatible with the “extreme behaviour”-criterion (i.e. the most recent incidents may 
not necessarily be good examples of "extreme behaviour").  
 
11.2.4 Procedure 
 
In the following is described the procedure in this study. As in the previous classification 
studies there are three main stages of the procedure: Information elicitation, segmentation 
and classification. 
 
Information elicitation 
 
An interview guide was written with the most essential questions for the ATCOs (see 
Appendix C). Each interview began with a brief introduction to the interview. In this 
introduction it was emphasised that we were particularly interested in episodes (1) where 
the interviewee had played a significant role in relation to the detection and/or recovery 
of an error and (2) that had occurred within a time window of about one year. The reason 
for the first desideratum was that the focus of the study was to obtain knowledge about 
the error management process and it was therefore considered most productive to focus 
on episodes where the interviewee played a significant role in the recovery so that he/she 
could elaborate on these aspects. The second desideratum was made because it was 
expected that the details of recent episodes would be more readily available in memory 
(and thereby be less vulnerable to distorting and/or forgetting details). It should been 
emphasised that these were only desiderata and were therefore not rigidly adhered to in 
all the interviews. The reason for this was that people seemingly varied significantly 
concerning their ability to recall specific episodes in detail. Consequently, this put some 
constraints on the requirements that could be made to the episodes reported. 
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Segmentation 
 
In the current study explicit attempts were made at distinguishing between the 
segmentation and the classification. Therefore, all of the cases were broken down to a 
number of error events and for each event narrative information from the incidents was 
added to the following headings: “Threat & Error”, “Detection”, “Recovery”, “Outcome” 
(all descriptions were taken verbatim from the case description – for a concrete example 
see section 6.4). For the segmentation of error events it was often necessary to make a 
graphical representation of the relationship between error events and recoveries. In 
addition to the free text descriptions related to the analysis of the error events free text 
associated with identified PSFs was included separately. 
 
Classification 
 
The procedure for classification of the error events was similar to the one in study 2 and 
consisted of three sub-phases: (a) Initial classification - First all the error events (96) and 
PSFs (106) were classified twice by the author with one month’s interval and a consensus 
classification was produced; (b) Calibration phase - The second classifier was trained in 
the use of the taxonomy. In order to achieve reliable and valid categorisations the 
classifier was given feedback concerning the "correct" classification as a part of the 
training (based on the author’s classifications) and potential misunderstandings in the use 
of the taxonomy were calibrated. The first eight scenarios containing 17 error events and 
24 PSFs were used for this purpose; (c) Test phase - On the basis of the remaining 
incidents the trained observer was asked to classify the errors and error recoveries (79) as 
well as the PSFs (82).  
 
A couple of unique issues related to the classification are described below. 
 
• Procedural violations: Intentional procedural violations are unique because, in 
principle, the error perpetrator will already know at the planning stage that an 
error has been committed. In the current context, it was chosen not to analyse the 
detection stage and detection cue in such situations because it seems a bit artificial 
to talk about when, how and by whom the intentional violation was detected. 
 
• PSFs: Since the PSFs are not mutually exclusive some decisions need to be made 
concerning how the classification should be made – in particular, because Kappa 
analysis is intended to be used on data material with mutually exclusive 
categories. For this reason it was decided that the classifiers should, as far as 
possible, try to determine only one category and if several categories seemed 
applicable then the choices should be ranked in the order that they seemed 
appropriate. By trying to restrict the choice of PSF to a single option the analysis 
is “pushed to the limit”, but nonetheless, as previously described, it is desirable if 
the analysis of PSFs can also be carried out by choosing just one category. 
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11.3 Results 
 
11.3.1 Reliability analysis 
 
To be able to ascertain whether the proposed conceptual tool is useful in the analysis of 
error and error management situations it is necessary to test whether it can support 
reliable and robust analyses. In the following is described the results from the intra- and 
inter-rater analysis (please note that all “unknown” classifications will not be used in the 
reliability analysis). 
 
Intra-rater reliability 
 
In the table below are given the Kappa results from the intra-rater analysis. The results 
are based on 96 identified error events and 106 PSFs. 
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Threat 
Threat type 
Kappa 0.77 P<0.001 
Threat anticipation 
Kappa 1.00 P<0.001 
Threat management 
Kappa 0.79 P=0.001 
Error 
Error producer 
Kappa 0.94 P<0.001 
Cognitive domain 
Kappa 1.00 P<0.001 
Procedural violation 
Kappa 0.81 P<0.001 
Detection and recovery 
Who – detection 
Kappa 0.90 P<0.001 
Who – correction 
Kappa 0.85 P<0.001 
When – detection 
Kappa 0.66 P<0.001 
How – detection 
Kappa 0.87 P<0.001 
How – correction 
Kappa 0.97 P<0.001 
Response and outcome 
What – response 
Kappa 0.96 P<0.001 
What – outcome 
Kappa 0.79 P<0.001 
PSF 
PSF – groups 
Kappa 0.97 P<0.001 
PSF – individual 
Kappa 0.88 P<0.001 
PSF – influence 
Kappa 0.97 P<0.001 
PSF – stage 
Kappa 0.68 P<0.001 
Table 12: Intra-rater kappa coefficients and P-values for each of the main 
dimensions in the framework (study 4) 
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As can be seen an overall very high level of agreement was achieved across all 
dimensions. All results are above 0.60 (i.e. a “substantial” level of agreement) and are 
highly significant. It is, in particular, interesting that a high reliability could be obtained 
for the threat management categories insofar as these have not be tested for reliability 
before. Also the high reliability for the PSFs is very promising. This included the main 
groups of PSFs (PSF-groups), the individual categories at the detailed level (PSF-
individual), the positive or negative influence of the PSFs (PSF-influence) and the 
performance stage that the PSF influenced (PSF-stage). The latter refers to whether the 
PSF affected the original error or the detection and recovery of the error. 
 
The intra-rater results are very promising for the framework, but should however be taken 
with some modifications. This is related to the fact the classifier was also the one who 
originally carried out the interview and the later transcription of the incidents (that is, the 
author). Consequently, the high degree of familiarity with the stories combined with the 
high degree of familiarity with the framework might have made it easier to be consistent 
in the analysis. 
 
Inter-rater reliability 
 
A second rater was given training in using the system. For this purpose the first eight 
incidents were used (consisting of 17 error events and 24 PSFs) and the remainder of the 
incidents were used for the inter-rater analysis. In the table below is shown the results of 
the inter-rater analysis of the critical incidents. 
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Threat 
Threat type 
Kappa 0.53 P=0,011 
Threat anticipation 
Kappa 0.80 P<0.001 
Threat management 
Kappa 0.75 P=0.005 
Error 
Error producer 
Kappa 0.95 P<0.001 
Cognitive domain 
Kappa 0.52 P<0.001 
Procedural violation 
Kappa 0.72 P=0.004 
Detection and recovery 
Who – detection 
Kappa 0.89 P<0.001 
Who – correction 
Kappa 0.54 P<0.001 
When – detection 
Kappa 0.27 P=0.119 
How – detection 
Kappa 0.71 P<0.001 
How – correction 
Kappa 0.60 P<0.001 
Response and outcome 
What – response 
Kappa 0.76 P<0.001 
What – outcome 
Kappa 0.69 P<0.001 
PSF 
PSF – groups 
Kappa 0.64 P<0.001 
PSF – individual 
Kappa 0.61 P<0.001 
PSF – influence 
Kappa 0.92 P<0.001 
PSF – stage 
Kappa 0.67 P<0.001 
Table 13: Inter-rater kappa coefficients and P-values for each of the main 
dimensions in the framework (study 4) 
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As can be seen all except one of the dimensions achieved an acceptable level of 
agreement and consequently it can be concluded that the framework allowed relative 
robust analyses. The results are encouraging insofar as they substantiate that other people 
can be trained in the system and achieve highly robust results. 
 
The only dimension that produced a Kappa coefficient below 0.40 was the when-
dimension associated with the detection stage. One of the reasons for this is that there 
was in general very little variability within this dimension (almost all detections 
happened at the outcome stage) and within the few variations the classifications did not 
correspond very well. Such dimensions are especially troublesome for the Kappa analysis 
insofar as even minor disagreements on the infrequent categories can have drastical 
effects on the Kappa-values. 
 
11.3.2 Pattern analysis 
 
The pattern analysis will first focus on the framework core and then the performance 
shaping factors. For each of these two parts of the framework both main effects and 
interactions will be explored. The same statistical tests that were used in study 1 and 2 
will be used in this study. 
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Framework core 
 
In the chart below is shown the distribution of threat management types for the error 
events that were preceded with one or several threats, Χ2(2, N=61)=11.25, P=0.004. 
Please notice that the anticipation category has been divided in two – one is anticipation 
without an active management (entitled “anticipation”) and the other is anticipation with 
active management (entitled “management”). As can be seen in the chart, many threats 
were either not anticipated at all or were anticipated but not effectively dealt with. In 
spite of this it might seem surprising that a significant part of the threats were effectively 
managed when considering that all the events analysed were “critical” or “potentially 
critical”. The explanation for this is that effective management covers situations where an 
ATCO was aware of a threat before it developed into an error and that the ATCO did 
everything possible to counteract the threat or to be ready to respond if an error should 
occur. 
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Figure 40: Distribution of threat management types. 
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In the figure below is shown the distribution of threat types, Χ2(1, N=54)=24.00, 
P<0.001. As can be seen there is a large majority of external threats compared with 
internal threats. The internal threats include fatigue, distractions, inexperienced or 
unskilled ATCO (that e.g. might issue untoward instructions), interface difficulties (e.g. 
difficulties with distinguishing between fixpoints and other representations on the radar 
screen). The external threats include problem pilot (that e.g. does not comply with the 
instructions), traffic congestion, incomplete radar coverage (with the consequence that 
aircraft under control might not appear on the radar screen), weather (e.g. wind might 
make it difficult to predict the trajectories of aircraft and bad weather might require 
aircraft being rerouted), potential conflict between two aircraft (which might be 
underestimated), VFR pilots (that are not under the control of ATC and might behave 
unpredicted). Whether the difference in the amount of threat types is a reflection of a 
reporting bias (i.e. ATCOs being more focused on external problem factors rather than 
internal) or a reflection of the real distribution of threat types cannot be determined on the 
basis of the available data. 
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Figure 41: Distribution of threat types 
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The distribution of error producers is shown in the figure below. The difference between 
the two groups of producers is not significant, Χ2(1, N=95)=1.78, P=0.220. In other 
words, there is a comparable amount of pilots and ATCOs who commit errors in the data 
material. 
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Figure 42: Distribution of error producer 
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In the chart below is shown the distribution of error types based on the cognitive domain 
Χ2(4, N=79)=83.34, P<0.001. As can be seen a very large majority of the errors in the 
critical incidents were decision-making errors. This is in good concordance with other 
studies that have indicated that decision-making errors are particularly troublesome and 
are frequently associated with critical situations (e.g. Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997; 
Klinect et al., 1999). The decision-making errors include procedural violations. 31.3% 
(i.e. 15 out of 48) of the decision-making errors were procedural violations and 47.9% 
(i.e. 23 out of 48) were not procedural violations (the remaining 20.8% were unknown). 
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Figure 43: Distribution of cognitive domains. 
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In the chart below is shown the error detector and corrector (Detector: Χ2(4, 
N=95)=99.79, P<0.001; Corrector: Χ2(4, N=95)=42.29, P<0.001). Similar to the other 
studies the results show that in the most cases the error detector is also the corrector. 
Interestingly, the most frequent detector and corrector is an ATCO different from the 
error producer. This pattern is different from the one observed in study 1 and 2 where the 
most frequent detector and corrector was the error producer. The difference in results 
from these two studies indicates that people prefer to report events where they detected 
errors committed by other people and is therefore a reflection of reporting bias associated 
with self-reports (please notice that even though the participants in this study were 
instructed to report events where they played a significant role in the error detection 
and/or recovery no instructions were given concerning whether or not they played a role 
in the error production). 
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Figure 44: Distribution of error detector and corrector. 
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In the chart below is shown the distribution of detection source, Χ2(2, N=76)=69.50, 
P<0.001. Clearly system feedback is the most prevalent source of detection even though a 
number of errors were detected on the basis of external communication. 
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Figure 45: Distribution of detection source 
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In the chart below is shown the distribution of problem-solving process underlying the 
correction, Χ2(3, N=63)=55.41, P<0.001. The most frequent type of recovery process is 
“apply rule”. As would be expected, “choose option” and “create solution” are very 
infrequent (that is, they are associated with more novel and unanticipated situations and 
should per se be infrequent for experienced controllers). 
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Figure 46: Distribution of error correction – problem-solving. 
 
 207
In the chart below is shown the distribution of responses associated with the correction, 
Χ2(2, N=95)=31.98, P<0.001. As can be seen a majority of the reported errors are 
“trapped/mitigated”. It is also interesting to note that a larger amount of exacerbations 
were registered in this study in comparison with the previously described studies. 
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Figure 47: Distribution of response types. 
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In the chart below is shown the outcome, Χ2(2, N=95)=44.48, P<0.001. Since the current 
study focuses on critical incidents it could be expected that a majority of the cases would 
lead to an undesired state. 
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Figure 48: Distribution of outcomes. 
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Previously it has been mentioned that other studies have indicated that procedural 
violations are frequently inconsequential and, consequently, it would be expected that the 
framework could verify this relationship (see hypothesis 13 in section 7.3). In the chart 
below is shown the interaction between procedural violations (of the sub-group of errors 
containing decision-making errors) and outcome. The interaction is not significant, Χ2(2, 
N=39)=4.71, P=0.101. A relatively smaller amount of non-procedural violations led to 
inconsequential outcomes (AR=-1.98). Conversely, a relatively smaller amount of the 
procedural violations led to an undesired state (AR=-2.09). It should be noted that the 
analysis was based on a very small sample (i.e. 39 error events) and that none of the 
classifiers were domain experts (and, consequently, in a lot of cases had to be omitted 
from the data material because it was not possible to determine whether or not something 
was a procedural violation). Hence, the lack of significance may be a result of a type-2 
error. 
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Figure 49: Interaction between procedural violation and outcome. 
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A related hypothesis is that errors that are ignored and tolerated are frequently 
inconsequential (see hypothesis 9 in section 7.3). In the figure below is shown the 
interaction between the decision-making associated with the correction of errors and the 
outcome (the group “consequential” covers both “undesired state” and “additional 
error”). The interaction is close to being significant, Χ2(1, N=76)=3.60, P=0.067. The 
trend is that errors that are ignored (including intentional procedural violations) are 
frequently associated with inconsequential outcomes (AR=1.90) whereas errors that are 
responded to are frequently associated with consequences (AR=1.90). 
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Figure 50: Interaction between ignore/respond and consequential/inconsequential. 
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Performance Shaping Factors 
 
The overall distribution of the main groups of PSFs is shown below, Χ2(6, 
N=106)=27.53, P<0.001. As can be seen most of the groups were frequently used 
throughout the scenarios. The most dominant groups were “Traffic, airport and airspace” 
and “Training and experience”. 
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Figure 51: Distribution of main groups of PSFs. 
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The distribution of positive and negative PSFs is shown in the figure below. As can be 
seen a very large majority of the PSFs had a negative influence on the course of events 
(81.0%), Χ2(1, N=106)=36.26, P<0.001. Similar distributions have been observed in 
several other studies based on the critical incident technique (Van der Schaaf & Kanse, 
1999). These results indicate that it might be more difficult to subtract positive factors 
compared with negative factors in the incident descriptions. In other words, the negative 
factors are more conspicuous compared with the positive factors. Nonetheless, important 
lessons might still be obtained from the positive factors in relation to improving the 
safety barriers within the system. 
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Figure 52: Distribution of positive and negative PSFs 
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In the figure below is shown the distribution of performance stages that the PSF 
influenced, Χ2(2, N=106)=3.70, P=0.163. As can be seen a majority of the PSFs had a 
positive or negative influence on the error management stages, namely detection and 
correction (58.5%). The variance in the distribution is not significant and it can therefore 
be concluded that there is a comparable amount of PSFs within each of these three 
performance stages. In other words, the PSFs seem to cover factors relevant for all three 
performance stages. 
 
 
44 
34
28 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
Error Detection Correction 
Performance stage
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
(a
bs
ol
ut
e)
 
 
Figure 53: Distribution of PSF performance stages 
 
There was not found any interaction between the PSFs and their positive or negative 
influence, Χ2(6, N=106)=7.10, P=0.311. However, overall there is an interaction between 
main groups of PSFs and the performance stage that they influenced, Χ2(12, 
N=106)=36.52, P<0.001. A more detailed analysis reveals that the there is no interaction 
when focusing on the PSFs which have a positive influence on the error management, 
Χ2(4, N=22)=3.35, P<0.669. This might, partially, be related to the fact that the positive 
PSFs are far less prevalent than the negative PSFs – that is, the sample is too small. The 
main contribution to the interaction seems to be the negative factors, Χ2(12, 
N=84)=41.62, P<0.001. In the chart below is shown the distribution of negative PSFs and 
the performance stage that they affect. 
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Figure 54: Interaction between negative PSFs and performance stage. 
 
The important contributions to the interaction are elaborated below: 
 
• “Traffic, airport and airspace” was frequently negatively associated with the error 
production stage (AR=2.64). This interaction is particularly related to the item 
referred to as “Traffic load/traffic mix/ R/T workload”. 
• “Workplace design, HMI and equipment factors” were frequently negatively 
associated with the detection stage (AR=3.83). This is, in particular, related to 
“Interface properties – radar display”. 
• “Person related factors” are frequently negatively associated with the correction 
phase (AR=2.03). This interaction is, in particular, associated with the items 
referred to as “Strategies: Risk assessments and short-cuts” and “Emotional 
state”. 
• “Social and team factors” are rarely negatively associated with the error 
production stage (AR=-2.18). In other words they are frequently negatively 
associated with the error management. This is in particular related to the items 
“Team climate and authority gradient” and “Verbal statements of 
plans/challenging plans” – in short, classical CRM issues. 
• “Company, management and regulatory factors” are frequently negatively 
associated with the correction phase (AR=3.44). This interaction is caused by the 
item referred to as “Management attitudes toward human error and safety issues 
in general”. More specifically, these factors are related to covering up the 
consequences of errors committed (e.g. by not using the term “avoiding action” to 
avoid that a report will be written). 
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11.3.3 Validity 
 
Content validity refers to the comprehensiveness of the framework. A way to get an 
indication of this is by looking at the amount of “Unknown” classifications within the 
individual dimensions of the framework. The amount of “Unknown” classifications in 
relation to the core of the framework and the PSFs are shown in the table below: 
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Threat 
Threat type 
3/57 5.3 % 
Threat anticipation 
0/61 0.0 % 
Threat management 
0/34 0.0 % 
Error 
Error producer 
0/95 0.0 % 
Cognitive domain  
17/96 (2/81) 17.7 % (2.5 %) 
Procedural violations 
12/51 23.5% 
Detection and recovery 
Who – detection 
0/95 0.0 % 
Who – correction 
0/95 0.0 % 
When 
0/77 0.0 % 
How – detection 
1/77 1.3 % 
How – correction 
16/79 (5/68) 20.3% (7.4 %) 
Response and outcome 
What – response 
0/95 0.0 % 
What – outcome 
0/95 0.0 % 
PSF 
PSF – main groups 
0/106 0.0 % 
PSF – individual 
0/106 0.0 % 
PSF influence 
0/106 0.0 % 
PSF – stage 
0/106 0.0 % 
Table 14: Amount of “Unknown” classifications for each dimension (study 4) 
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The overall picture is that very few unknown classifications were applied for most of the 
dimensions. However, it should be noted that the relatively high amount of unknown 
classifications for the cognitive domain and “how-correction” is mainly related to the fact 
that pilot errors were included in the analysis and, in most cases, the mechanisms behind 
the error and its recovery could not be determined on the basis of the available 
information. If the pilot-errors are removed the unknown-rate drops to 2.5%. In similar 
vein, if the errors corrected by the pilots are removed the amount of unknown 
classifications for the “how-correction”-dimension drops to 7.4%. Finally, the relative 
high amount of unknown classifications for the procedural violations is related to the fact 
that none of the classifiers were ATC domain experts and consequently a conservative 
approach was taken in deciding whether something was a procedural violation or not. 
 
The detailed distribution of PSFs is shown in the table below (the relative amount of 
positive and negative factors is shown in the parentheses). Even though the current study 
was based on a very small sample, it can be seen in the table that both for the main 
groups and for many of the subgroups a wide range of the categories were used. A 
conspicuous exception is “Company, Management and Regulatory Factors” where only 
one subgroup was used. 
 
1.  Traffic, airport and airspace 24 (5/19)
a)       Traffic load/ traffic mix/ R/T workload 7 (0/7)
b)       Time available and degree of urgency 4 (1/3)
c)       Call sign similarity 0 (0/0)
d)       Air space and airport design characteristics 2 (0/2)
e)       Temporary sector activities – military, parachuting, student pilot 0 (0/0)
f)        Weather - clear weather, snow/ice/slush, fog/low cloud, thunderstorm, windshear 11 (4/7)
g)       Other traffic, airport and airspace factors 0 (0/0)
2.  Procedures and Documentation 4 (0/4)
a)       Procedures (availability, compatibility, quality and usability) 4 (0/4)
b)       Operational materials – checklists/advisory manuals/charts/notices 0 (0/0)
c)       Regulations and standards 0 (0/0)
d)       Other procedure and documentation factors 0 (0/0)
3.  Workplace design, HMI and equipment factors 18 (5/13)
a)       Interface properties - Radar display 5 (0/5)
b)       Radar and transponder factors 6 (1/5)
c)       FPS factors 0 (0/0)
d)       Communication equipment 2 (0/2)
e)       Warnings, alarms and automation 5 (4/1)
f)        Other workplace design, HMI and equipment factors 0 (0/0)
4.  Training and Experience 24 (2/22)
a)       Knowledge/experience 16 (2/14)
b)       Quality of training 3 (0/3)
c)       Time since last (re)training in task 0 (0/0)
d)       Informal work practice 5 (0/5)
e)       Other training and experience factors 0 (0/0)
5.  Person Related Factors 17 (5/12)
a)       Vigilance (fatigue, boredom, alertness) 7 (5/2)
b)       Strategies: Risk-assessment/short-cuts 4 (0/4)
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c)       Confidence and trust in self/others 1 (0/1)
d)       Confidence in equipment and automation 1 (0/1)
e)       Emotional state (calm, chock, panic, stress) 4 (0/4)
f)        Other personal factors 0 (0/0)
6.  Social and Team Factors 15 (5/10)
a)       Quality of hand over /take over 0 (0/0)
b)       Language/phraseology/culture issues 1 (0/1)
c)       Brevity, timing, accuracy and clarity of communication 1 (0/1)
d)       Sterility of environment (noise, distraction - supervisors, colleagues, visitors) 1 (0/1)
e)       Team climate and authority gradient 4 (1/3)
f)        Monitoring/cross-checking 3 (3/0)
g)       Verbal statements of plans/challenging plans 4 (1/3)
h)       Review status/modification of plans 1 (0/1)
i)         Other social and team factors 0 (0/0)
7. Company, Management and Regulatory Factors 4 (0/4)
a)       Company/commercial pressure - unsafe ops, failure to correct  problems 0 (0/0)
b)       Regulatory – planning, decision making, feedback 0 (0/0)
c)       Management/Organisation - planning, decision making, feedback 0 (0/0)
d)       Organisation of work and responsibilities 0 (0/0)
e)       Training plan 0 (0/0)
f)        Personnel selection plan 0 (0/0)
g)       Supervision 0 (0/0)
h)       Management attitudes towards human error and safety issues in general 4 (0/4)
i)         Other organisational factors 0 (0/0)
PSFs Unknown 0 (0/0)
Unknown 0 (0/0)
Table 15: Distribution of PSF categories (study 4). 
 
11.4 Conclusion 
 
The critical incident technique was chosen as a method in this final study as a means to 
evaluate the comprehensive version of the framework. This approach was considered 
useful insofar as it would allow examining parts of the framework that are rarely 
available when using traditional sources of information (such as incident reports) and that 
requires having access to the underlying cognitive processes of the subjects involved in 
the events – in particular, when it comes to shedding light on the error management 
process.  
 
In the study all of the dimensions except one produced Kappa-values above 0.50 in both 
the intra- and inter-rater analysis. Consequently, the comprehensive edition of the 
framework has been proved applicable to error management analyses. In particular, it was 
encouraging that the previously non-evaluated dimensions of the framework – namely 
threat management, problem solving associated with error recovery and the PSFs – all 
provided robust results. 
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In relation to the management of threats it was interesting to note that a majority of the 
threats were either not anticipated or anticipated but not responded to (in short, 
ineffective threat management). This is most likely a reflection of the data material used 
in this study – that is, it can be expected that a significant amount of threats are 
inadequately dealt with when focusing on critical incidents. Since it can be expected that 
threats in normal everyday operations would, in general, be more effectively dealt with a 
more comprehensive study of threat management in ATC would require real-time based 
observations of normal operational practice. 
 
The analysis of the problem solving underlying the recovery process also produced some 
interesting results. In particular, it was demonstrated that in a large majority of error 
situations the underlying decision to an error recovery was either to deliberately ignore it 
or action was initiated without any consideration of other alternatives (i.e. “apply rule”). 
Only in rare cases were several options considered (i.e. “choose option) or was it 
necessary to create an entirely new solution to a problem never encountered before (i.e. 
“create solution”). These results fit well with the fact that the people who recovered the 
errors in the critical incidents to a large extent were highly experienced controllers who 
consequently had a good deal of expertise in dealing with many types of situations.  
 
The fact that the PSFs produced a high degree of reliability was a bit surprising because 
the categories were not mutually exclusive and, consequently, several categories might be 
applicable in relation to a single factor. This makes it both difficult to obtain a 
measurement of reliability and to obtain a high degree of agreement. Nonetheless, a high 
degree of reliability was obtained both for the overall groups and the more specific 
subcategories. Furthermore, for the analysis of influence (positive or negative) and 
performance stage (error, detection and correction) yielded robust results. In this manner 
it has been demonstrated that the PSFs can be used consistently to the analysis of both 
error and error management. 
 
The analysis of the critical incidents revealed a large majority of negative PSFs compared 
with positive PSFs. This is most likely because it is often more difficult to identify 
positive factors compared with negative factors simply because negative factors are 
easier to spot whereas positive factors often concern factors taken for granted. An 
illustrative example could be the readback procedure. This procedure requires that pilots 
read back the instructions that they have been given by the ATCO. If a read-back is not 
carried out by the pilot this might be considered a negative factor. If, on the other hand, 
the read-back procedure is carried out as required most people would be reluctant to 
describe this as a positive factor. The distribution of positive and negative factors could 
also be a reflection of the type of data material being used and if normal operations had 
been studied a more balanced distribution could be expected. 
 
The PSFs are interesting because they directly target areas that should be dealt with to 
enhance safety. However, a simple summation of the different contextual categories is 
perhaps not sufficient to determine which areas should receive most attention. When 
having a large database of PSFs it seems relevant to incorporate some principles for 
prioritisation of the individual factors to ensure a more goal-directed and effective 
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improvement of safety. Some kind of weighting of the PSFs on the basis of their relative 
risk and how easy they can be corrected should be considered when making managerial 
decisions (e.g. the two dimensions can be used to create a risk-matrix, as suggested by 
researchers at the Human Factors Research Project at University of Texas). Such 
estimations should be done by or in close cooperation with domain experts. In this way 
factors that score high on risk and high on easy correction should be the ones that should 
be given highest priority when planning safety enhancing strategies. 
 
A factor that could have improved the accuracy of the classifications in this study is to 
have had domain experts involved in the analysis. This is, for example, the case for the 
classification of threats and procedural violations. In relation to threats the involvement 
of subject matter experts could be relevant, because without a very thorough 
understanding of the domain it can be difficult to determine whether an ATCO should 
have been attentive to a certain factor in the internal or external environment. Without 
such experience and knowledge it is hard to tell whether the ATCO could reasonable be 
expected to have known about the threat or could have dealt with it in another way. In 
similar vein, whether some action or inaction is a procedural violation requires a 
comprehensive knowledge about both regional and international procedures. In short, the 
validity of the analysis would benefit from having domain experts involved in all stages 
of the analysis. 
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12 Evaluation of framework 
 
The previous studies have been useful to shed some light on the utility of the conceptual 
framework. It is now reasonable to return to the product criteria described in the 
beginning of this thesis - namely reliability, comprehensiveness, diagnosticity and 
usability - and take a look at how it satisfies these. Since the whole literature review as 
well as the development of the framework has been focused on these issues, this will to 
some extent be a summary of the previously described issues. 
 
12.1 Reliability 
 
A critical measure of the utility of the framework was the intra- and inter-rater reliability 
of the classifications in the three studies based on incidents reports, a simulator study and 
interviews based on the critical incident technique. The reason why it is so important to 
obtain a satisfactory level of reliability is that if it were not possible to obtain reliable 
results the whole foundation of the framework as a scientific tool would be undermined. 
Kappa-results for all dimensions from these three studies are shown in the table below. 
 
  Empirical studies 
  Incidents Simulator study Critical incident 
Main 
dimension 
Sub-dimension Inter-
rater 
Intra-
rater 
Inter-
rater 
Intra-
rater 
Inter-
rater 
Type    0.77 0.53 
Anticipation    1.00 0.80 
Threat 
Management    0.79 0.75 
Producer  0.90 0.95 0.94 0.95 
Cognitive domain 0.81 0.86 0.69 1.00 0.52 
Error 
Procedural violation    0.81 0.72 
Detector 0.64 0.94 0.81 0.90 0.89 Who 
Corrector 0.62 0.88 0.69 0.85 0.54 
When Detection  0.56 0.89 0.60 0.66 0.27 
Detection  0.62 0.84 0.68 0.87 0.71 How 
Correction    0.97 0.60 
Response 0.45 0.94 0.80 0.96 0.76 What 
Outcome 0.51 0.74 0.50 0.79 0.69 
Groups    0.97 0.64 
Individual    0.88 0.61 
Influence    0.97 0.92 
PSF 
Stage    0.68 0.67 
Table 16: Kappa coefficients from study 1, 2 and 4 
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As can be seen in the table the overall picture from the empirical studies is that the 
framework did support highly robust classifications throughout all of the empirical 
studies. Only once did the reliability results get below the critical 0.40 cut-off point, 
namely for the when-dimension. The lower kappa values for the first study compared 
with the other two studies is related to several reasons: (1) the limited amount of 
information concerning error management in the incident reports; (2) it was possible to 
provide the second classifier with more training in the last two studies; (3) in the last 
study explicit efforts were made in relation to separate the segmentation phase from the 
classification phase – this was not done in study 1 (and was not necessary in study 2). 
 
12.2 Comprehensiveness 
 
Comprehensiveness is related to the extent to which the framework is able to cover all the 
main categories and issues associated with the area of error management. A way to 
determine the extent to which the categories adequately reflect the natural variation of a 
phenomenon is to examine the amount of unknown classifications used within the 
individual dimensions. A summary of unknown classifications in the simulator study and 
the critical incident study is shown below. 
 
  Simulator study Critical incident 
Main 
dimension 
Sub-dimension Unknown 
classifications 
Unknown 
classifications 
Type  5.3 % 
Anticipation  0.0 % 
Threat 
Management  0.0 % 
Producer 0.0 % 0.0 % 
Cognitive domain 4.4 % 17.7 % (2.5 %) 
Error 
Procedural violation  23.5% 
Detector 0.4 % 0.0 % Who 
Corrector 0.4 % 0.0 % 
When Detection  1.0 % 0.0 % 
Detection  3.6 % 1.3% How 
Correction  20.3 % (7.4 %) 
Response 0.0 % 0.0 % What 
Outcome 0.0 % 0.0 % 
Groups  0.0 % 
Individual  0.0 % 
Influence  0.0 % 
PSF 
Stage  0.0 % 
Table 17: Amount of “Unknown” classifications in study 2 and 4 
 
As can be seen the existing categories within the framework were able to account for 
almost all of the error events analysed in the two empirical studies. In those few cases 
where a relatively high level of unknown classifications was found this was mainly 
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related to insufficient information available in the data material (in particular from the 
pilot’s perspective). In the case with the high amount of unknown classifications for 
procedural violations this was basically a reflection of the fact that the classifiers did not 
possess a sufficient degree of domain knowledge to make the classification in these cases. 
In the analysis of the PSFs similar positive results were obtained insofar as no unknown 
categories were used (see Table 15). 
 
Just as important as it is to ensure that the main types of phenomena within the area of 
interest are covered it is also important to avoid having unnecessary dimensions and 
categories within the framework. In this thesis the framework has been applied to several 
different types of data material and the results have revealed that the variation within the 
individual dimensions is to some extent dependent on the type of data material being 
used. For example, it is clear that within the dimensions of detection stage and source 
little variation was found in the incident study (study 1) and the critical incident study 
(study 4). In these cases a large amount of errors are detected at the outcome stage and on 
the basis of system feedback. However, these two dimensions showed a much more 
varied pattern in the study based on simulator data (study 2). As a consequence of this, it 
can be concluded that their relevance is to some extent dependent on which type of data 
material that is being analysed. 
 
In relation to the PSFs most categories within the different main dimensions were used 
even though the sample used in study 4 was very limited. This indicated that most of the 
main dimensions as well as their subcategories seemed relevant for the error management 
analysis. The only noteworthy exception was “Company, Management and Regulatory 
Factors” where only one subcategory was used from the extensive list. This might 
indicate that most of these categories are too abstract to be useful in understanding their 
effect on concrete errors. In other words, these categories are too far removed from the 
activities at the front-line to be able to determine a relationship with the concrete errors 
committed.  
 
Finally, some indication of the comprehensiveness of the framework could also be 
obtained from the questionnaire study. Even though the issue of comprehensiveness was 
not explicitly addressed in this study several of the comments from the participants 
clearly revealed that they felt that the framework widely covered most of the important 
issues within the area of error management.  
 
12.3 Diagnosticity 
 
There were several requirements in relation to the diagnosticity of the framework. The 
first of these was that the framework should have a psychological cognitive basis that 
would allow insight into the underlying mechanisms of error production and recovery. 
The second was that the framework should adequately encompass contextual factors that 
influenced the error and error management events. These two issues have been given 
elaborate attention during the literature review and been incorporated into the framework 
core and the PSFs, respectively. In addition to these requirements there were a number of 
 224
hypotheses that concerned how the framework should “behave”. The question was here 
whether the results from the pattern analysis corresponded with theoretical expectations 
and previous research. In this context a series of hypotheses were previously formulated: 
 
Error: 
 
• Hypothesis 1: Long-term memory errors will be more frequent among novices.  
 
A way to explore this hypothesis is to compare the error distribution from the simulator 
study (study 2) and the critical incident study (study 4). In the simulator study the ATCOs 
were trainees whereas the ATCOs in the critical incident studies were experienced 
controllers. The distribution of errors in the two studies is shown in the chart below (SIM 
is the simulator study with the novice ATCOs; CIT is the critical incident study with the 
experienced ATCOs). As can be seen in the chart there is a significant variation of error 
types in the two studies, Χ2(4, N=391)=84.93, P<0.001. In this context long-term 
memory errors contribute significantly to the interaction (AR=5.2). 
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Figure 55: Interaction between cognitive domain and type of data material. 
 
Error and error detector: 
 
• Hypothesis 2: Response Execution errors are most frequently self-detected  
 
In study 2 a large amount of response execution errors was committed and consequently 
this constituted the best foundation for exploring this hypothesis. Here the interaction 
analysis clearly demonstrated an overall interaction between error and detector (see 
Figure 33) and, more specifically, that the error producer has a large tendency to detect 
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his or her own response execution errors (AR=7.64). Consequently, this hypothesis was 
confirmed. 
 
• Hypothesis 3: Decision-making errors are either not detected at all or detected by 
others  
 
This hypothesis can be explored by analysing the interaction between cognitive domain 
and outcome within the three empirical studies.  
 
Study 1 
 
In the chart below is shown the interaction between cognitive domain and detector from 
study 1, Χ (9, N=64)=36.12, P<0.001. The figure clearly shows that most frequently 
decision-making errors are detected by no one (AR=5.32).  
2
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Figure 56: Interaction between cognitive domain and error detector. 
 
Study 2 
 
In the analysis of the interaction between cognitive domain and detector an overall 
interaction was found, but no interaction between decision-making errors and no-
detection was found (please refer to Figure 33). However, the results from study 2 
demonstrated an interaction between decision-making errors and detection by others 
insofar as decision-making errors were frequently detected by the instructor present in the 
scenario (AR=2.10) and these were rarely detected by the error producer (AR=-2.57).  
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Study 4 
 
In this study a large majority of the errors were decision-making errors and, 
consequently, it was not possible to find an interaction between cognitive domain and 
detector. However, if we look at the distribution of error detectors associated with 
decision-making errors in study 4 it is clear that other people are most frequently 
involved in the detection of decision-making errors – in this case an ATCO colleague, 
Χ2(4, N=48)=32.83, P<0.001. This might be a result of reporting bias insofar as people 
might prefer to tell about incidents where they played a positive role rather than a 
negative role (i.e. the participants reported frequently about episodes where they 
discovered errors committed by either a colleague or pilot). Nonetheless, the study 
confirmed together with study 2 that other people might be critical in relation to detecting 
decision-making errors. 
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Figure 57: Distribution of error detector of decision-making errors. 
 
In sum, on the basis of these three studies it has been demonstrated that decision-making 
errors are frequently detected either by no one or by another person than the error 
perpetrator: Study 1 showed that decision-making errors are frequently not discovered by 
anyone involved in the error scenarios. On the other hand, the results from the two other 
studies showed the detection by other people is dependent on the type of context being 
analysed. 
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• Hypothesis 4: Long-term memory errors are either not detected at all or detected 
by others.  
 
In study 2 in the analysis of the interaction between cognitive domain and error detector 
(Figure 33) it was demonstrated that long-term memory errors frequently were not 
detected by anyone (AR=6.28) or by the instructor (AR=2.80). In this manner both parts 
of this hypothesis were confirmed in this study. 
 
• Hypothesis 5: Error detection by others depends on the amount of context-
sharing.  
 
A way to explore this hypothesis is by analysing the errors committed by ATCOs and 
look at the distribution of errors detected by pilots and ATCO colleagues, respectively. 
The results from the three empirical studies are shown in the chart below. As can be seen 
in all three studies there was a clear tendency in the same direction: Errors committed by 
an ATCO were far more frequently detected by a colleague than a pilot, Χ2(1, 
N=90)=25.13, P<0.00118. This result indicates that context-sharing is an important 
parameter in relation to detection by others (please note that in study 2 – the simulator 
study - detection by instructor has not been included so the data only cover the colleague 
present in the scenario). 
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Figure 58: Detector of ATCO errors in the three studies. 
 
                                                 
18 This analysis is based on main effect – not interaction effect. It has been done by the use of Wald Statistics. 
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Errors and Detection stage: 
 
• Hypothesis 6: Response Execution will be more frequently detected at the 
execution stage. 
 
In study 2 it was demonstrated there was an interaction between cognitive domain and 
detection stage (Figure 33). More specifically, the results showed that there was a 
significant relationship between response execution errors and detection at the execution 
stage (AR=7.98). Hence, the hypothesis was confirmed. 
 
• Hypothesis 7: Errors found in incidents reports will have a tendency to be more 
frequently detected at the outcome stage compared with errors committed in 
normal operations. 
 
A comparison of the detection stage of errors found in the simulator study and the errors 
found in the critical incident study is shown in the chart below. As can be seen there is a 
very clear relationship between the detection stage and the two types of data material, 
Χ2(2, N=346)=87.58, P<0.001. More specifically, detection happened more frequently at 
the outcome stage in the critical incident study (AR=9.4). The conclusion should, 
however, be treated with some modification because it was not possible to obtain a 
satisfactory level of reliability in the classifications of detection stage in study 4 (i.e. the 
critical incident study). 
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Figure 59: Interaction between detection stage and type of data material. 
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Error correction and problem-solving: 
 
• Hypothesis 8: The problem-solving process associated with error recovery will 
vary in such a way that ‘Ignore’/’Apply rule’ will be most frequent and ‘Choose 
option’/‘Create solution’ the least frequent.  
 
In study 4 the different kinds of problem-solving were explored. Here it was clearly 
revealed that most error situations were associated with a non-resource demanding 
problem-solving strategy. The error (or its consequences) was either ignored or could be 
responded to by applying a straightforward resolution process (Figure 46). Only in rare 
cases was it necessary to use more resource-intensive processes associated with the 
‘Choose rule’ and ‘Create solution’ situations. 
 
• Hypothesis 9: The errors that are ignored are frequently inconsequential  
 
This hypothesis was based on the expectation that error management to some degree is 
regulated on the basis of metaknowledge concerning which errors are relevant to recover 
and which are not relevant. This hypothesis was explored in study 4. More specifically, 
the interaction between the decision-making associated with the correction of errors 
(ignore vs. respond) and the outcome (consequential vs. inconsequential) was examined 
(see Figure 50). The interaction found was close to being significant, Χ2(1, N=76)=3.60, 
P=0.067. The trend was that errors that are ignored are frequently associated with 
inconsequential outcomes (AR=1.90) whereas errors that are responded to are frequently 
associated with consequences (AR=1.90). In sum, even though the hypothesis could not 
be confirmed the results were close to being significant and in the expected direction. 
This might be a result of a type-2 error. 
 
Errors and their consequences: 
 
• Hypothesis 10: Response execution errors (including speech or action errors) 
should be easier to detect than other errors (lapses and mistakes).  
 
As can be seen in Figure 55 response execution errors were relatively much more 
frequent in the simulator scenarios than in the critical incidents (AR=3.9). Consequently, 
the hypothesis was confirmed. 
 
• Hypothesis 11: Decision-making errors are more often associated with undesired 
states.  
 
This hypothesis can also be examined by looking at Figure 55. Here it can be seen that 
decision-making errors are much more frequent in the critical incident scenarios than in 
the simulator scenarios (AR=8.7). 
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• Hypothesis 12: Most errors in everyday-life everyday situations will be 
inconsequential.  
 
A way to explore this hypothesis is by comparing the outcome of the errors found in the 
simulator study and the critical incident study. As it can be seen in the figure below there 
is a clear interaction between the type of data material and the outcome, Χ2(2, 
N=438)=150.87, P<0.001. In the simulator study a relatively larger amount of 
inconsequential errors were found (AR=11.9) and, conversely, in the critical incident 
study a far larger amount of errors leading to an undesired state (AR=12.0). 
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Figure 60: Interaction between outcome and type of data material. 
 
• Hypothesis 13: Procedural violations will frequently be inconsequential.  
 
Only in study 4 were procedural violations explored. It was not possible to confirm the 
hypothesis (see Figure 49). The results revealed that the interaction was not significant 
(Χ2(2, N=39)=4.71, P=0.101), but this might be the result of a type-2 error. This is 
supported by the fact that only a very small sample was available in this study (that is, the 
study was based on a small sample and at the same time many cases were not used in the 
analysis because they were classified as unknown due to an insufficient degree of domain 
knowledge of the classifiers). To examine whether this was the case it was decided to 
identify procedural violations in the incident reports from study one and try to collapse 
the results from study 1 (Swedish incident reports) and study 4 (Scandinavian Critical 
Incidents). On this basis a total of 68 decision-making events were available. The results 
of the interaction between procedural violations and outcome are shown below. The 
interaction is significant (Χ2(2, N=68)=6.35, P=0.037): Procedural violations have a 
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tendency to be inconsequential (AR=2.30) and non-procedural violations have a tendency 
to lead to an undesired state (AR=2.04). 
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Figure 61: Interaction between procedural violation and outcome (based on study 1 
and 4). 
 
As previously suggested, the interpretation of this is that people build up a certain 
knowledge concerning the relevance and risk associated with different kinds of decisions, 
including procedural violations. Hence, some types of procedural violations will be 
considered less dangerous or problematic compared with others (Helmreich et al., 2001). 
For example, not providing traffic information after a conflict resolution or not using the 
term “avoiding action” when resolving a conflict will normally be less dangerous 
violations. On the other hand, if a controller becomes overambitous and give take-off 
clearances with a less than required separation between the aircraft this could easily lead 
to a critical situation. Consequently, the above results should not be taken as an argument 
for not adhering to the procedures and, as can be seen in the figure, a series of procedural 
violations actually lead to undesired states. 
 
Did the results provide new insights? 
 
The framework has not only been useful in verifying a number of a priori defined 
hypotheses, but also in uncovering previously unknown patterns in the data material from 
the different studies. In particular, the results from the empirical studies have provided 
support for the importance of linking the issues of team resource management and error 
management. On a positive note it was, for example, demonstrated in study 2 that 
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perception and working memory errors are frequently discovered through the assistance 
of a colleague. Another interesting result from this study was that decision-making errors 
are – when they get discovered - frequently detected through external communication. 
This result indicates the importance of clearly externalising the plans as a critical factor 
for detecting errors at an early point in time. On a more negative note, it was 
demonstrated in the analysis of PSFs in study 4 that “social and teams factors” were 
frequently negatively associated with error management in the critical incidents. In 
particular, issues such as “team climate and authority gradient” and “verbal statements of 
plans/challenging plans” seemed to have a negative effect on the error management. 
Consequently, there is empirical support that error management can be both 
constructively and adversely affected by the team dynamics. Such results suggest that 
error management should be the overarching rationale in CRM and TRM training 
programs (Helmreich & Merritt, 2000). 
 
On a more general level the results from the empirical studies provided support for the 
notion that human operators are normally very good at detecting and correcting the errors 
that are committed by themselves or their colleagues (Wioland & Amalberti, 1996). This 
can, for example, be seen in the figure below that illustrates the distribution of error 
responses in the three studies19. The main effect for response is highly significant, Χ2(4, 
N=439)=33.35, P<0.001. As can be seen, the amount of errors (or their consequences) 
that are eventually trapped or mitigated is ranging from 56.8 % (study 4) to 71.6 % (study 
2). In other words, a large part of the errors are caught while there is still a chance to do 
something about it. Since system warnings only had a minimal contribution to the 
detection and correction of errors or their consequences in all three studies, these results 
are important to highlight the positive contribution of the human actor in relation to 
containing the errors that are produced. Hence, it can be concluded that error recovery is 
“more than sheer luck or coincidence” (Van der Schaaf, 1995). 
 
                                                 
19 Please notice that for study 2 the instructor’s contribution is included in the tabulation. However, if removing the 
errors that were detected and/or corrected by the instructor the relative distribution does not change very much: 123 
are trapped/mitigated (68%), 0 are exacerbated (0%) and 58 are not responded to (32%). 
 233
 0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
Study number
Er
ro
r r
es
po
ns
e  
Fail to respond
Exacerbate
Trap/mitigate
Fail to respond 37 (29.8) 70 (79.2) 32 (30.1) 
Exacerbate 0 (2.1) 1 (5.7) 9 (2.2) 
Trap/mitigate 57 (62.1) 179 (165.2) 54 (62.8) 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 4 
 
Figure 62: Distribution of responses in the three empirical studies. 
 
Summary 
 
The studies reported in this project have been somehow limited by the fact that only a 
modest sample of error events was collected from each of these studies. This is a direct 
consequence of the fact that it was decided to use the framework on a series of different 
kinds of data material and consequently the amount of data that could be obtained from 
the individual studies would have to be restricted. In spite of this, the exploration of the a 
priori defined hypotheses, as well as the new insights generated by the use of the 
framework, clearly revealed that the framework has a high degree of diagnosticity. 
 
12.4 Usability 
 
Even though the framework is comprehensive, attempts were made to ensure that it still 
maintained its usability. This included both employing categories that were easy to 
understand and at the same time were practically relevant. 
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Are the categories easy to understand and use? 
 
Deliberate attempts were made to optimise the usability of the framework. For example, 
the categories associated with the detection source were chosen because they seemed to 
make intuitively sense. In principle, it was possible to split this dimension into much 
finer-grained categories as the ones described in the literature review. However, it was 
expected that this would jeopardise the reliability and usability of the taxonomy by 
introducing very subtle distinctions. It was therefore chosen to use a rougher but also 
easier applicable categorisation. Similar deliberations were made in relation to other 
dimensions such as the how-correction dimension where the problem-solving terms were 
chosen on the basis of using terms that are easy to grasp. Even though considerations 
have been given to develop a framework with a high degree of usability it should be 
emphasised that it is – as previously mentioned – difficult to develop a framework that 
displays a high level of diagnosticity and usability at the same time. Therefore, the 
framework will require some degree of familiarisation and training before it is possible to 
apply the concepts in a consistent manner. 
 
Are the categories practically relevant? 
 
In the questionnaire study human factors experts were asked to give their opinion about 
the relevance of the framework. The results revealed that both the overall structure of the 
framework as well as the individual dimensions received a high level of expert 
acceptance (all average ratings were somewhere between relevant and highly relevant). 
Actually, several of the comments also indicated that framework could be relevant in 
error management studies in other contexts – such as the maritime domain and process 
control. 
 
12.5 Conclusion 
 
The validity of the framework is largely dependent on whether it would be able to satisfy 
the defined criteria: reliability, comprehensiveness, diagnosticity and usability. The 
results from the empirical studies indicate that the framework is able to comply with 
these four criteria. Consequently, the framework can be said to have demonstrated a 
certain degree of utility in relation to error management studies. 
 
A couple of minor modifications could be recommended on the basis of the empirical 
studies: 
 
• First, the relevance of the when-dimension should be considered. In the 
questionnaire study it received the lowest average rating among the core 
components of the framework. Also some of the comments from the participants 
questioned the relevance of this item. Finally, the reliability analysis of this item 
in the critical incident study revealed a less-than-acceptable level of agreement. 
These results indicate that the when-dimension should be removed from the 
framework. 
 235
 
• Second, the relevance of the “Company, Management and Regulatory Factors” 
group of the PSFs should be considered. Even though this dimension received a 
high average rating in the questionnaire study, the critical incident study revealed 
that this group was rarely used in the classifications. Actually, only one subgroup 
was used in this context. Even though a small database was used in the study the 
results indicate that this group of PSFs might be of less relevance compared with 
the other PSF-dimensions in error management studies. This might, in particular, 
be the case in relation to incident reports where the level of inquiry into the 
underlying causal factors is less detailed compared with accident reports. In other 
words, for these organisational factors to be of relevance it would require a very 
thorough investigation which is normally only seen in accident reports. 
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13 Summary and conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study was to develop and validate an error management framework. 
To achieve this goal an extensive literature review was conducted. This included both a 
review of existing error and error management taxonomies as well as performance 
shaping factors that may influence the whole process from error production to error 
recovery. The review of the error taxonomies was focused on identifying a relevant 
framework among the already existing frameworks. The review of the error management 
literature was focused on how it was possible to integrate empirical studies and available 
taxonomies into a coherent error management framework. Finally, the review of 
Performance Shaping Factors provided a foundation for generating a condensed list of 
positive and negative factors that could influence the error and error management 
process. 
 
An error management taxonomy was generated on the basis of the literature review and 
analysis of different kinds of empirical material. The core of the framework consisted of 
the following main dimensions: A threat management, an error and an error management 
section. The latter was designed in such a way that it was possible to answer four main 
questions: The who-, the how-, the when and the what-question. In addition, a list of 
performance shaping factors specifically addressing the Air Traffic Control environment 
was presented. In this way it should be possible to answer to the why-question. That is, 
why did the error occur and why was it successfully or unsuccessfully managed. 
 
Four different empirical studies were conducted to validate the framework. First, a pilot 
study was carried out on the basis of Swedish incident reports to get an initial indication 
of whether the core of the framework could successfully be applied to the analysis of real 
complex ATC scenarios. The results indicated that fairly robust analyses could be 
produced by the use of the conceptual framework. The second study used simulator 
scenarios from an ATC training curriculum. Here it was possible to analyse error events 
that in many ways are comparable with those that occur on a normal everyday basis in 
ATC. The third study was a questionnaire study where different human factors experts 
provided their opinion about the framework. This feedback provided the means for 
determining the face and content validity of the framework as well as refining the 
framework. The final study focused on analysing a series of cases generated on the basis 
of the critical incident technique. Here it was possible to test out a full-scale version of 
the framework. 
 
The empirical studies revealed that robust classifications could be obtained by the use of 
the framework. Both on the basis of intra- and inter-rater analyses a high level of 
reliability was obtained. In addition, analyses of patterns of both main effects and 
interactions between dimensions provided interesting insights. In particular, the analysis 
of interaction between dimensions was useful in supporting the analysis of the criterion 
validity of the framework. Actually, 12 out of the 13 a priori defined hypotheses - based 
on theoretical expectations and previous research – were confirmed by using the 
framework on the data material from the empirical studies. That the framework was able 
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to support a series of results from numerous other studies within the field of error 
management is an important quality of the framework because studies within this area 
have been limited by not having any overarching framework to integrate the different 
results within. Hence, the results give credence to the utility of the framework. 
Furthermore, the framework includes several dimensions that have not been adequately 
explored in the extant literature and might therefore pave the way for conducting new 
studies of the error management process. 
 
Error management is an issue of high importance in relation to ensuring safety within 
safety-critical work environments such as air traffic control. Suggestions concerning error 
management issues that should be given more attention in future research are given in the 
following. 
 
Combining sources of data 
 
Several different types of data material were used in the current project to validate the 
framework. It is interesting that the distributions of categories within the individual 
dimensions seemed to vary dependent on the type of data material. For example, in the 
critical incident study the pattern of error detection and correction was different from the 
two other studies. It is likely that this reflects a reporting bias associated with the events 
elicited through the critical incident technique. Many variations found were also 
dependent on whether or not the data material was based on observations from everyday 
error events (e.g. study 2) or based on critical episodes (e.g. study 1 and 4). The 
consequence of such variations is that conclusions about main effects based on a single 
type of data material should be treated with some caution. On the other hand, it can be 
expected that analyses based on several types of data material - and on interaction effects 
- should be far less vulnerable to potential distortions. Consequently, future studies could 
benefit from using several types of data material and on uncovering interaction effects 
within the framework. 
 
Larger database 
 
Some of the aspects of the framework were only covered in the final study based on 
critical incident reports – namely threat management, recovery related problem-solving 
and the performance shaping factors (both positive and negative). The results from the 
classifications revealed that these issues - which have been given insufficient attention in 
the extant literature - could be applied consistently to real-life cases if sufficient 
information was elicited. However, a limitation is that only a small database could be 
generated and, consequently, more extensive studies related to these dimensions and their 
interaction with other dimensions within the framework might be a useful scientific 
endeavour. Such studies should preferably focus on both normal operations and on 
critical incidents. 
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More comprehensive incident reports 
 
To be able to expand on the knowledge about error management it is clear that incident 
reports can constitute an important source of information in future studies (see e.g. Van 
der Schaaf, 1988). However, for these reports to be useful it is desirable that more focus 
in incident investigations and incident reports is given to the error management part. This 
was emphasised by the first study based on incidents reports that contained a high level 
of useful information related to the errors, but little information was available about what 
occurred after the error – that is, the processes lying behind how it was discovered and 
recovered. To be able to derive useful information about error management it is necessary 
to increase the awareness of the importance of error management outside the research 
community. Furthermore, it is important to be able to guide investigators with a 
conceptual framework – such as the one proposed in this project - that provides them 
with some guidelines about which issues to expand on.  
 
Error management in the future systems 
 
The air traffic control system is undergoing many challenging changes in the near future 
that might have implications for both the errors that will occur and the chances of 
discovering and recovering from these errors. The impetus for these changes grows out of 
the fact that the system is currently stretched to its capacity limit and rapid increases in 
traffic levels are envisaged for the near future. To be able to accommodate this 
development it is necessary to implement new equipment as well as considering new 
procedures for regulating the air traffic. Some examples of future research areas where 
the issue of error and error management should be given careful attention are given 
below: 
 
Datalink. A concept that has been given a lot of attention in recent years is datalink that 
allows replacing the traditional audio-voice communication between controller and pilot 
with an automated transfer of digital information (e.g. clearances and weather 
information). An important advantage of this solution is that it is possible to avoid 
problems with communication bottlenecks that can cause significant delays. Another 
benefit is that it is possible to avoid some of the notorious communication breakdowns 
associated with human perception and working memory (Wickens et al. 1998). This is 
related to the fact that both the ATCO and the pilot can have all information transferred 
available on a display and in this manner it is possible to avoid forgetting instructions 
(which especially is a risk in the case of lengthy sequences of instructions). Datalink may 
in similar vein be helpful in the detection of errors (e.g. having misunderstood or misread 
a clearance) insofar as the clearances are available for later reference. In spite of these 
potential advantages of datalink in relation to error and error management there are at the 
same time also some risks. Some examples are: (1) It can be more difficult to convey a 
sense of urgency in the digital communication compared with oral communication and, 
consequently, some instructions might not be adhered to as fast as they should be; (2) 
There is a risk of new types of errors – such as keystroke errors or pilots not asking for 
clarification – which might require unique solutions to ensure that they are trapped before 
leading to operational problems; (3) The party-line effect is removed insofar as pilots can 
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no longer listen to the communication between controllers and other pilots on the same 
frequency to which they are attuned. Consequently, pilots are deprived of a source of 
information that can be helpful in maintaining and updating their situation awareness – 
and, in some cases, can be a critical resource in relation to catching errors that can have 
consequences for the colleagues. 
 
Free flight. Free flight is a concept that has been proposed to enhance pilots’ possibilities 
of determining in real time optimum routes, speeds, and altitudes without being 
constrained by air traffic control. The idea is that the pilots should be allowed to fly to 
destinations directly which is far more cost- and time-effective than flying along fixed 
routes. Even though a high degree of autonomy is transferred to the pilots it is still the 
intention that the controllers should monitor the flight system and, in the case of safety 
critical circumstances, to be able to “bail out” pilots from these situations. Several factors 
might make this difficult for the controllers. First, it might be difficult to obtain the “big 
picture” if the controller is not actively involved in the process of controlling the aircraft 
(Willems & Truitt, 1999). Second, the fixed structure - which characterises the current 
airspace - will be replaced by a more unconstrained structure and the consequence of this 
is that it becomes more difficult to predict the future status of the aircraft and the chances 
of determining potential separation problems are thereby reduced (Endsley et al., 1997). 
Both of these factors may potentially reduce the ATCOs chances of effectively detecting 
and recovering from pilot-induced critical situations. 
 
Innovative concepts – such as the ones described above – will require changes in 
procedures, displays and automation and can have significant effects on the task 
performed by the human controller. They have the potential for both improving safety 
and efficiency, but at the same time there is a risk of compromising the human operator’s 
chances of ensuring safety. With the advent of new technologies and new operating 
philosophies there is a risk that new types of errors will emerge and at the same time the 
chances of recovery might be diminished. Since human errors cannot be completely 
avoided and some level of system unreliability is inevitable it is of paramount importance 
for safety to be maintained that the powerful human recovery abilities are not 
undermined. Hence, the development and evaluation of future initiatives aimed at safely 
enhancing the capacity of the air traffic system will require careful consideration of error 
and error management profiles if the strong safety record should be maintained. 
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14 Dansk resume (Danish summary) 
 
Hovedformålet med denne afhandling er at udvikle, validere og evaluere en 
fejlhåndteringstaksonomi (”error management taxonomy”), som kan anvendes til at 
analysere fejlbegivenheder indenfor flyveledelsesområdet. Idéen bag taksonomien er at 
gøre det muligt at analysere mekanismerne bag menneskelige fejl og deres genoprettelse. 
På nuværende tidspunkt eksisterer der en mængde taksonomier til at beskrive 
mekanismerne bag menneskelige fejl, hvorimod der eksisterer kun en begrænset viden 
omkring mekanismerne bag opdagelsen og genoprettelsen af fejl. Dette er uheldigt da 
hurtige og effektive indgreb kan ofte forhindre fejl i at have alvorlige konsekvenser for 
systemsikkerheden. Det forhåndenværende projekt prøver derfor at tilvejebringe mere 
viden omkring hvordan fejl bliver indfanget. Dette vil være et vigtigt fundament for at 
kunne udvikle strategier rettet imod at reducere kritiske hændelser. For at dette kan lade 
sig gøre er det vigtigt at have et struktureret klassifikationssystem, hvor operationelle 
data om udførelsen, opdagelsen og rettelsen af menneskelige fejl kan blive analyseret 
inkl. de bagvedliggende omstændigheder for fejlene og deres indfangning.  
 
Rapporten er inddelt i fire dele: 
 
Del 1 – Baggrund. I den første del bliver betydningen af menneskelige fejl og 
fejlhåndtering indenfor flyveledelse gennemgået. Ligeledes bliver der opstillet nogle 
generelle krav til en fejlhåndteringstaksonomi. For de læsere som ikke er bekendte med 
flyveledelsesområdet bliver der givet en kort beskrivelse af området. 
 
Del 2 – Litteraturgennemgang. I den anden del bliver der gennemgået den relevante 
litteratur for at afgøre, hvilke kategorier som skal inkluderes i 
fejlhåndteringstaksonomien. Fokus er på taksonomier forbundet med menneskelige fejl 
såvel som de begivenheder der går forud og efter fejlene. Før fejlens opståen er fokus 
især på, hvordan potentielt kritiske operationelle faktorer der kan lede til fejl – og måske 
bringe sikkerheden i fare - bevares under kontrol (”threat management”). I forbindelse 
med fasen efter fejlens opståen er der især fire emner, som vil blive beskrevet: hvem var 
involveret i opdagelsen og indfangningen af fejlen og/eller dens konsekvenser; hvornår 
blev fejlen eller konsekvenserne opdaget; hvordan blev fejlen og/eller dens konsekvenser 
opdaget og indfanget; og endelig hvad var reaktionen og udfaldet? Herudover bør det 
være muligt at kunne besvare hvorfor-spørgsmålet – nemlig hvorfor skete fejlen og 
hvorfor blev den effektivt eller ineffektivt håndteret? Dette kan bestemmes på basis af 
såkaldte ”Performance Shaping Factors” (PSFs), som kan ses som kontekstuelle faktorer, 
der kan have positiv eller negativ indflydelse på begivenhedsforløbet. 
 
Del 3 – Konstruktion af taksonomien. I den tredje del vil fejlhåndteringstaksonomien 
blive beskrevet. Den er udviklet på basis af litteraturgennemgangen og er desuden blevet 
tilpasset og testet på basis af hændelsesrapporter, interviews omkring kritiske hændelser 
og et simulator studie (resultaterne af disse beskrives i den næste del). Systemet er 
organiseret omkring en fejlhåndteringsmodel. Den består af to hovedkomponenter: 
Kernen i systemet er udviklet på basis af litteraturgennemgangen af fejl og 
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fejlhåndteringstaksonomier. Listen over kontekstuelle faktorer er udviklet på basis af 
gennemgangen af Performance Shaping Factors. 
 
Del 4 – Validering. Nytteværdien af fejlhåndteringstaksonomien i forbindelse med 
fejlbegivenhedsanalyser vil blive udforsket. Til dette formål er rammeværket blevet 
evalueret på basis af forskellige typer af datamateriale. For det første er værktøjet blevet 
anvendt på fejlbegivenheder fundet i kritiske hændelser (både svenske 
hændelsesrapporter og kritiske hændelser baseret på interviews med flyveledere) og i et 
simulatorstudie. På dette grundlag har det været muligt at få viden om det er muligt at 
opnå konsistente klassifikationer (på tværs af tid og personer) og yderligere har det været 
muligt at udforske mulighederne for at opdage interessante mønstre i disse forskellige 
typer af datamateriale. Systemet er også blevet evalueret v.h.a. af en række human factors 
eksperter, der har været involveret i forskning, som er højest relevant i forbindelse med 
dette projekt. På den måde har det været muligt at få en både kvantitativ og kvalitativ 
evaluering af systemet. 
 
Resultaterne fra studierne rettet imod at anvende værktøjet indikerer, at det er både 
muligt at opnå robuste analyser på basis af systemet, og det er muligt at verificere 
resultater fra andre studier såvel som at tilvejebringe nye indsigter. Yderligere viser 
resultaterne fra spørgeskemaundersøgelsen, at eksperter mener, at værktøjet er yderst 
relevant i forbindelse med studier af fejlhåndtering. Kort sagt viser resultaterne, at 
fejlhåndteringssystemet kan være nyttig i forbindelse med fremtidige 
fejlhåndteringsstudier. Særligt kunne det være et nyttigt redskab i forbindelse med 
analyse af virkningerne af en række sikkerhedsinitiativer indenfor flyveledelse – det være 
sig ændringer i system design, procedurer eller træning af personale. 
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Appendix A: Glossary  
 
 
ACC Area Control Centre 
Accident An event leading to physical harm or damage, brought 
about unintentionally. 
ADREP-2000 ADREP-2000 is a classification system that has been 
proposed by the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) for structuring the data analysis of aviation 
accidents. 
APP Approach Controller 
AR Adjusted Residual 
ATC 
 
Air Traffic Control 
ATCO 
 
Air Traffic Controller 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
BASIS British Airways Safety Information System 
CAA Civil Aviation Authorities 
Cognitive theory Theories of or pertaining to the mental processes of 
perception, memory, judgement, and reasoning. 
Construct 
validity 
Construct validity is probably the most difficult type of 
validity to establish and cannot be done within a single 
research study. It refers to the extent to which evidence 
points to the construct or concept being useful in a 
scientific endeavour. 
Content validity Relates to whether the methodology adequately 
represents the variety and balance of the field it purports to 
examine. 
Criterion 
validity 
 
A criterion can be seen as an already validated and 
accepted standard to which a measurement or 
methodology can be compared. 
Critical incident An unintended event which could have reduced, or did 
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reduce the safety margin of the system 
Critical Incident 
Technique 
Interview technique originally developed by the 
Flanagan (1954) as a systematic effort to gather incidents of 
effective and ineffective behaviour with respect to a 
designated activity. 
CRM Crew Resource Management 
Error Any action (or inaction) that potentially or actually 
results in negative system effects given the situation that 
other possibilities were available. This includes any 
deviation from operating procedures, good working 
practice or intentions. 
External validity Can the results be generalised to other situations or 
domains? 
Face validity Does the framework seem reasonable, using ‘common 
sense’? 
Failure Can be a technical or human failure 
Fault Equipment breaking down or ceasing to function 
FL Flight Level 
FPB Flight Progress Board 
FMS Flight Management System 
FPS Flight Progress Strip 
Framework 
model 
 
A frame or structure composed of a hierarchical set of 
theories which fit together and make up a coherent overall 
theory.  
HCI Human-Computer Interaction 
Hearback The procedure associated with listening to instruction 
read back by the pilot. 
HERA Human Error Reduction in ATM. Error taxonomy 
developed for the European organisation for Air Traffic 
Control (EUROCONTROL). 
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HRA Human Reliability Assessment 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
ILS Instrument Landing System 
Incident A critical occurrence that could have led to an accident 
if not recovered or spontaneously resolved. 
Interactive 
critiquing 
A concept that has been proposed to overcome the 
problems associated with the traditional cooperative 
architecture of decision aids. Instead of having the human 
to critique the computer the computer system will be 
assigned with the role of critiquing the system user’s 
problem-solving. 
Internal validity Are the results valid within a particular setting? 
LOSA Line Operations Safety Audit. Method where experts 
observe and collect data about crew behaviour and 
situational factors on normal flight. 
Mistake An error caused by an act where the intention itself was 
wrong. 
PSF Performance Shaping Factors 
Readback 
 
The procedure required by pilots when they have been 
given an instruction to repeat the instruction. 
Reliability Consistency of a methodology in providing the same 
results, e.g. among different observers (Inter-observer 
reliability) or repeatedly with the same observers (Intra-
observer reliability). 
Risk A chance or possibility of danger, loss or injury or other 
adverse consequence 
R/T Radio/Telephone 
SHEL-model In this model the focus is on the human component 
(i.e. the liveware) and its interaction with other main 
components within a socio-technical system. The 
components are given in the SHEL-acronym: Software, 
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Hardware, Environment and Liveware. 
Slip An error caused by an act where the intention was 
correct but the actual action was wrong. 
SRK framework A framework describing cognitive control mechanisms. 
Contains three distinct cognitive levels of problem solving 
activities: Skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge based 
performance. 
SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar, a radar-type system that 
requires a transponder to transmit a reply signal. 
STCA Short-Term Conflict Alert 
Taxonomy Classification, e.g. the systematic classification of 
phenomena into groups or taxa. 
TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System 
Threat Threats are operational factors that have the potential of 
jeopardising safety and require active operator involvement 
to maintain safety. 
Threat 
Management 
Threat management is the act of anticipating and 
minimising the potential consequences of threats on flight 
safety 
TRM Team Resource Management 
TWR Tower Controller 
Validation The process of determining the validity of a framework. 
Validity Validity is related to the degree to which a study 
accurately reflects or assesses the specific concept that a 
researcher is attempting to measure. 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
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Appendix B: PSF Taxonomies 
 
HERA PSFs 
• Traffic and Airspace are factors associated with the airspace which can 
influence the ATCOs task such as excessive traffic load, air space design 
characteristics and poor or unpredicted weather. 
• Pilot - Controller Communications describe factors that can influence 
breakdowns in the communication between the pilot and the controller 
such as pilot/language difficulties and pilot breaches of R/T standards. 
• Procedures and Documentation concern everything from problems 
with procedures (e.g. incomplete, poor, unclear or contradictionary) to 
inappropriate regulations and standards. 
• Training and Experience are factors that affect the individual ATCO's 
abilities and resources to respond to the demands encountered such as 
inexperience on position, inadequate specialist training (e.g. emergency 
training and TRM training) and inadequate time on position due to other 
duties. 
• Social and Team Factors are different kinds of factors associated with 
the communication and interaction between ATCOs such as unclear hand 
over/takeover, trust in others (over/under/miss) and inadequate 
assertiveness.  
• Workplace Design, HMI and Equipment Factors are the influences that 
are associated with the technical and design related aspects of the work 
environment and include radar failure and HMI-deficiencies (e.g. visibility 
and consistency). 
• Ambient Environment concerns disturbing factors such as noise, 
distraction (e.g. by supervisor or colleagues) and lighting (e.g. illumination 
and glare). 
• Person Related Factors concerns characteristics associated with the 
individual controllers such as fatigue, boredom, complacency and 
confidence in self and others.  
• Organisational Factors are factors associated with broader 
organisational issues that directly or indirectly can affect the working 
conditions of the controllers such as problems in the work environment 
(e.g. general understanding/manning levels, work scheduling and poor 
relations/confidence with management) and companies/commercial 
pressure. 
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ADREP-2000 
Liveware: 
• Personal physical and sensory limitations 
• Human physiology 
• Psychological limitations 
• Personal workload management 
• Experience, knowledge and regency 
 
Liveware (Human)-Environment Interface: 
• Physical environment 
• Psychosocial factors 
• Company, management, manning and regulatory issues 
• Operational task demands 
 
Liveware (Human)-Hardware/Software Interface: 
• Human and hardware interface 
• Inadequate information/data sources 
• Human firmware/software interface 
• Automation/automatic systems 
• Automatic defences/warnings 
• Operational material 
 
Liveware (Human)-System Support Interface: 
• Human/system interface procedures 
• Human/system interface training 
 
The Liveware (Human)-Liveware (Human) Interface: 
• The interface between humans in relation to communication 
• The interface between humans in relation to interaction/team skills 
crew/team resource management training 
• The interface between humans in relation to supervision 
• The interface between humans in relation to regulatory requirements 
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Recovery Influencing Factors 
• Factors relevant for prioritisation of recovery related tasks 
• Occurrence related factors 
• Person related factors 
• Social factors 
• Organisational factors 
• Technical/workplace/situational of factors 
 
ASAP Contributing Factors (Cockpit Crew Factors) 
• Physiological State 
• Memory/recall 
• Experience 
• Procedures selected 
• Procedural compliance 
• Setting priorities 
• Distributing workload 
• Situational awareness 
• Assessing threats to safety 
• Verbal statements of plans/challenging for clarification 
• Review status/modification of plans 
• Monitoring/cross-checking of communications or settings 
 
BASIS 
• Crew actions. This group includes, among other things, the error types 
from Reason’s model of human performance and Helmreich’s CRM team 
skills.  
• Personal influences. This group is concerned with the subjective state of 
the individual actor and includes e.g. boredom, personal stress and 
tiredness. 
• Organisational influences. These factors are under the control and 
responsibility of the company such as training and technical support. 
• Informational influences. These are influences related to the operational 
information and materials such as standard operating procedures and 
electronic checklists 
• Environmental influences. These are influences outside the control of the 
company such as the ATC services and technical failures. 
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Appendix C: Interview guide 
 
Briefing 
“The present study will seek to gain more knowledge of how potential critical 
situations are captured in operational practice. In other words, it is the positive side of 
the critical incidents that we are interested in - that is, how you managed to detect and 
recover (which requires skills and knowledge), and not so much what caused the 
problem in the first place.  
 
The main purpose of this interview is to gather and analyse a record of ATM-related 
potential critical incidents and how they were discovered and recovered. In other 
words, I am very much interested in hearing your descriptions of specific situations 
which could have led to a dangerous outcome if not discovered. For the specific 
situations I focus on it is important that 
 
(1) You played a central role in the discovery and/or recovery of the situation. 
(2) The situation occurred recently (e.g. within a year). 
 
It should be emphasised that a substantive negative outcome is not required. The 
focus is on events that have the potential of negatively impacting safety, but do not 
fall within the category of “reportable” incidents or accidents 
  
Please notice that even though I do have some basic knowledge concerning ATM, I 
am in no way expert and it may therefore be necessary to explain some of the 
concepts and abbreviations to us. 
 
For practical reasons I would like to emphasise that this interview is strictly 
confidential and therefore no data that can be used to identify you or your colleagues 
will be reported. In particular, no feedback will be given to management about 
particulars of reports that could identify you or your colleagues or the ATM centre in 
question. 
 
The interview is expected to last between 45 and 60 minutes. Do you have any 
questions before we begin?" 
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Questions 
1: "Can you think of an experience that stands out in your mind as a critical situation? 
Could you please tell me what happened with as much detail as possible (what, where, 
when, who)? It would be helpful if you can make a drawing of the scenario." 
If the anecdote is not usable: "Do you have any other examples of critical situations?" 
Note 1: Be sure to get background information - such as the type of ATM position 
involved, the time of the day, number of people in the position and the workload. 
Note 2: When having heard the critical incidents, echo back a version to make sure 
you understand all the details and can relate them clearly. 
2: "Why do you think the situation occurred? Were you aware in advance that 
problems could arise and, if so, did you make any initiatives to avoid or minimise 
them?" 
3: "Please tell me about the discovery of the problem. Who discovered the problem? 
When was the problem discovered? What source(s) of information was used (radar, 
strips, communication with pilots/controllers, etc.)? How was the problem realised? 
Where any attempts made at finding the root cause of the problem? Was it a problem 
you have (frequently) encountered in the past?" 
4: "Who recovered the situation? How was the situation recovered (e.g. What were 
your specific goals at the time? Did it require a routine or a more 'creative' response? 
Were you reminded of any previous experience? What specific training or experience 
was necessary or helpful in making the decision? Were other courses of action 
considered and, if so, why were they rejected? Was the time pressure and risk high?)" 
5: "What was done and what were the consequences (e.g. violation of separation 
standards, inconvenience to other people or inconsequential)? What do you think 
would have happened if no recovery was made?" 
7: "What could improve to prevent this event from reoccurring in the future? That is, 
do you think there are any lessons learned from this incident?" 
8: "If I should have some follow-up questions is it okay if I contact you again?" 
Note: Get E-mail, telephone number, etc. 
9: "I don't have any further questions. Is there anything that you would like to add or 
ask before we close this interview?" 
 
Debriefing 
A more elaborated description of the purpose and design of the interview is given, if 
wanted, after the tape recorder is stopped.  
 
